# AFF AT: K—Security

## FW

### Framework – 2AC

#### Framework: only compare competitive policy options

#### First, predictability – checks infinite regress to nit-picking individual words – incentive to shift goalposts to moot the 1AC and preclude AFF offense is unfair and disincentivizes in-depth research and analytical skills

#### Second, rejoinder – turns their offense – centering stasis on comparative solvency is key to critical purchase and avoiding cooption – if ALT solvency does NOT match the scope of their impacts, then links are NOT offense

Visoka 19 Gëzim Visoka, Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Dublin City University, “Critique and Alternativity in International Relations,” International Studies Review, 21(4), 2019, pp.678-704, DOI 10.1093/isr/viy065 /GoGreen!

More broadly, alternativity in critical IR theory needs to be rescued from never-ending conceptual reifications, which have ended up making ontological assentation about the world become completely detached from the world. In this regard, there is a growing realization in IR that “critique is a necessary but secondary task; the priority is to return to practical theory as quickly as possible” (Levine 2012, 69). Recalibrating the purpose of alternativity in critical theory requires recalibrating knowledge production, not only to unmask power relations and the dynamics of dominance and to create space for a politics of resistance but also to generate practical knowledge for political action that challenges, confronts, and disrupts existing power relations and offers alternative solutions for reshuffling social relations on more emancipatory and inclusive terms (see Duvall and Varadarajan 2003, 85; Murdie 2017; Deiana and McDonagh 2018). A feature of critical peace and conflict studies is a congruence between the emancipatory and problem-solving perspectives, which should be predicated on the conciliation of knowledge, the expansion of onto-politics of peace, and the pluralization of epistemological and methodological approaches. The recent methodological work by J. Samuel Barkin and Laura Sjoberg (2017) on interpretive quantification is a promising move toward this much-needed pluralist fertilization within critical theory. In particular, a stronger linkage between criticality, alternativity, and practicality could help critical security, peace, and conflict theories to offer alternatives that would maintain critical impetus while simultaneously strengthening ties to practical and societal problem-addressing solutions. Genealogical studies would blend well with a critical analysis of conceptual and policy alternatives (see Milliken 1999). Statistical analysis with an emancipatory hypothesis coupled with critical analysis would contribute to subverting policy practices and would normalize alternative knowledge about peace, justice, and emancipation.

The recent practice-turn in IR offers new bridges between scholars and practitioners, making it possible to translate critical knowledge into practice without compromising the normativity and criticality of scholarly works (see Bigo 2011). A forum on pragmatism published in this journal has implicitly highlighted the importance of alternativity in understanding global politics and generating impactful knowledge beyond the existing epistemological and methodological divides (see Hellmann 2009). Friedrichs and Kratochwil (2009, 701) have argued for “the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge.” Practicality is essential for generating alternatives. For instance, Jonna Nyman (2016, 142) argues that “a pragmatic, practice-centred approach . . . can help us gain practical knowledge of how security works and understand the value of security better, as well as help us to suggest alternative possibilities.” Similarly, Navnita Chadha Behera (2016, 154) argues: “theorizing in IR needs to step out of the rarefied atmosphere of its academe, develop a healthy scepticism toward its canonical frames, and open up to the possibilities of learning from everyday life and experiences of people and their living traditions and practices.” Practicality shifts the focus from abstract criticality and normativity to contextual critiques that account for everyday practices and interactions. This would be essential for rescuing critique from becoming a postempirical endeavor.

Critical knowledge that engages with policy alternatives “is not only pragmatic, it is also politically enabling: it forces us away from instrumental problem-solving perspectives towards a wider framework of pragmatic thought where narrow instrumental goals are overridden by wider normative and political concerns” (Kurki 2013, 260). Such grounded critiques are crucial in order to expand non-prescriptive alternativity and exploring practical possibilities for social emancipation and change. For Steve Smith (2002: 202), “the acid test for the success of alternative and critical approaches is the extent to which they have led to empirically grounded work that explores the range and variety of world politics.” This would also be congruent with Daniel Levine's (2012, 30) concept of sustainable critique, which entails thinking in both practical and critical terms at once so that “IR could create a sustainably critical perspective on global politics that might then be turned back onto, and made to inform, ongoing policy debates and discourses.” Behera (2016, 154) further maintains that the “state-centric ontology of IR has effectively ended up dehumanizing the discipline in a way so that normally it has little to do with human relations, human needs, and the larger imperatives of humanity.” Generating practical alternatives would therefore require endorsing situated knowledge as an epistemological and methodological basis for any engagement with the real world. The work of feminists such as Donna Haraway (1988, 584) on situated standpoints is also relevant here because they offer “more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world.” Situated knowledge is, mostly, nonrepresentational knowledge, in that it is not firmly mediated through preexisting discourses. In this regard, promoting subjugated knowledge discourses and practices could be central to rejuvenating the emancipatory commitment of critical theory (see Doty 1996).

Situated alternatives could derive from emplaced and embodied knowledge and could have a more emancipatory character as they “bring forth the importance of recognizing, valuing, and employing marginalized voices by working from this perspective, as well as by reshaping research to include marginalized communities as part of knowledge production” (McHugh 2015, 62). For Robson and McCartan (2016, 3), “real world research looks to examine personal experience, social life and social systems, as well as related policies and initiatives. It endeavours to understand the lived in reality of people in society and its consequences.” Milja Kurki's (2013, 245) recent study of democracy promotion has approached alternativity from the perspective of policy provocations, which focus “on not prioritising one or another perspective, but rather on encouraging self-reflection by all practitioners, which in turn is considered as a key condition of seeking adequately pluralism-fostering reforms in concrete policy frameworks.” Kurki (2013, 248–51) further maintains that “instead of relying on objective knowledge and criteria, policy process can and should be attuned to the logic of interpretive, politicised and participatory judgements.” Her study is an excellent example of pragmatic congruence between criticality and alternativity, whereby policy alternatives are not geared toward totally improving or enhancing the current system but openly promote more pluralistic, reflexive, and emancipatory policies for democratization and peacebuilding.

Moreover, for these new grounds of critical alternativity to be introduced in practice, knowledge production should be decentered, decolonized, and “de-methodolised” (see Lisle 2014). R. B. J. Walker (2002, 265) has argued that “the key achievement of supposedly alternative and critical literatures over the past two decades has been to open up at least some possibility of asking questions about the location and character of the political.” As elaborated in this study, knowledge production in peace and conflict studies is predominantly based on Western epistemologies, which are shaped by specific cultures of thought, self-perpetuated epistemological superiority, and codified academic practices. Most of the international scholarship on postconflict societies derives from an unrepresentative body of knowledge, which tries to mediate, deviate, reinterpret, and, consequently, construct a different social reality that is interpreted through different measurements, reference points, and analytical concepts (see Latour 2005). This has greatly limited the possibility for proposing realizable alternatives. Due to these epistemological anomalies, there are growing calls in scholarship to decolonize knowledge from Eurocentric and Western dominance and instead to pursue more pluralist and particularist modes of knowledge (Smith 2012). For instance, Acharya and Buzan (2010, 2) have argued that IR theory should be “an open domain into which it is not unreasonable to expect non-Westerners to make a contribution at least proportional to the degree that they are involved in its practice.” Similarly, Andrew Hurrell (2016, 151) has proposed that “the pathway to a global IR will need to look beyond ‘IR’ and is likely to require new models for organizing social science research and knowledge production.” Decolonized epistemologies of peace would reverse the order of knowledge, placing the local first and then the regional and international as spatial and ontological scales for understanding peace processes (Visoka 2017). They would not operate in isolation but would engage in shaping global IR knowledge. Therefore, a genuine search for achievable alternatives should try to decolonize peace knowledge from Western and Eurocentric frameworks, interrogate decolonized knowledge and agencies, and explore the joint constitution of international intervention and local resistance (see Smith 2012; Memmi 2006). Local scholars often have rich knowledge, but the primary usage of it is not for instrumental purposes or for transferring and sharing with audiences of outsiders. Local knowledge is very much used to respond to narrow practical and everyday interests and needs and, as such, is embedded in the logic of generating sufficient knowledge to respond to specific circumstances.

In the context of peacebuilding, as examined in this article, generating alternatives from the ground up has the potential to bring about more sustainable forms of peace and reconciliation for groups and societies affected by violent conflict. Situated alternatives for emancipatory peace are more prone to avoiding co-optation by positivist and problem-solving epistemic predators, resulting thus in developing pluriversal political and peace orders beyond liberal peacebuilding and other Eurocentric impositions. From this situated perspective, emancipation could take the shape of “the transformation of structures and relationships of vulnerability through localized political action, aimed at the creation of spaces in people's lives so that they are enabled to make decisions and act beyond mere survival” (Basu and Nunes 2013, 69). Emancipatory alternatives would not be universal in their applications because such an attempt is not viable. Rather the focus should be on searching for practical emancipatory possibilities within a given context, time, space, and place (see Fierke 2007, 24). In other words, critiques with an adequate dose of alternativity are more likely to generate globally understandable and locally impactful knowledge. Nevertheless, alternativity does not necessarily have to be predicated on representative views of the world—it can also be a by-product of performing hope and imagined possibilities in global politics. Shapiro (2013, xiv) argues that critical thinking helps to “create the conditions of possibility for imaging alternative worlds.” That said, as the purpose of critical theory is emancipatory change, any alternative theoretical and empirical observation in service of improving the human conditions should generate a morally and practically acceptable standpoint. Because any attempt to establish an alternative interpretation inevitably “empowers a particular social and political standpoint” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 261). According to Ní Mhurchú and Shindo (2016, 5), “critique can help us to develop different ways of talking about, evaluating, doing and interrogating the changing nature of politics, relations and experiences of the international in a globalising world.” Hence, critique is inevitably implicated in world-making and, with a much clearer understanding of alternativity, can steer the thrust for world-changing in a more emancipatory, just, and inclusive direction.

Conclusion

Emancipation is a central feature of critical IR debates, but scholars often fail to develop alternatives or solutions achieving emancipation in practice. This article has examined the relationship between criticality and alternativity in IR in order to shed light on some of the most contested issues of critical theory, namely, the epistemological pathways for identifying the inconsistencies and flaws in existing knowledge and practices and the extent to which critical knowledge should generate alternative emancipatory possibilities. The article has argued that alternativity provides an opportunity for critical scholars to remain relevant without being affiliated with positivist logics of inquiry. In unpacking the conceptual contours, the article first explored how different branches of critical IR engage with the episteme of alternativity. The analysis found that although alternativity is often affiliated with problem-solving epistemologies, it has played a major role in shaping critical knowledge in IR. While this is acknowledged and endorsed at the epistemological level by a branch of critical scholars who engage in normative and reconstructive modes of critique, other scholars embedded in deconstructive modes of critique have disregarded the merits of alternativity in IR. The article has argued that, contrary to what is often assumed, alternativity is not incompatible with deconstructive or reconstructive critiques across different subdisciplines of IR. Yet critical IR debates, which have now become the new mainstream in IR, have failed to engage with the episteme of alternativity in a more empirical and practical sense. They preach emancipation but fail to develop tangible emancipatory alternatives.

As a result, there is a growing realization that, without tangible alternativity, critical theory risks losing its normative impetus and its ethical and emancipatory commitment, potentially becoming a post-epistemological vocation without politics. Critical knowledge without a dose of alternativity may examine the causes and consequences of subject matters but could fall short of reaching out to the wider policy community and the affected subjects where power relations reside, thus missing the opportunity to transform the structural, discursive, and performative practices that reproduce violence, inequality, and injustice on human and nonhuman ecology. To bridge this epistemological gap, the analysis in the second part of this article examined how alternativity features in peace and conflict studies, a disciplinary field known for adding normative, empirical, and practical substance to critical IR debates. The analysis offered a conceptual scoping of three modes of critique and alternativity in peace and conflict studies. The three modes of critique showed that a conjunction between criticality and alternativity is possible and that it is necessary to renew the practical and emancipatory potential of critical theory in IR. The three modes of alternativity in peace and conflict studies expose a spectrum of different critiques, ranging from those perspectives that disengage completely from conceptual and empirical alternatives, to more pragmatic and prescriptive approaches.

Critique-without-alternative represents one strand, which tends to avoid offering normative and practical alternatives to their critical reflections aimed at maintaining the conservative and radical impetus of critical theory and dissociating from problem-solving and policy-relevant methods of inquiry. This mode of critique is committed to revealing the weaknesses of peacebuilding interventions but refuses to offer any emancipatory and practical alternative on how to build sustainable peace after violent conflict. If the end goal of critical perspectives is achieving emancipation, then critique should not only be directed toward problematizing dominant discourses, practices, and policies but also needs to envisage political and practical alternatives rooted in ideational and material elements. In turn, the lack of an explicit emancipatory agenda limits their social and political impact and unintentionally validates the existing order. In response to this challenge, a new mode of critique has emerged, namely, critique-as-alternative, which exemplifies the optimal approach. Proponents of critique-as-alternative have remained committee to critical analysis, but most importantly, they have taken up the challenge of offering emancipatory knowledge that has practical relevance for vulnerable societies in global politics. Their main flaw, however, has been their inability to elaborate sufficiently their practical and emancipatory alternatives—a flaw that has opened up space for epistemic contestation and policy co-optation. Finally, the third mode of critique—critique-with-alternative—which is embedded in a positivist, problem-solving, and policy-driven logic of inquiry, offers alternatives that seek either to verify existing knowledge and the existing interventionary order or to reject other critical alternatives.

Looking at different modes of critique through the lens of alternativity in IR's subdiscipline of peace and conflict studies has provided interesting insights on the promise and limits of critical IR in shaping global politics. The analysis found that existing modes of critique have failed to develop elaborative emancipatory alternatives at both the conceptual and the practical levels. To infuse critique-with-alternative with emancipatory elements, expand the epistemological scope of critique-without-alternative, and operationalize further the practical solutions offered by this mode of critique, substantial changes are needed. This article has suggested exploring postparadigmatic approaches of inquiry in order to avoid existing epistemological entrapments and limitations, reclaiming the practical relevance of critical theory through pragmatic, reflexive, and situated alternatives—across the conceptual, normative, and empirical spectrums—and promoting decolonized, bottom-up methods of knowledge production. The existing modes of critique require pursuing more nonconflictual and postparadigmatic epistemologies, embracing situated knowledge and reclaiming and expanding its practical relevance, breaking away from geo-epistemological hierarchies, and opening up to post-Western IR. To conclude, promoting alternativity has the potential to rejuvenate critical scholarship embedded in the ethos of impactful engagement with the world without being co-opted by the policy world. The next challenge for scholars should not be whether alternativity and criticality are congruent but how emancipatory alternatives can renew the social and political purpose of critical theory and make an impact in the real world.

### Framework – 1AR

#### Reject their “critical theory *only*” framework — it precludes actually emancipatory scholarship.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 72)

Conclusion

IR theory has undoubtedly been ‘in a state of disarray’ for several decades now,96 and the approach espoused above does not necessarily seek to turn things around. One thing that praxeological deconstructionism, as a ‘third way’, seeks to do, however, is to show that efforts at theory building and social transformation are complementary in most cases; hence researchers should maintain the liberty to pick and choose from various perspectives to inform their particular case studies. Many theoretical approaches have had similar ambitions but I find that IR is still taking baby-steps towards what I have envisioned as a ‘third way’, which grows from the continuous frustration with the problem-solving/critical theory binary in the field. I insist on intellectual diversity and theoretical pluralism but at the same time diversity and pluralism should be underpinned by the need for genuine cross-communication and multi-disciplinarity. This escapes the ‘paradigmatic paramountcy’ of either rationalist or critical approaches,97 thereby improving dialogue and furthering disciplinary growth.

In sum, the case this paper has made is that, without the careful synthesis of the multiplicity of approaches and perspectives that best capture the field as ‘international’, thereby incorporating alternative and marginalised perspectives, the future of IR as a field that contributes meaningfully to addressing the problems of the day will remain untapped. So far, I have argued that deconstruction alone is not enough. One has to have a conversation after deconstruction and then try to reconstruct in both theoretical and pragmatic ways, bearing in mind the dangers of reconstruction. This would allow research not only to understand the world but also to change it. Some theorists who are set in their ways will ask: is synthesis of the IR field possible? Is it even desirable? I would say ‘yes’ to both questions. The need for a synthetic ‘third way’ has arisen; one that is neither essentialised as problem-solving nor critical, but which embraces some relevant assumptions of both. More importantly, nevertheless, IR theorists (particularly of the ‘post’ tradition) should get out of their ivory tower to espouse theories that are self-critical, meaningful and continually relevant to the human experiences of the agents/subjects they study. This is the purpose of theory!

#### Our framework solves their offense, but their framework links to ours.

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The second premise derives from some critical scholars’ refusal to offer specific alternatives. Richard Ashley (as well as many post-structural, postcolonial, and post-development scholars), for instance, will argue that it is not the goal of critical theory to provide alternatives, as such an endeavour defeats the self-reflexivity that undergirds the theory. But this is problematic because, while these theories reveal the agency in the theory, there is no clarity of purpose in terms of ‘actionable’ leeway for the agent. Also, instead of glorifying realism, for instance as offering a ‘timeless wisdom’,66 the followers in this camp should be more reflexive so as to overcome the inert determinism and parochialism that underpin their theorising. Closely related to the second justification is the argument that the purpose of both theoretical and empirical analyses is not only to understand the world but also to change it. This change is not possible if critical theorists engage solely in inward-looking critiques of existing theories without providing a programmatic understanding of what their perspectives entail or how the existing condition can improve. [end page 67] Additionally, as the need for theoretical pluralism becomes more apparent, PD assists in making sure the notion of ‘pluralism’ moves from being a buzzword to an actual practice. Essentially most IR theories have four main themes in common: power, order, structure and agency—although the emphasis placed on each of these elements differs from theory to theory. Praxeologically oriented deconstruction helps to elucidate these four components without taking any aspect of them for granted. The argument here recognises the ontological and epistemological difficulties one falls into when thinking of a ‘third way’—the difficulty of having so many established scholars and theorists disagree with the approach on many grounds, even including grounds of originality and usefulness. But the point is that, while we emphasise, for instance, what Ashley calls the ‘four p’s’—process, practice, power and politics67—we need to explore the structure and utility of the state in contemporary world politics—and by so doing unveil the axes of domination in existing structures. This is therefore an approach which symbolises the mutually constitutive synergies between knowledge/theory and praxis/practice, as explained below, rather than one that seeks to revolutionise the entire field of study by turning it upside down.

This approach does not simply seek to reimagine ‘deconstruction’ but rather attempts to show that deconstruction, without praxis, ends at a point which leaves the individual subject unable to ascertain what options of social transformation are available.68 The main contention in recent times has been between those who call themselves ‘rationalists’ and the ‘constructivists’, although neither possesses a concise set of theoretical and methodological assumptions that explain the entirety of IR. As the socio-political phenomena IR addresses are often subjective and context-specific, there is no ‘scientific truth’ to be had which will transcend space and time. The ontology of PD, as evident from Figure 1, is that there is no one world or ‘truth’ out there, if any, and in the same manner there is no single way of knowing or standard by which ‘good’ knowledge is measured. In this case ‘truth is always contingent, always a matter for debate and always partial’, meaning that ‘truth is not “out there”, waiting to be discovered’.69 Rather, there are multiple understandings which reside in [end page 68] different sites—times and spaces. A ‘third way’ is thus crucial, especially for people who are concerned with both discursive interpretations and real (emancipatory) alternatives.70 It is only in this way that the discipline can become transformative or pro-change while taking into cognisance the fact that change can occur from both within and outside established arenas of power. PD also shows that there is no point in ‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’; although the water is dirty, the baby can be saved lest the purpose of bathing the baby itself becomes self-defeating. This speaks to the freedom and flexibility this approach gives to the researcher in choosing from multiple perspectives.71

#### The most important question is: How can we actually make the world a better place? Only our framework asks it.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 66-67)

Contours of praxeological deconstructionism: research programme54

It remains problematic to think along the lines of the strict distinction Robert Cox makes between problem-solving or rationalist theories and critical or interpretivist theories of IR because in essence ‘[all] theory is political and [all] political action is theory-laden’.55 The rigidity that comes with the two main approaches, or ‘theoretical churches’, does no specific good to the field in general. While there is dignity in difference, there is hope in some degree of commonality. The approach being promoted here is more congenial to critical theory thanks to its reflexivity but it also embraces mixed methods. The quest is to problematise the ‘problem-solving/critical theory’ binary that we have been presented with in the field of IR, based on the argument that it is arbitrary and often a misrepresentation of the many theories and research traditions that often attempt to exhibit both characteristics. In some cases what is considered to be solving a problem actually solves nothing, since the theory can be so removed from the world ‘out there’ that it attempts to describe, revealing an overpowering ‘practicality deficit’ in the theory’s core assumptions.56

My proposition for a ‘third way’ is based on these premises: First, historically some critical theorists have borrowed from problem-solving theorists, and vice [end page 66] versa. For instance, a feminist theorist like Ann Tickner has attempted to reformulate realism.57 While there are many variants of feminism, some of them appear to begin their theorising with an acknowledgement of traditional realists such as Hans Morgenthau.58 The point here is that some critical theories seem to have built upon some of the assumptions of problem-solving theories, although others deconstruct and reject them outright. After all, Cynthia Enloe has argued that a book about international politics should leave one with a sense that ‘I can do something’, a more instrumental and affirmative orientation that most IR books lack.59

Let me note at this point that I find this approach receptive to the kind of scholarship being pursued by some critical feminist scholars. Such scholars have been successful at borrowing from problem-solving theories, yet still with a quest for progressive change. In their analysis of social movements, for instance, Meyer and Lupo argue that feminism’s uniqueness derives from its ability to consistently illuminate the relationship between self and community.60 Critical feminist scholarship is interested in processes of domination that are often silenced by the mainstream’s fetishism with the state, power and anarchy, a commitment that results from the ‘lived injustices’ or sufferings of marginalised groups.61 Thus, feminist scholars’ commitment to emancipatory politics is ‘aimed at transforming relations of inequality and domination’.62 Additionally, feminist scholars have carefully examined the concept of intersectionality, which mainly emphasises the interwoven nature of race, class, gender and sexuality in order to show the mutually constitutive nature of identity and structures of inequality.63 And ‘because intersectional knowledge is grounded in everyday lives of people of diverse backgrounds, it is seen as an important tool linking theory with practice’.64 These ‘feminist characteristics’ are elements that the approach espoused below identifies with and, in fact, I hope that the notion of PD will encourage discussions among scholars interested in progressive social change through research. As some critical scholars are already doing, we should particularly ask: ‘how should we do our research in order to increase the likelihood that it will actually help make the world a better place?’.65

#### No neg offense — critical theory and problem-solving theory aren’t mutually exclusive.

Andrews 13 — Nathan Andrews, Trudeau and Vanier Scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada), former Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at Queen's University (Canada), holds a Ph.D in Political Science from the University of Alberta (Canada), 2013 (“Beyond the Ivory Tower: A Case for ‘Praxeological Deconstructionism’ as a ‘Third Way’ in IR Theorising,” *Third World Quarterly*, Volume 34, Number 1, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Taylor & Francis Online, p. 59-60)

International Relations (IR) theory is typically divided into two: traditional (often known as problem-solving/rationalist) theory and critical (often referred to as reflectivist/interpretivist) theory. Traditional theories remain the most predominant in the field of study as they often have powerful proponents and a larger number of disciples. The Oxford English Dictionary defines tradition as ‘a long established and generally accepted custom or method of procedure, having almost the force of a law’.3 In this context anything ‘traditional’ is ‘observant [end page 59] of, bound by tradition’.4 The origins of the theories are what make them cohere as traditional theories of IR and include realism (neorealism and critical realism); the English School; and liberal theories (liberalism, neoliberalism, global governance and cosmopolitanism). These are theories that often dwell on ancient and classical writings from Aristotle to Voltaire, and are sometimes committed to (re)interpreting these writings as though they were written for this contemporary age. They are also traditional because they possess the force of law where, for instance, the ‘realist gambit’5 has been dominant as well as the (neo)liberal ‘common-sense’.6

Theories considered to be critical include feminism, post-structuralism, securitisation and postcolonialism, among others. The question then is: what makes them ‘critical’? As Steven Roach asserts, ‘what makes critical IR theory “critical” is its self-awareness as a theory’—an awareness woven into the critical traditions of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Habermas, Derrida and Butler7—and we can certainly add Michel Foucault among other post-Enlightenment French philosophers. It is argued that critical theory was introduced into IR in 1981 with the publication of Robert Cox’s Social Forces, States and World Orders and Richard K Ashley’s Political Realism and Human Interests.8 A discussion of the so-called ‘great debates’ will show that critical theorists are generally post- positivist and to a large extent anti-foundationalist in that they do not accept any objective, Archimedean point or standard by which ‘legitimate’ knowledge should be measured. And they are also postmodern in the sense that they oppose the teleological measurement of human progress that characterises Enlightenment thinking, in addition to their quest to deconstruct established interpretations (discourse) in order to ascertain their embedded ‘silences’. It is based on this common ontological and epistemological orientation that neo- Gramscian theory and deconstructionism manage to fit under critical IR theory.

The problem, however, is that couching the broader field into two binaries— what Cox in 1981 classified as problem-solving and critical theory, respectively—is a problematic simplification of the discussion of international relations. Although many people will agree that there is no pure form of these two main schools, some IR textbooks, course syllabuses and journal articles perpetuate this trend.9 This configuration of the field inhibits the multidimensional nature of the subject matter. In an attempt to reconcile the binary between problem-solving (rationalist) theories and critical (interpretivist) theory, this paper also tries to construct what can be considered a ‘third way’ in IR theorising for those who seek to transcend what is usually characteristic of either of these theoretical traditions. The crux of the entire paper is to explain why the contention here is to adopt a ‘third way’ (what I refer to as ‘praxeological deconstructionism’10) as opposed to the rationalist and reflectivist/interpretivist schools in IR theory. The quest is to make the discipline practically relevant in explaining the ‘here and now’ while not abandoning the need to be critical and self-reflexive in its theorising. Overall the paper initiates a purposive call for the dual goal of deconstruction and reconstruction, a normative and instrumental position that the ‘thick descriptions’ of most critical theorists (particularly those belonging to the ‘post-’ approaches) often fail to emphasise.11

### AT: Policy Failure

#### Reversing policy failure does NOT require methodological consistency, merely causal policy relevance – ALT makes it worse through theoretical reification and alienating policymakers

--reification = confusing deliberately oversimplified theory with the complex reality it attempts to describe

Desch 19 Michael C. Desch, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center at the University of Notre Dame, “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations,” Chapter 9, *Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security*, Princeton University Press, 2019, ISBN 978-0-691-18121-9, pp.250-251 /GoGreen!

There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71

There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, political science needs to rethink how it balances scholarly rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism, on one side, and scholastic irrelevance on the other.73 The best approach to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method (or all of them) but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these two principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can not only survive, but thrive, in political science.75

Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policy-relevant security studies scholarship. While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much of it can be a bad thing. In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 Theory is a powerful tool of statecraft, but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse.

Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue.

While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. In addition to doing these things, scholars should address pressing real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80

The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible.

### Scenario Analysis Good

#### Descriptive scenario analysis is vital to critical reflexivity – deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed epistemological assumptions, and empowers creativity and flexibility in thinking and advocacy

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Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.

Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.

This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.

What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.

The Art of Scenario Analysis

We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.

While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.

Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).

Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present.

Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry

The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.

Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8

An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.

In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.

The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.

The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

## IMPACT

### ! – Case Outweighs

#### Our threats are real and endorsing analysis of attendant existential risks is the only ethical approach

Baum 18 Seth D. Baum, and Anthony M. Barrett, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks,” *Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing*, ed. Vicki Bier, Routledge, 2018, pp.174–184 /GoGreen!

1. Introduction

The most extreme type of risk is the risk of a global catastrophe causing permanent worldwide destruction to human civilization. In the most extreme cases, human extinction could occur. Global catastrophic risk (GCR) is thus risk of events of the highest magnitude of consequences, and the risks merit serious attention even if the probabilities of such events are low. Indeed, a growing chorus of scholars rates GCR reduction as among the most important priorities for society today. Unfortunately, many analysts also estimate frighteningly high probabilities of global catastrophe, with one even stating “I think the odds are no better than fifty-fifty that our present civilization on Earth will survive to the end of the present century” (Rees 2003:8).

Regardless of what the probabilities are, it is clear that humanity today faces a variety of serious GCRs. To an extent, humanity always has faced GCRs, in the form of supervolcano eruptions, impacts from large asteroids and comets, and remnants of stellar explosions. Events like these have contributed to several mass extinction events across Earth’s history. The Toba volcano eruption about 70,000 years ago may have come close to bringing the human species to a premature end. However, scholars of GCR generally believe that today’s greatest risks derive from human activity. These GCRs include war with biological or nuclear weapons, extreme climate change and other environmental threats, and misuse or accidents involving powerful emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and synthetic biology. These GCRs threaten far greater destruction than was seen in the World Wars, the 1918 flu, the Black Death plague, or other major catastrophes of recent memory.

The high stakes and urgent threats of GCR demand careful analysis of the risks and the opportunities for addressing them. However, several factors make GCR difficult to analyze. One factor is the unprecedented nature of global catastrophes. Many of the catastrophes have never occurred in any form, and of course no previous global catastrophe has ever destroyed modern human civilization. The lack of precedent means that analysts cannot rely on historical data as much as they can for smaller, more frequent events. Another factor is the complexity of GCRs, involving global economic, political, and industrial systems, which present difficult analytical decisions about which details to include. Finally, the high stakes of GCR pose difficult dilemmas about the extent to which GCR reduction should be prioritized relative to other issues.

In this paper we present an overview of contemporary GCR scholarship and related issues for risk analysis and risk management. We focus less on the risks themselves, each of which merits its own dedicated treatment. Other references are recommended for the risks, perhaps the best of which are the relevant chapters of Bostrom and Ćirković (2008). Instead, our focus here is on overarching themes of importance to the breadth of the GCRs. The following section defines GCR in more detail and explains why many researchers consider it to be so important. Next, some of the analytical challenges that GCR poses and the techniques that have been developed to meet these challenges are explained. There follows a discussion of some dilemmas that arise when GCR reduction would require great sacrifice or would interfere with each other. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important?

Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004).

A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species.

Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives.

Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives.

Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization.

The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them.

While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

### Consequentialism Good

#### Evaluate causal consequences – subsumes the effects of representations – BUT conflating “causes” with “justifies” is ethically bankrupt

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The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an adequate framework for ethical evaluation and critique must include the comparison and evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can contribute to the quality of ethical critique by ensuring that a wide range of arguments are considered in making decisions, that all alternatives are taken into account and thoroughly criticized, and that people have to (at least) moderate their own partialities in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is oriented to action, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The primary activity in such discourse is practical argumentation, argumentation over action, over what is to be done (e.g. what policies should be adopted). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the primary analytical focus in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This does not exclude other familiar forms of analysis (such as analysing representations) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to create particular public attitudes and opinions, and thus legitimize or facilitate a particular course of action. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a normal part of everyday practical argumentation: people find reasons in favour and against proposals for action, they consider alternatives, adopt them or discard them, and so on. A course of action worthy of being adopted is one that has withstood criticism. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are likely to be instrumentally inadequate in relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them ethically problematic, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a form of practical argumentation (Fairclough 2013), open to the same critical questions that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA does not come out of thin air, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the primary focus of critical analysis in CDA should be practical argumentation and deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of what is to be done. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which (alternative) proposals are being tested. The framework for critical analysis of practical argumentation and deliberation which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an effective way of evaluating and critiquing discourse from an ethical point of view. One of its strengths is that it allows different approaches to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to filter out those practical conclusions (and corresponding decisions) that would not pass the test of critical questioning. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are tentatively supported by practical arguments from goals, and are tested in the light of their potential consequences, via practical arguments from consequence. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to expose potential negative consequences of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their acceptability or reasonableness: if the consequences are on balance unacceptable for those affected, then it would be more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action. Unacceptable consequences are critical objections which can conclusively rebut a proposal. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be chosen as the better proposal on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the most significant perspective in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a consequentialist one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is likely to result in a situation that is illegal or unjust, then the proposal can be evaluated as unacceptable from both a consequentialist ethics and a deontological ethical position. Our framework can therefore accommodate deontological ethical issues within a broader consequentialist perspective. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

### AT: ! – Self-Authorization

#### Their self-authorization internal link is backwards – NATO’s liberal identification empirically constrains exceptional justifications for violence – which do NOT map to a West/non-West divide

Gill-Tiney 22 Patrick Gill-Tiney, Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics, St. John’s College, Oxford, “A Liberal Peace?: The Growth of Liberal Norms and the Decline of Interstate Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 66(3), 2022, pp.413-442 /GoGreen!

This article shows that liberal interpretations of sovereignty, which emphasize international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms, have become increasingly prevalent in UN Security Council resolutions since 1970. Given that two non-western states, Russia/Soviet Union and China, are permanent members, I argue that the content of these resolutions reflects broad consensus between major powers—both western and non-western—as how these norms should be interpreted. This is not the same as arguing that these states share preferences or interests, rather, substantial differences remain, largely along the cleavage between the United States, Britain and France on the one hand and China and Russia on the other (Einsiedel and Malone 2018, 156-58).1 Yet, the collective positions of these states have evolved over time, suggesting a shift in how sovereignty is understood. The dominant role that these states have in shaping the international order means that their collective understandings may be taken as representative of the normative structure of international society at any point in time, with the expectation that this impacts all states in the system.2

I argue that as liberal interpretations of these fundamental norms increase, the likelihood of a dispute participant resorting to violence decreases. Through content analysis of all UN Security Council resolutions between 1970 and 2014 I first create a measure of the strength of liberal interpretations of sovereignty. This is then utilized in quantitative analysis of dispute participants in the period to explain the variation in the level of violence employed. I find statistical and substantive support for my theory, showing empirically that the growth in liberal norm interpretations is negatively associated with the likelihood of a state resorting to violence in an interstate dispute.

This is not to argue that structural arguments are wrong, far from it, nor is it to reject the roles of conventional and nuclear capabilities in shaping interstate conflict behavior. Rather, state power does matter, that is why the collective interpretations of the permanent members of the UN Security Council are used to understand the system. Domestic veto players, intergovernmental enforcement mechanisms, and trade dependency all do shape the responses of policymakers during an interstate dispute. However, the intersubjective ideas they carry with them into disputes are also crucial to understand why some disputes escalate, and others do not.

This article contributes to our understanding of the role that ideas have in shaping interstate conflict in two ways. Firstly, I contribute to the large literature which has sought to understand the role which norms play in selecting for certain behaviors over others. Most of the work within this area has been qualitative and has either charted the development of specific bundles of norms over long periods (Keene 2012, 2013; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sandholtz 2007) or focused on the life-cycle of specific norms (Eckstein 1988; Finnemore 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Krook and True 2012; Nadelmann 1990; Sandholtz 2007; Sandholtz and Stiles 2008). I build upon these insights by arguing that the norm of sovereignty has been re-interpreted over time, and that the collective nature of reinterpretation means that it can be used to examine its impact in interstate conflict.

Secondly, this article provides an innovative means of exploring ideas in a quantitative framework. The quantitative interstate conflict literature has heavily favored structural and power-based explanations for actor behavior. This has come at the particular expense of norms. Whilst there is widespread acceptance that norms matter amongst these scholars, they have tended to set aside norm-based explanations given the difficulty of objective measurement. This difficulty revolves around the problem of having surety that multiple actors share an idea, that is, intersubjective understanding. The most obvious sources of data to assess this would be a survey of policymakers or the content of international legal documents. This first avenue is incredibly difficult to gain anything but anecdotal responses too. Policymakers are hard to get access to and may misrepresent their own thoughts and actions to show themselves in as best light as possible. Ensuring that any respondents have understood the survey in the same way is difficult given language differences, whilst response rates are likely to be so low as to prevent a non-random sample from being acquired, even if the potential pool of relevant participants is widened to include all senior politicians and bureaucrats, both incumbent and preceding.

Some of these problems are resolved by utilizing the texts of international legal documents. Given that these are generally carefully and cautiously written the researcher is more certain that the drafters actually share an understanding of the topic. Recent work by Allee and co-authors (Allee, Elsig, and Lugg 2017; Allee and Lugg 2016) have innovatively utilized content analysis of interstate trade deals to explore how much is replicated in subsequent deals, which sheds light on the relative power of the participants. This has certainly gained deeper understanding of the topic, but is not a suitable approach for this research questions for two reasons. Firstly, these deals are generally drafted by small numbers of states, that is, they may not be assumed to represent the preferences and interests of nonparties. Secondly, whilst interpretations are spelled out, these may be mechanistic rather than ideational, making it unclear what the broader normative position may be. This is made more acute by the drafting being down by bureaucrats and lawyers rather than policymakers themselves. Whilst some direction is no-doubt given by the latter, assuming a high level is problematic. Utilizing the content of UN Security Council resolutions addresses these problems because the documents may be assumed to be political, that is, though member states are represented by ambassadors, a high-level of involvement by their state governments is typical given the importance attached to security issues. Moreover, since the permanent membership is diverse in interests and preferences, and these members can veto unpalatable resolutions, they may be reasonably assumed to provide insight into intersubjective understandings.

Existing Explanations of Interstate Conflict and the Role of Norms

Two existing literatures are built on here, firstly, the broad democratic peace literature, including its offshoots and opponents, and secondly, scholarship on the evolution of international norms. The former literature initially focused upon regime type, and over time has been widened to include more fine-grained analyses of domestic political structures in any state (Bell and Quek 2018; Fearon 1994; Gries et al. 2020; Huth and Allee 2002; Tomz, Weeks, and Yarhi-Milo 2020; Weeks 2012; Weiss 2013; Weiss and Dafoe 2019). However, the approach in all of these works is to examine structures, that is, formal institutional constraints encountered by decision makers, rather than norms, that is, the role of shared principles, perceptions and expectations of behavior. The distinction between norms and structure is not rigid. This is most clearly seen in the term “institution” which is commonly used to mean both formal structures which limit the agency of decision makers, but also a set of norms, rules, and practices which govern a specific area. To clarify the distinction being made in this article, I adapt the nomenclature used by Reus-Smit (1999) who distinguishes between constitutional institutions, norms without which a society of states could not exist, and fundamental institutions, which facilitate cooperation. The former includes sovereignty, as well as the rights of self-determination and nonintervention, and the latter contractual international law and the organizations which enforce it (both internal and external to states). In this article, I term the former “norms” and the latter “structures.”

The democratic peace literature has spurred several offshoots, the most relevant of which are those which have argued that rather than regime type the “peace” is generated by economic factors including trade interdependency and level of development (Gartzke 2007; Hegre 2000; Kim 2014; Kinne 2012; McDonald 2009, 2010; Mousseau 2013; Schneider and Gleditsch 2010) or shared intergovernmental organization membership (Appel 2018; Kinne 2013a, 2013b; Prorok and Appel 2014). More general critiques have argued that any effect seen is due to the prior settlement of territorial disputes (Gibler 2012; Gibler and Tir 2014; Owsiak 2012), nuclear weapons (Waltz 1990), alliances (Kydd 2005), unipolarity (Monteiro 2014) or military power (Layne 1994; Rosato 2003) instead. With the exception of the latter critiques, this debate has broadly accepted the importance of norms (Doyle 1986; Moravcsik 1997; Owen 1994; Russett and Oneal 2001), especially as the “good” functioning of domestic and international structures, particularly veto players, requires political actors to have the right norms.

This relationship between norms and structures has been more closely addressed through the focus on contracts, that is, to hone in on specific economic norms and structures characterized as allowing an economic market to function “with extensive and regularized transactions among strangers that require an element of trust” (Mousseau and Xiongwei 2018, sec. Emergence Contractualist Peace). This literature argues that the relationship between peace and democracy is spurious, and rather, that both are explained by “contracturalist” norms and structures (Gelpi and Grieco 2008; Mousseau, Hegre, and O’Neal 2003), which builds upon the work of (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Dahl 1997; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Yet, the literature still relies upon operationalizations which are essentially structural, that is, whilst recognizing the importance of norms, the empirical testing has fallen short.

A comparatively small subset of the literature has examined norms as an explanation for the democratic peace. For Deutsch (1957), though NATO is understood as a structure, a security community is more crucially formed around shared values (norms). Kahl argues that the basis of the democratic peace is collective identity rooted in liberal democracy interlinked by intergovernmental organizations (1998). For Risse, the influence of NATO allies upon the foreign policy of the United States demonstrates the importance of liberal norms, through a mechanism which relies upon the similarity of domestic political institutions in these liberal democracies and coalition-building (1995). Though valuable additions to the literature, and in Deutsch’s case systematic in its treatment of the subject, these works fail to tackle the question of whether the democratic peace is structural or norm based since the two are entwined throughout. The difficulty in conceptualizing, isolating and operationalizing norms is a clear problem. Broadly, it is hard to isolate a norm from either the structure in which it exists or from other norms for analysis. It is also a challenge to show that any norm is truly intersubjective in understanding or to measure its effect upon some outcome of interest. Yet, without attempts to do so we are left with a partial picture, particularly for those emphasizing the importance of structures—be these domestic or international—for reducing interstate conflict. In short, the existence of a domestic legislature, independent judiciary, or interstate treaties, is only relevant if the individuals which employ them do so appropriately. To understand this necessitates exploring the ideas in the heads of these individuals, and particularly, how these ideas are shared.

In contrast to the large, predominantly quantitative, literature which has examined the democratic peace and wider questions linking regime type to the onset, conduct and termination of interstate disputes and wars, the broader literature on interstate norms has tended to be qualitative and highly focused. This has resulted in detailed work on human rights (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2000), and nuclear weapons (Rublee and Cohen 2018; Tannenwald 1999). There is no doubt that this has contributed to our understanding of interstate relations, yet the clear shortcoming is generalizability. That is, the specificity of these approaches, necessary to make any form of causal claim, is in a sense also the undoing.

In this article I focus on the reinterpretation of the sovereignty norm by powerful states. I argue that they have a dominant role in shaping the normative landscape of the international system by being tasked with the interpretation of norms and the maintenance of international society (Hurrell 2007; Wight 1978; Saunders 2006). Operationalizing this, I utilize UN Security Council resolutions as a means of assessing what the consensus position of the permanent members is. Content analysis is used to examine the normative framing of resolutions, allowing both an exploration of change over time, and quantitative measures of the relative strength of these ideas to be derived which can then be used in regression analysis.

The Constraining Effect of Liberal Interpretations of Sovereignty

Norms are dynamic, and undergo processes of evolution, creation and destruction. Change may occur gradually as actors shift their understandings towards an alternative, or suddenly through systemic, and thereby social, change. In international relations, the latter is tightly linked to sudden shifts in great power authority, which has typically occurred due to defeat and a subsequent realignment of international order. War, and its aftermath, can lead to substantial rearrangements of international order, meaning both a new distribution of power, but also a re-interpretation of international society. In examining change in understandings of sovereignty I term gradual change “evolution” and sudden change “tectonic.”

Interpretations of Sovereignty

The post-World War Two era allows examination of both evolutionary and tectonic change in understandings of sovereignty. Evolution occurs during relative peace, whilst tectonic change is part of major realignments of international order. The end of the Cold War, though non-violent certainly led to significant power shifts, resulting in a tectonic change. The pre- and post-Cold War eras are eras of evolution. Assessing rivalrous interpretation of norms is crucial to understanding these changes. I outline a divergence between traditional and liberal interpretations which are used to examine change in norms, and the effect upon international conflict.

Over the post-World War Two period two interpretations of sovereignty have existed, firstly, that emphasizing territorial sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and secondly, that emphasizing international law, interdependence, free trade, democracy and individual rights and freedoms in international affairs. I term the former approach to sovereignty “traditional,” and the latter “liberal.” A liberal interpretation of sovereignty, therefore, is one which places emphasis upon the actions of states, particularly those between a government and its citizens. Sovereignty in this understanding implies not only the exercise of power over a territory and people (as in the traditional understanding), but also that there are limits to the exercise of power and duties to a people (Sandholtz and Stiles 2008, 287-88).3 This has been most clearly stated in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. I examine the relative balance between these two interpretations over time, arguing that this balance alters how sovereignty is understood, and thereby is related to the likelihood of escalation in interstate disputes.

My expectation is that the relative balance between these two modes of interpretation has shifted over the post-World War Two period to favor a liberal interpretation. This does not mean that traditional interpretations are irrelevant, rather, that they have been de-emphasized in international discourse relative to the latter. A spectrum in which purely traditional and purely liberal interpretations mark the poles is conceived of as existing, with great powers occupying positions between the two. The effect that this shift toward a liberal interpretation of sovereignty has occurred on international conflict escalation is now examined.

Understandings of Sovereignty and Conflict Escalation

How understandings of sovereignty impact international disputes may be explored in terms of the conflict life-cycle, that is, why a dispute emerges, why violent conflict breaks out, and how the conflict ends, or in terms of participant conduct during war. Here, I examine the effect of change in the collective understanding of sovereignty upon escalation, meaning that I assume the prior existence of international disputes. Whilst the effect of norms upon the onset of disputes is an important question, very few disputes result in the use of violence, that is, though onset is a necessary condition for violence, it is far from sufficient. I examine escalation from a nonviolent dispute to a violent dispute—the use of armed force in international relations—because this is of greater substantive significance to state leaders and their citizens. Moreover, whilst reducing the likelihood of dispute onset would likely result in less international violence, the more normatively important question is how to avoid escalation, as this reduces the costs of war: human death and economic destruction.

This is not to trivialize dispute onset, and logically we might expect the growth of liberal understandings of sovereignty to also reduce onset rates as well as escalation likelihood. However, there are two reasons why we may doubt the substantive significance of this, firstly, dispute onset is a relatively low threshold, and secondly, onset is often triggered by events beyond the direct control of a state. To this first point, a dispute simply means that two or more actors disagree over something, oftentimes the behavior of the other side or the distribution of some good (for instance, territory). This article utilizes Militarized Interstate Disputes as the operationalization of dispute, and many disputes are comparatively minor events, with the threshold being that one of the two parties has a minimum level of militarization as part of the dispute (for example, the issuance of a deterrent, or compellent, threat). A focus on onset, therefore, would prevent observation of substantively more important actions, that is, the actual use of force against another. Secondly, many disputes begin due to accident and/or the decision making of low-level military commanders or political officials who are neither in the position to consider national interests nor strategic interactions. This means that onset may essentially be an apolitical decision which takes little or no account of the broader strategic landscape nor the structural and normative context. It is after onset, that is, when escalation is considered by policymakers, that the stakes are higher and when causal mechanisms common to this topic are most active.

Escalation then, is a political decision. In making the choice to escalate, or not, policymakers are impacted by a range of strategic factors, but crucially, are also constrained by norms. The use of force in international relations must be justified, and since 1945 the UN Charter specifies just two: self-defense and collective peace enforcement. To this, we might also add humanitarian intervention, though this remains contested. As a baseline, therefore, when faced with dispute onset, policymakers must justify their actions with reference to one of these reasons. Moreover, in making the decision to escalate, policymakers are also constrained by liberal values which emphasize diplomacy, cooperation, international law, international organizations, the rights of the individual, and to question the legitimacy of the march to war. Taken together, this slows the decision to escalate, since legal justification is needed, diplomacy is necessary, and potential economic and human costs understood, calculated and defended. A shift toward liberal interpretations thereby means a reduced probability of escalation to violence, tacitly assuming that the risk of a dispute arising in the first-place is unchanged. This leads me to my first hypothesis, which relates to the evolution mechanism of change:

Hypothesis 1: Given an international dispute, the risk of escalation decreases as liberal interpretations increase.

An alternative explanation is that any impact of normative change is actually a result of the end of the Cold War, that is, the redistribution of power between great powers, typically resulting from system-wide conflict results in qualitative differences in interpretations of fundamental norms between peace-periods. Whilst the end of the Cold War did not involve a system-wide war, it did mark the end of sustained rivalry between great powers. The pre- and post- periods can thereby be compared. Given the rivalry of the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, and the relative dominance of the United States post-Cold War, we might expect qualitative differences in conflict behavior to be observable in the two time periods, attributable, perhaps, to a greater emphasis upon liberal interpretations in the post-Cold War era. The dramatic change in the distribution of power triggered a significant change in the consensus surrounding interpretation of fundamental norms of international society. This leads me to my second hypothesis, which captures the tectonic change mechanism:

Hypothesis 2: The risk of dispute escalation decreases given a systemic increase in liberal interpretations of sovereignty attributable to the end of the Cold War.

### AT: ! – Endless War

#### No endless wars – “Western” liberalism’s NOT the only cause NOR justification – AND the ALT doesn’t solve any of it – BUT even if it did, would result in comparably unethical forms of violence that liberal interventionism prevents

Davidson 12 Joanna Davidson, BA International Politics, Italian, University of Leeds, “Humanitarian Intervention as Liberal Imperialism: A Force for Good?” POLIS Journal, vol.7, Summer 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20180419183752id\_/http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/joanna-davidson.pdf /GoGreen!

5.2. The Consequences of Non-Intervention

The War on Terror has raised concerns over the future of the practise of humanitarian intervention. Indeed it would seem the liberal agenda, despite its ideological foundations of universalism and cosmopolitanism, has exhausted what little political will and strategic capabilities existed for true humanitarian intervention in the pursuit of Western security in an increasingly insecure world. Yet to respond to the ever darkening cloud the War on Terror is casting over humanitarian intervention by dismissing the practise entirely is to render a valuable instrument in the protection of human rights as undeservedly useless (Heinze 2006: 31). Proponents of humanitarian intervention have argued that those who dismiss humanitarian intervention as simply a vehicle through which liberal regimes wish to extend their control are ―condemning other people to death‖ (Rieff 1999) and ―leaving the innocent to suffer the world over‖ (Ramos-Horta 2005: 284) through being overtly politically correct. It is difficult to counter such arguments when we consider the consequences of nonintervention in Rwanda, as well as the consequences of intervention where political commitment to the cause is lacking, as was the case with the Srebenica massacre. Such morally abhorrent events were allowed to happen as a direct consequence of a lack of strategic interest for the states with the power to intervene, and have led to commentators such as Richard Just to argue that despite the controversies the War on Terror has wrought upon the practise of humanitarian intervention, to respond by saying that it is wrong for the United States to intervene to spread its own moral universal values is to condemn the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo which stopped ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide, and to agree with the decision not to intervene in Rwanda as right (Just 2005: 212), a position which most would find morally unacceptable. Here then we can clearly see the crux of the problem, in that non-intervention is intolerable, but humanitarian intervention, as has clearly been demonstrated in previous chapters, remains impossible (Falk 1993: 757).

Such a problematic of humanitarian intervention requires confrontation if future human rights atrocities are to be halted, and if the unchecked spread of liberal technologies of governance and control is to be challenged. It is not enough simply to denounce humanitarian intervention as reflecting only the imperial interests of ˑpowerful western governments, as ex-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan highlighted when he posed the question, ―If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?‖ (Annan 2000) Even if one were to argue for an absolute rule of non-intervention so as to avoid abuse of the humanitarian sentiment by liberal regimes, one need only look at the interventions in Kosovo and Iraq to note that international legitimization is not a necessary precursor to liberal intervention. Given the power Western liberal states have to override international legal norms to intervene in situations which threaten their interests and security, and given the fact that there exists many parts of the world where the humanitarian situation remains intolerable, to respond to the liberal crusade towards intervention by calling for a steadfast rule of non-intervention is not only impossible, but also immoral.

Conclusion

The debate over the legitimacy and conduct of humanitarian intervention continues to rage fiercely within the international community, particularly in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the declaration of the War on Terror. From growing calls for more humanitarian action and political involvement to solve the humanitarian crises of the 90s, to international scepticism and condemnation of the liberal interventions in the Middle East following the events of 9/11, it comes as no surprise that humanitarian intervention is generally deemed to be ―in crisis‖ (Rieff 2002). As this essay has demonstrated, the waning of state sovereignty and the subsequent rise in humanitarian‘ interventions has been an emergent reality throughout the 1990s; yet far from being the result of a growing humanism amongst the powerful liberal states, such a shift in concern from the state to the individual is in reality part of a much more sinister liberal enterprise which is quintessentially concerned with the art of global governance (Gordon 1991: 14). The repercussions of the implication of liberal self- interests alongside the achievement of humanitarian goals has been highlighted only too clearly in an analysis of the development of humanitarian intervention throughout the 1990s, during which time it became painfully clear that intervention undertaken for purely humanitarian concerns, if it occurs at all, has generally been underfunded and insufficient (Falk 2000: 333), therefore leading to interventions which arguably did more harm than good. Rwanda provides us with a clear example of what happens when, despite grave humanitarian concerns, there exists no strategic interests for the states with the power to intervene, whilst events in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo illustrated the fact that in the absence of state self-interest, there exists little political will to pay the costs of blood and gold in order to ensure that ―humanitarian war is conducted in a humanitarian manner.‖ (Falk 2000: 331) The 1990s then, far from being the ‗golden era of humanitarian intervention‘ (Bellamy and Wheeler 2008), were in reality an experimentation in liberal expansionism, yet where there existed few security concerns for the liberal states, there existed little political will to commit to the mission. It is only when national interests are implicated that states are willing to accept the costs and stay the duration necessary to alter the humanitarian situation in any meaningful way (Weiss 2004: 37).

As has been noted throughout this essay, the vital interests of the intervening states are grounded in liberal notions of human security; that is to say entire swathes of the world‘s population are re-conceptualized as a threat to humanity which requires pacification through assimilation into the liberal world order or, failing that, destruction. In liberalisms quest to expand its control and influence across the world, the remit of intervention has been broadened to include within its scope democracy spreading, nation building, and regime change, as has been demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more recently, Libya. It would seem undeniable that humanitarian intervention is essentially a veil behind which liberal imperialism can disguise itself, despite protestations of liberals heralding a ―revolution of moral concern‖. Indeed, we can see clear similarities between the old rhetoric of empire and current discussions surrounding liberal imperialism. As Nardin has noted, in the old days of empire humanitarianism was used to justify the imposition of foreign power on populations at the margins of the ‗civilized‘ world in order to uphold the standards of civilized morality; essentially in order to protect the population from themselves. We can see that little has changed between then and now when we note that current rhetoric on humanitarian intervention constructs the third world as a threat to itself and to the rest of the world, and therefore the barbarity of tyranny and terrorism that these ‗uncivilized‘ regions breed ―must be countered, in the name of humanity, by the exercise of imperial power‖ (Nardin 2006: 25). In construing humanitarian intervention as liberal imperialism, the motives behind liberal intervention become clearer, in that essentially liberal regimes wish to subjugate and impose indirect control on those portions of the population securitization discourse has constructed as a threat to global security. Whilst it is true that the days of territorial expansion are over, what we are experiencing now is by no means a waning of imperial ambition, as through the spread of liberal values and the imposition of liberal structures, through force if necessary, liberalism is extending its ‗universal‘ values across the world, justifying any means by the end which is indisputably morally right (Bishai 2004: 51).

Indeed, as was highlighted in chapter four, there exists a significant cognitive dissonance between liberal universalism, with its proclaimed notions of a cosmopolitan humanitarianism, and liberal imperialism, which finds its expression through intervention which is justified on a humanitarian basis, yet which in reality functions through the eradication or exclusion of all life forms which do not conform to liberalism (McCarthy 2009: 166). It would seem that the obvious conclusion to draw would be one which wholly condemns the practise of humanitarian intervention as a front for the furthering of a liberal ideology which functions through the subjugation of morally inferior‘ populations so as to extend its own remit of control and power. Humanitarian intervention is less about a moral concern for the suffering of people, than a method through which Western liberal states can secure their own populations from a global imaginary of threat. Yet such a damning analysis of liberal intervention is incomplete, as it fails to give a sufficient analysis of the effects these interventions have on the populations concerned, not to mention the effects non-intervention could have on those populations suffering human rights abuses. Of course a proclaimed interest in saving strangers‘ will only ever be put into action when the strategic interests of liberal states are at stake, meaning liberal cries of a duty to intervene‘ and a responsibility to protect‘ in those situations that shock the moral conscience of mankind must be regarded with scepticism. Such scepticism, however, should not be translated into an absolute rule of nonintervention, as to do so would be to turn our backs completely on the suffering of those that need our help, in whatever form such help may come in. Indeed, the spread of liberal imperialism does not necessarily signify the death of humanitarian sentiments; rather the two can coincide, and when they do, a greater window of opportunity is created for those wishing to act on the humanitarian impulse in the Security Council (Weiss 2004: 37).

When we consider the globalizing effect the War on Terror has had on liberal intervention, however, as we move further into the new millennium it is becoming ever clearer that liberal intervention is being stretched to its limits. Ten years after the invasion of Afghanistan and eight years after the invasion of Iraq, 99,000 and 46,000 US troops remained in each country respectively (New York Times 2011), highlighting the extensive nature of the liberal imperial mission in the aftermath of 9/11. The ‗unending war‘ against terrorism seems to have taken its toll on Western liberal states capacity to intervene, meaning that, rather than coinciding, the requirements of the war against terrorism will have to be balanced against the more distant demands of humanity (Macfarlane et al 2007: 985), and it is not difficult to work out which will prevail. Indeed, since the coming to power of the Bush administration in 2001, humanitarian intervention where no national interests were at stake has been dismissed as ―blunting the purpose of the military‖ (Ignatieff 2003), yet quite paradoxically Bush pinned continuing support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan on humanitarian rhetoric regarding nation-building and the promotion of democracy for the Afghan and Iraqi people. In doing so it would seem that the US has manipulated the idea of a responsibility to protect to include a much broader remit for intervention, embracing not just the ―responsibility to react‖ but the ―responsibility to prevent‖ and the ―responsibility to rebuild‖ as well (Evans and Sahnoun 2002: 101), stretching the language of humanitarianism to suit liberalisms own political agenda. As has been evidenced by the growing disillusionment with the on-going operations in the Middle East in which thousands of western troops have been killed, the continued threat of terrorist attacks, and more recently the lack of political support for further meaningful interventions in Libya and Syria, it would seem that liberal interventionism has not only lost sight of the universal humanitarian notions that lie at its roots, but is struggling to retain its omnipotence in the face of widespread opposition to the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the 9/11 attacks may have had a ‘rally round the flag’ effect within the US, the most ardent exporter of international liberalism, it has had the opposite effect across the rest of the international community, which has sought to distance itself from the aggressively Western liberal interventionist stance that provoked such terrorist attacks (Ignatieff 2003).

All things considered, it would seem that Fukuyama‘s prediction in 1992 that the rise to predominance of Western liberal democracy would signal the ‗End of History‘ in that it would become the universal and final form of human government (Fukuyama 1992) is increasingly being challenged. The rise in militant Islam and terrorist attacks against the West highlights inescapably that the proclaimed universal moral righteousness of the liberal mission is in reality far from universal, whilst the rising spectre of China as the new superpower on the international stage could diminish Western liberalisms power and influence in years to come. This being said, the reality remains that, for now at least, Western liberal regimes retain hegemony on the global stage, and therefore hegemony in decisions to intervene or not. As we have seen, liberal humanitarian‘ intervention is deeply flawed; oftentimes the primary motives for intervention are far from humanitarian, and there is much resentment in the international community regarding the omnipotence of the Western liberal states wishing to impose their world view on weaker states. What is more, the War on Terror has only exemplified such concerns, highlighting the way in which liberal states have manipulated humanitarian sentiments to justify intervention with other motives (Ayoob 2002) and allowed liberalism to broaden its scope of expansion globally (Evans 2010). Yet the reality is that liberal intervention, however imperfect and unpalatable it may be is currently the only choice the international community has if it is to avoid another Rwanda, or another Srebenica, to avoid once again becoming a bystander to genocide. As we have seen, where no other interests exist, attempts at humanitarianism will flounder. To argue for intervention motivated by purely humanitarian motives and conducted in a completely humanitarian manner is to ignore the realities of the world in which we live. The reality is that, as Weiss quite succinctly put it, the rise to predominance of liberal imperialism and the resultant convergence of humanitarian values and liberal security interests ―has not brought utopia, but made the world a somewhat more liveable place than it would have been otherwise‖ (2001: 104). Whether this remains the case in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in a seemingly endless War against Terror, and in a world where Western liberalism is increasingly feeling threatened yet where political support and capacity for liberal intervention is low, remains to be seen.

#### Prefer induction to deduction – their impacts are hasty overgeneralization from an unnecessarily totalizing ontological commitment – no relationship between intervention and violence is inevitable, and the perm’s self-reflexive communication can overcome the link

Borg 17 Stefan Borg, postdoctoral research fellow in International Relations at the Department of Economic History, Stockholm University, associated research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, “Genealogy as critique in International Relations: Beyond the hermeneutics of baseless suspicion,” Journal of International Political Theory, 14(1), 2017, pp.41-59, DOI: 10.1177/1755088217707225 /GoGreen!

Conclusion

This article has examined genealogy as a form of critique in IR. The first part of the article demonstrated that Foucault’s genealogy was an important component in the work of the first generation of post-structuralist IR as well as in contemporary scholarship informed by frameworks of governmentality and biopolitics. It was shown that when genealogy is understood as critique, violence risks being inscribed as foundational to global political life. However, despite the fact that it is virtually impossible to understand the meaning of “critical” in this work without a grasp of genealogy, the assumptions of genealogy have been insufficiently engaged. To rectify this, the second part of the article critically examined the philosophical underpinnings of genealogy. Through a close reading of three core texts where Foucault grapples with genealogy, it was shown that genealogy relies on an ontology of forces, which are postulated as arbitrarily and violently related. Genealogy therefore tends to inscribe violence as foundational to social relations. It was further noted that genealogically informed critique brings a peculiar form of suspicion to all that is presented as common, shared, and universal. This suspicion was traced back to Nietzsche and characterized as “baseless,” which again reflects a set of particular ontological commitments idiosyncratic to genealogy. These commitments, which inscribe violence as foundational, were finally contrasted to an ontology which follows the genealogical understanding of emergent forces, but refuses the assumption of them as arbitrarily and violently related.

Finally, what are the implications for empirical Foucauldian work for the argument I have pursued in the article? In empirical work informed by governmentality and biopolitics, IR scholars often examine the encounter between Western and non-Western countries. The problem to which I ultimately want to draw attention is not that such scholarship is often critical of military intervention undertaken by Western powers. On the contrary, it is important to bring out and critically scrutinize the paternalistic and indeed hierarchical renditions that no doubt are common in, for instance, the liberal peace project (e.g. Richmond, 2011). The problem is rather that the genealogical ethos risks turning into a global interpretive disposition, with which all global interactions by whatever means are made a priori suspect. Instead of seeking to engage in a careful empirical consideration of the merits of forms of intervention in each case, the generalized genealogical suspicion [hinders] disables any other understanding of global political life than a ceaseless unfolding drama of clashing wills to dominate and conquer. Since the liberal project is exposed as just a particular will to power, it must inscribe a relation of violent hierarchy to non-Western localities, as opposed to an understanding of similar and harmoniously overlapping subjectivities already existing in those places. On such a pre-methodological genealogical disposition, intervention becomes suspicious in whatever form it may take. Whether it is in the form of peacekeeping troops or rule of law advisors assisting local actors in security sector reform, any involvement can only be read as a manifestation of “the West’s” ongoing will to colonize and impose its will on others.

The genealogical disposition easily lends itself to an assertion of incommensurability, more often than not coded in terms of “culture,” since the clashing wills to power in Foucault’s ontology of emergence do not belong to a common space; they have nothing in common. What is made suspect to the extent of [hindered] disabled is genuine social learning through communication, which presupposes that different sociocultural settings may display profound similarities of aspirations of what is desired. For instance, holding out the possibility that whatever goes under the label of human rights, and especially its minimalist rendition of what human means, is compatible with a range of walks and ways, may harmoniously blend with, and may resonate with many traditions around the world is perhaps the ultimate hope on which the liberal peace project rests (e.g. Moyn, 2010). This hope, however, is disabled [hindered] by a peculiar form of genealogical faith which lures the researcher to interpret all human interaction as disguising a ceaseless and primordial clash of wills to power.

Following the argument pursued in this article, one needs to realize that the genealogical disposition is reflective of certain ontological assumptions which are but one option. Empirical work in IR informed by governmentality frameworks is no doubt valuable in that such work opens up for a much more extensive power analysis than approaches that reify state actors as the only relevant actors in global politics. Moreover, Foucault’s writings on biopolitics have served as a starting point for examining what happens when life rather than territory become the object of rule, thus broadening the traditional focus in IR to include geopolitics and biopolitics (e.g. Vaughan-Williams, 2015). However, when conducting empirical work in such traditions, it is important to refrain from reading an ontology of violence into the empirical analyses, or at the very least, reflect on the ethico-political stakes involved in doing so.

#### No “liberal wars”

David Chandler 9, Professor of IR at University of Westminster, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics", Review of Dillon and Reid’s *The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live*, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that this starting point is already an ideological dead end ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are insuperable methodological hurdles to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’? It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and its alleged specific form, of ‘unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be a particularly unproductive one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

### AT: ! – Structural Root Causes

#### They have everything backwards – no structural root causes – AND radical transformation wouldn’t solve – BUT proximate focus does

John Horgan 14. Director of the Center for Science Writings at Stevens Institute of Technology, “To End War, Focus on Culture Rather than "Root Causes"”, Scientific American, 8-18, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/to-end-war-focus-on-culture-rather-than-root-causes/

When I started researching war, I also assumed that to get rid of war, we have to get rid of its root causes. The trouble is, scholars have identified countless causes of war. One pseudo-explanation (which I'm glad Kloor does not mention, and which I rebut early on in my book and in posts such as this) is that war stems from a compulsion bred into our ancestors by natural selection. Biology underpins war, as it underpins all human behaviors. The crucial question is, why does war break out in certain places and times and not others? The most popular non-biological explanations of war are what I call the Malthusian and Marxist hypotheses. The first posits that war stems from our tendency to over-reproduce and hence fight over land and other resources. The second holds that war stems from inequality, the tendency of societies (especially capitalist ones) to divide into haves and have-nots. Scholars have also blamed wars on religion, racism and nationalism, which Kloor mentions above, as well as such fundamental social traits as hierarchy, sexism and injustice. If you cherry pick, you always find evidence to support your favorite theory. But as scholars such as Lewis Fry Richardson (whom my friend David Berreby recently profiled) have shown, neither the Malthusian and Marxist theories nor any of the other explanations above can account for the vast diversity of wars. Moreover, some factors that provoke conflict, such as religion, can also inhibit it. Religion has inspired some of our greatest antiwar leaders, notably Gandhi and Martin Luther King. I have found only one theory of war that fits the facts. The theory holds that war is a self-perpetuating, contagious meme, which can propagate independently of other social and environmental factors. As anthropologist Margaret Mead put it in a famous 1940 essay, "Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity." In other words, the major cause of war is war itself, which has a terrible tendency to spread even to societies that would prefer to remain peaceful. I make this point in my book and in a 2010 blog post, "Margaret Mead’s war theory kicks butt of neo-Darwinian and Malthusian models." Here is an edited excerpt: In his 1997 book War Before Civilization, anthropologist Lawrence Keeley notes that war among North American Indians often stemmed from the aggression of just a few extremely warlike tribes, "rotten apples that spoiled their regional barrels." He added, "Less aggressive societies, stimulated by more warlike groups in their vicinity, become more bellicose themselves." Societies in a violent region, the political scientist Azar Gat emphasizes in his 2006 book War in Human Civilization, have a strong incentive to carry out preemptive attacks. Societies may "attack the other side in order to eliminate or severely weaken them as a potential enemy. Indeed, this option only makes the other side more insecure, rendering the security dilemma more acute. War can thus become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fear of war breeds war." Many people are pessimistic about ending war because they assume it will require radical social engineering. World peace will require eliminating poverty, inequality, sexism, racism or [fill in the blank]. We will need to eradicate religion, or all embrace the same religion. We will need to get rid of all nation states and become anarchists, or form a single global government. My analysis of war suggests that if we want to end war, we don't need to create a society radically different from our own, let alone a utopia. If we want to end war, we should focus on ending war and the culture of war rather than on supposed causal factors. If we can do that, we will take a major step toward solving many of our other social problems, as I argued in my previous post. And that brings me to Keith Kloor's final challenge to me. He devotes much of his column to a discussion of how extremists on both sides of the conflict between Israel and Palestine have "hijacked the peace process. Horrific spasmodic cycles of violence and death is the result." He asks me how we can "rid the world of extremist groups that sow the seeds of war." Kloor has his causation backwards. Just as war promotes poverty, tyranny, inequality and resource depletion at least as much as vice versa, so war promotes fanaticism. Once militarism seizes hold of a society, it can transform vast populations into virtual sociopaths. It turns decent, ethical, reasonable people into intolerant fanatics capable of the most heinous acts. Breaking out of what Kloor calls "spasmodic cycles of violence and death" can be extraordinarily difficult, but history offers many examples of societies that have done just that. Germany and France were bitter, bloody rivals for centuries. But it is now inconceivable that Germany and France—or any members of the European Union--would go to war against each other. One of my favorite examples of a nation that has renounced militarism is Costa Rica. Like many of its neighbors in Central American, Costa was once wracked by terrible violence. But after a bloody civil war in the 1940s, Costa Rica disbanded its army, freeing up more funds for education, health care, transportation and tourism. It is often ranked as one of the most peaceful, healthy, "happy" nations in the world.

### AT: ! – Value To Life

#### Value to life is inevitable and subjective – their assertions are the only scenario for negative value

Schwartz, et al 2 Lisa, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine, Department of General Practice, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK; Paul Preece, Theme Coordinator of Medical Ethics, Dundee Medical School, Ninewells, Dundee, UK; and Rob Hendry, Medical Advisor, Medical & Dental Defense Union of Scotland, Mackintosh House, Glasgow, UK, Medical Ethics: A Case-Based Approach, p. 112, November 2002 /GoGreen!

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.

#### Extinction must precede ethics – their prioritization of ideology turns value to life and makes extinction inevitable

Schell 82 Jonathan, writer for the New Yorker and nuclear weapons expert, The Fate of the Earth

For the generations that now have to decide whether or not to risk the future of the species, the implication of our species’ unique place in the order of things is that while things in the life of mankind have worth, we must never raise that worth above the life of mankind and above our respect for that life’s existence. To do this would be to make of our highest ideals so many swords with which to destroy ourselves. To sum up the worth of our species by reference to some particular standard, goal, or ideology, no matter how elevated or noble it might be, would be to prepare the way for extinction by closing down in thought and feeling the open-ended possibilities for human development which extinction would close down in fact. There is only one circumstance in which it might be possible to sum up the life and achievement of the species, and that circumstance would be that it had already died, but then, of course, there would be no one left to do the summing up. Only a generation that believed itself to be in possession of final, absolute truth could ever conclude that it had reason to put an end to human life, and only generations that recognized the limits to their own wisdom and virtue would be likely to subordinate their interests and dreams to the as yet unformed interests and undreamed dreams of the future generations, and let human life go on.

### !/T – NATO Peace

#### Studies confirm NATO’s net violence-reducing – because of its liberalism

Recchia 11 Stefano Recchia, Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Cambridge; and Michael Doyle, Professor of International Affairs, Law and Political Science at Columbia University; “Liberalism in International Relations,” *International Encyclopedia of Political Science*, eds. Badie, Berg-Schlosser and Morlino, Sage, 2011, pp.1434-1439 /GoGreen!

Relying on new insights from game theory, scholars during the 1980s and 1990s emphasized that so-called international regimes, consisting of agreed-on international norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, can help states effectively coordinate their policies and collaborate in the production of international public goods, such as free trade, arms control, and environmental protection. Especially, if embedded in formal multilateral institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), regimes crucially improve the availability of information among states in a given issue area, thereby promoting reciprocity and enhancing the reputational costs of noncompliance. As noted by Robert Keohane, institutionalized multilateralism also reduces strategic competition over relative gains and thus further advances international cooperation. Most international regime theorists accepted Kenneth Waltz's (1979) neorealist assurription of states as black boxes-that is, unitary and rational actors with given interests. Little or no attention was paid to the impact on international cooperation of domestic political processes and dynamics. Likewise, regime scholarship largely disregarded the arguably crucial question of whether prolonged interaction in an institutionalized international setting can fundamentally change states' interests or preferences over outcomes (as opposed to preferences over strategies), thus engendering positive feedback loops of increased overall cooperation. For these reasons, international regime theory is not, properly speaking, liberal, and the term neoliberal institutionalism frequently used to identify it is somewhat misleading. It is only over the past decade or so that liberal international relations theorists have begun to systematically study the relationship between domestic politics and institutionalized international cooperation or global governance. This new scholarship seeks to explain in particular the close international cooperation among liberal democracies as well as higher-than-average levels of delegation by democracies to complex multilateral bodies, such as the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NAFTA, and the WTO (see, e.g., John Ikenberry, 2001; Helen Milner & Andrew Moravcsik, 2009). The reasons that make liberal democracies particularly enthusiastic about international cooperation are manifold: First, transnational actors such as nongovernmental organizations and private corporations thrive in liberal democracies, and they frequently advocate increased international cooperation; second, elected democratic officials rely on delegation to multilateral bodies such as the WTO or the EU to commit to a stable policy line and to internationally lock in fragile domestic policies and constitutional arrangements; and finally, powerful liberal democracies, such as the United States and its allies, voluntarily bind themselves into complex global governance arrangements to demonstrate strategic restraint and create incentives for other states to cooperate, thereby reducing the costs for maintaining international order. Recent scholarship, such as that of Charles Boehmer and colleagues, has also confirmed the classical liberal intuition that formal international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, independently contribute to peace, especially when they are endowed with sophisticated administrative structures and information-gathering capacities. In short, research on global governance and especially on the relationship between democracy and international cooperation is thriving, and it usefully complements liberal scholarship on the democratic peace.

### !/T – Liberal Peace

#### Liberalism is resilient to the ALT – and even if imperfect, it’s the most practical way of organizing power for radical change – ALT throws fifty years of positive change out the window and only empowers worse illiberal populists

Isaac, 18—James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington (Jeffrey, “Putting Liberal Democracy First,” Dissent, Volume 65, Number 2, Spring 2018, pp. 151-159, dml)

Those of us who consider ourselves “left liberals” have expressed particular alarm about the symbolic and practical dangers posed by leaders such as Donald Trump and his supporters. To name but a few: mass rallies denouncing “the liberal media”; inciting and sometimes enacting violence against critics or protestors; calling for the imprisonment of political adversaries; racist and xenophobic rhetoric invoked to support Muslim bans, border walls, and mass deportations; conspiracy-mongering attacks on career civil servants as agents of “the deep state,” and on journalists as “enem[ies] of the American people”; and orchestrated campaigns of lying and disinformation under the banner of speaking “truth” directly to the people and opposing “fake news.” In many ways, these tactics and actions are all too reminiscent of the “origins of totalitarianism” discussed by Hannah Arendt in her 1951 classic of that title. To note this is not to deny the profound differences between the global crises of 1914–1945 and today. But it is to register profound fear for the future of liberal democracy.

Colleagues further to my left have been critical, sometimes harshly, of this liberal response. They insist that Trump is not quite so dangerous, and that the dangers he does pose are largely expressions of deeper tendencies of neoliberalism that require more fundamental challenge. It thus makes little sense, they argue, for the left to reflexively defend liberal democracy— liberal democracy itself is the problem, and the solution is its transformation. While tactically these arguments track the 2016 debates between supporters of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, they also run deeper. Some on the left—whether enthusiastic Bernie supporters, or unenthusiastic supporters who nonetheless saw his candidacy as an opening—reviled Clinton for her neoliberalism, and could not bring themselves to vote for her even once she won the Democratic nomination. They argued that the threat posed by Trump was overstated since both parties are oligarchical and capitalist (they are), and thus essentially similar (they are not). This contingent believed that the real danger is not Trumpism but the corruption, hypocrisy, inequality, and violence plaguing liberal democracy itself.

To be clear, the majority of Sanders supporters did vote for Clinton in the general election. Moreover, I have no interest in “blaming” people with such convictions for Clinton’s defeat, however they voted (and in a liberal democracy each individual has the fundamental right to vote as he or she chooses). Further, many Sanders activists have been involved in important long-term organizing efforts that are in no way reducible to the terms of a single election. At the same time, in the debates about the election and since Trump’s inauguration, there have been serious differences of opinion between those who are greatly alarmed by Trumpism and who regard the defense of liberal democracy as an urgent imperative, and those who regard it as nothing more than a symptom of a deeper and more fundamental crisis. “Socialism or barbarism” is a slogan rarely heard. But something like it seems to represent the logic of an anti-liberal position with real traction on the left.

It is important to acknowledge that what we call “liberal democracy” is a complex, novel, imperfect, and ultimately fragile form of politics, created after the Second World War through an accommodation between liberalism and democracy that was neither inevitable nor innocent. It required the buyin of social democratic and Christian democratic movements and parties; it relied on the unique conditions of postwar growth, class compromise, and Cold War “vital center” anticommunism; and it incorporated from the start some profoundly illiberal policy commitments (the national security state, post-colonial counter-insurgency, an uncritical embrace of “modernization,” and compromises with racial and gender inequality, to name a few). This regime was flawed from the start: it was already in crisis by 1965, and much of the politics of the past sixty years can be seen as an intensification of this crisis. Such an arrangement hardly represents a “riddle of history solved.”

Yet liberal democracy—in spite of its corruptions, failings, and complicity with injustice—represents the most practical and normatively legitimate way of organizing political power at the level of the nation-state. And every effort to install an alternative has resulted in disaster.

Liberal democracy is both limited and precarious. And simple appeals to liberal values are insufficient, either to defend liberal democracy under siege, or to further advance the causes of social justice and deepen democracy. For this reason, I disagree with self-identified liberal democrats who regard populism in any form as a danger to liberal democracy. I would instead agree with those such as Chantal Mouffe and Étienne Balibar, who argue that new forms of left populism and new left movements and parties (exemplified by Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, and Demos in Romania) are important to advance the cause of social justice, to counter the rise of right-wing populism, and thus to defend liberal democracy itself.

At the same time, I believe that calls to unambiguously embrace a new left populism, or to declare one’s goal to be socialism (or for some, even communism) are seriously misguided, at least for those who take liberal values seriously. There are two reasons why.

The first is broadly political: because a new socialist or left populist hegemony faces profound and probably insuperable obstacles, and these are not gainsaid by the obvious failings of capitalism. Marx was simply wrong when he declared that “Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve.” And the fact that capitalism is the source of profound harm to social justice and environmental sustainability does not mean that there is any obvious way to “solve,” rather than simply to remedy, these harms.

In their recent Jacobin piece “Social Democracy Is Good. But Not Good Enough.” Joseph Schwartz and Bhaskar Sunkara take issue with recent advocacy of liberal versions of socialism. They argue that “history shows us that achieving a stable welfare state while leaving capital’s power over the economy largely intact is itself far from viable. Even if we wanted to stop at socialism within capitalism, it’s not clear that we could.” But it is much less clear that it is possible to institute a wholesale socialist transformation. And, as Schwartz and Sunkara themselves concede: “To chart a different course, we would need a militant labor movement and a mass socialist presence strengthened by accumulated victories, looking to not merely tame but overcome capitalism.” But such a socialist mass politics is rather unlikely given the current forms of social and economic life, which differ dramatically from the forms of industrialism that gave birth to the modern socialist movement in the mid-nineteenth century.

“Post-Fordist” forms of flexible accumulation, automation, neoliberal forms of consumerism, new digital means of communication, new forms of “liquid modernity”—such developments have promoted new forms of inequality, but they have also eroded the social, cultural, and economic bases of working-class formation that grounded socialist politics in the past. In countries such as the United States, there is no mass proletariat to mobilize or organize. And while there is a working class, not many of the individuals inhabiting this class regard wage-labor as the defining feature of their experience or identity under capitalism.

In fact, a range of struggles for recognition now flourish in real tension with class politics—including civil rights, women’s rights, and gay rights. Right-wing populism represents a powerful backlash against these struggles that has successfully garnered substantial white working-class support. The identities of many members of the white working class are deeply and profoundly constituted by sexism and resentment toward immigrants and people of color in ways that make them poor targets for socialist advocacy.

It does not follow from this that socialist political organizing ought to be disparaged. But it does follow that left liberals have every reason to approach the aspiration to transcend capitalism, and liberal democracy, with skepticism. And so, when socialist colleagues challenge us from the left, insisting that we “reify” liberal democracy and fail to understand the “real” sources of our difficulties, we have every reason to question who exactly is doing the reifying.

The second reason to keep a liberal distance from invocations of socialist transformation relates to questions of ethical and political judgment. Even if one were to believe that the only way to defend liberal democracy and to defeat the forces of the right is to join the struggle for a more radical challenge to capitalism itself, this would not mitigate some very difficult and consequential political choices that present themselves in the here and now.

Thus after Hillary Clinton was nominated, many Sanders supporters who sincerely believed that something more radical than Clintonism was necessary were faced with a stark choice: on the one hand, voting for and supporting Clinton, and, on the other hand, refusing to support Clinton, by abstaining or supporting Jill Stein, and thus making it more likely that Donald Trump would be elected. To support Clinton in this context was not to repudiate Sanders or the importance of the political “revolution” he led. It was simply to acknowledge that the danger to liberal democracy represented by Trump was too great—and that neoliberalism with a human face is always to be preferred to right-wing authoritarianism. A similar dilemma presented itself to many French leftists in the May 2017 presidential elections. During the first round, a number of center and left candidates decided to run, including left socialist Jean-Luc Mélenchon, along with Marine Le Pen of the right-wing National Front. But in the runoff, the choice was stark: support Emmanuel Macron against Le Pen, on the grounds that the danger from the right must be averted, or refuse to do so, on the grounds that Macron is a neoliberal. Yanis Varoufakis, self-described “erratic Marxist” and former Greek Finance Minister, explained the stakes in Project Syndicate: Progressives have good reason to be angry with a liberal establishment that feels comfortable with Macron. . . . Moreover, it is not hard to identify with the French left’s feeling that the liberal establishment is getting its comeuppance with Le Pen’s rise. . . . But the decision of many leftists to maintain an equal distance between Macron and Le Pen is inexcusable. There are two reasons for this. First, the imperative to oppose racism trumps opposition to neoliberal policies. . . . Just like in the 1940s, we have a duty to ensure that the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence is not controlled by those who harbor violent sentiments toward the foreigner, the cultural or sexual minority member, the “other.” . . . But there is a second reason for backing Macron. . . . My disagreements with Macron are legion. . . . [yet] I support Macron . . . [for I] refuse to be part of a generation of leftists responsible for allowing a fascist and racist to win the French presidency. Naturally, if Macron wins and becomes merely another functionary of Europe’s deep establishment, my comrades and I will oppose him no less energetically than we are—or should be—opposing Le Pen now.

Yet there are those on the left who view the neoliberal as no less of a threat than the neo-fascist. The philosopher Slavoj Žižek, for example, refused to support Macron against Le Pen, echoing a stance he had taken in the Clinton-Trump contest. Similar sentiments have been expressed by the scholar Nancy Fraser, a harsh critic of Clinton. Like Žižek, Fraser insists that “far from being the antidote to fascism, (neo)liberalism is its partner in crime. . . . the left should refuse the choice between progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism.”

But there are times when such a choice is necessary, and making the right choice is not a form of capitulation but political responsibility. The making of such a choice does not preclude other choices as well, and it makes perfect sense to say “I support this candidate or policy now, when the alternative is much worse, at the same time that I will continue to work for a future in which better choices are available.”

And so on May 15, 2017, shortly after Macron’s victory, Varoufakis, as promised, published a follow-up: “Congratulations, President Macron—Now We Oppose You.” There may be a vantage point from which it makes sense to denounce Varoufakis for refusing to refuse the choice between “progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism.” But it is a vantage point from which the fate of liberal democracy, with its civil liberties, ethnic and religious tolerance, and political pluralism—and the fate of those constituencies who need these very things to survive—would seem to matter all too little. As Varoufakis stated in another op-ed for Le Monde, “Of course we all wish, at least those of us on the left, that the French electoral system were not binary. But it is. And given that it is, I refuse to be part of a generation of European progressives who could have stopped Marine Le Pen from winning France’s Presidency but didn’t.” Varoufakis describes the refusal of this choice as “scandalous.” To choose against right-wing authoritarianism is to put liberal democracy first, and to treat it not as the end, but as an essential means of any ends worth pursuing.

The questions of means and ends raised by such electoral choices are even more pressing when it comes to another set of tactics supported by some on the left—tactics of sometimes violent direct action represented by antifa. Natasha Lennard explained in the Nation last August that “the antifascist project is not one of asking for better statutes or a reconfiguration of rights. . . . antifa is a promise to neo-Nazis and their bedfellows that we will confront them in the streets; we will expose them online and inform their place of employ.” She makes clear that such a politics has little regard for the discourse of human rights or the rule of law. Last summer, Lennard also pursued this anti-liberal theme in Dissent: Time and again in recent months I have seen political writers apoplectic over alleged rips in the social contract, as wrought by Trump, anti-immigrant policy, or austerity, or any number of political plagues. The liberal response has been outrage and disbelief that the state can fall so far from its alleged foundation as a contract forged by the will of equal pledgers. . . . Calling upon some mythic social contract to deliver us from evil is not just futile, it’s downright religious, as Nietzsche would see it. Liberal outrage peddles Christian morality in a world where God is dead, and we have killed him. . . . Power determines which narratives about reality get to count as truth. Recognizing this is a political necessity for those who would challenge the Trumpian Weltanschauung.” Antifa historian and organizer Mark Bray similarly writes that “anti-fascism is an illiberal politics of social revolutionism applied to fighting the Far Right, not only literal fascists [emphasis added].” The roots of antifa lie in the most radical forms of anarchism. As the journalist Chris Hedges (and also Noam Chomsky) have argued, “The focus on street violence diverts activists from the far less glamorous building of relationships and alternative institutions and community organizing that alone will make effective resistance possible.” Moreover, antifa rhetoric, like the “alt right” and neo-Nazi rhetoric it despises, is Manichean. Instead of efforts to forge broad coalitions capable of defeating right-wing authoritarians at the ballot box, antifa tactics promote cycles of recrimination, giving public credibility to right-wing authoritarians, such as Trump, who valorize police brutality and claim to represent “law and order.” There is a long history of Manichean “friend/enemy” thinking on the left, represented by polemics such as Lenin’s 1918 “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky” and Trotsky’s 1938 Their Morals and Ours. It was, in part, to counter such thinking that Dissent magazine was founded. That generation of democratic socialists, shaken by the experiences of Stalinism, totalitarianism, genocide, and world war, and hemmed in by McCarthyism and what Irving Howe called a deadening “age of conformity,” created a journal committed to a critical and liberal version of socialism centering on the importance of vigorous disagreement. In its sixty-four years, Dissent has experienced generational changes and featured many important debates. But at no time since the journal’s founding has the very existence of liberal democracy seemed more in danger.

The illiberal forces on the rise threaten to reverse every important achievement, however limited, of the past five decades of liberal democracy. These achievements include reproductive freedom and domestic violence legislation; environmental and workplace health and safety regulation; civil rights and voting rights enforcement; moderate forms of consumer protection; and press freedom and protection against censorship. All deserve to be defended, not because of their role in advancing us toward a future beyond capitalism, but because they represent real improvements in our lives. The fear-mongering, repression, and evisceration of public criticism promoted by right-wing populism diminish democratic citizenship for everyone. They are harmful to left organizing and to anyone who believes in defending political freedom. Resisting these assaults on liberal democracy through the political means made available by liberal democracy is an urgent task. This does not prevent one from also seeking to build a movement beyond “resistance.” But resistance is important work in its own right and, for many of us, it is the work that is currently most important.

Sarah Leonard, a Dissent editor-at-large and former editor at the Nation, recently remarked about the uncertainties of liberals: The problem with many prominent representatives of liberalism today . . . is that they don’t seem to know which side they’re on. Say Bernie, vote Hillary; say universal health care, but condemn its advocacy; say electable, lose everywhere; say you’ll don sneakers to walk the picket line, don’t show up. The name of my desire is socialism; do liberals know the name of theirs? This reluctance to pick “a side” that disturbs Leonard—which I prefer to describe as ambivalence—is real, and while it can be bridged, I doubt it can be eliminated. For to be a left liberal is to be troubled by the hesitations and inconsistencies of which Leonard writes but also to believe that a pluralistic politics of freedom in our complex world requires such tribulations. I supported Sanders and voted for him in the Indiana primary. But I doubted he could win the Democratic nomination, much less the general election, and I worried about the harshness with which some of his supporters attacked Clinton, a harshness that has persisted over the past year. I support universal healthcare, and welcome the shift by many important Democratic leaders to support the Sanders plan. Still, I wonder whether the plan itself is viable, and whether it is the most compelling issue on which to mobilize the Democratic Party to electoral victories in 2018 and 2020. Because I so profoundly fear Trumpism, I regard Democratic victories as critical—even if they involve compromises on healthcare and even as they will likely bring disappointments. Am I confused? Am I lacking in conviction? Or am I simply unable to believe there are easy, clear-cut answers to many current political questions?

And so “liberal” works for me as a political identity in a way that “socialist” does not. It places a priority on the civil and political freedoms that make it possible for us to argue about how to challenge injustice and work for greater justice. It furnishes peaceful channels of political participation and contestation that allow for provisional agreements to be reached about how to move forward.

Again, Lennard writes, disparagingly, that: “The liberal response has been outrage and disbelief that the state can fall so far from its alleged foundation as a contract forged by the will of equal pledgers.” But liberals such as myself do not believe that the liberal democratic state was ever founded through an idyllic process of egalitarian consent. We believe only that liberal democracy is a flawed outcome of struggle worth defending, and that the idea of free and equal democratic will formation has furnished, and continues to furnish, a powerful normative ideal. There is no “mythic social contract” that can “deliver us from evil.” There is no such contract, and there is no such deliverance. There is only ongoing debate and contestation.

It is perhaps that fundamental commitment to ongoing political contestation that marks the difference between left liberals and those to our left who embrace a more “radical” and often emphatically socialist politics. To note this is not to disparage those to my left. It is to identify points of honest difference as well as commonalities, on which agreements and alliances are possible.

In December 2001, Robert Kuttner published a short piece in the liberal journal he co-edits, the American Prospect, with the self-explanatory title “Why Liberals Need Radicals.” In June 2013, Bhaskar Sunkara, editor of Jacobin, published a piece in the Nation, entitled “Letter to ‘The Nation’ From a Young Radical.” Sunkara explains why he and his colleagues have embraced a new radicalism with strong Marxist roots. He too makes the case that liberals and radicals need each other. At the same time, from the radical and not the liberal side, Sunkara’s view of this association is rather harsh: “American radicalism has had a complex and at times contradictory association with liberalism. At the peak of the socialist movement, leftists fed off liberal victories. Radicals, in turn, have added coherence and punch to every key liberal struggle and advance of the past century. Such a mutually beneficial alliance could be in the works again. The first step is to smash the existing liberal coalition and rebuild it on a radically different basis.”

I share Sunkara’s belief that now is the time for mutually beneficial connections and alliances between democratic socialists and liberals. But I am rather wary—perhaps for reasons of generational experience—of calls to “smash the existing liberal coalition.” I am skeptical of that “radically different basis.” Most importantly, I believe that the danger posed by the radical right, to the political conditions and elemental life chances of many millions of individuals, makes it important to defend, to build, and to extend the liberal coalition rather than disrupt or destroy it. Because in the struggle between socialism and barbarism, it is barbarism that has the advantage. And because the civil and political freedoms and forms of responsive public policy made possible by liberal democracy are a necessary condition of any social or economic justice worth having.

#### Ks of lib-ism link to themselves by dismissing post-colonial liberal perspectives and the concrete needs of colonial subjects—rejecting lib-ism all too easily feeds into the growing wave of global fascism

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Too often, with liberalism, we throw the baby out with the bathwater. In contemporary critical and cultural theory, criticisms of liberalism are almost mandatory. This is most true in the field of postcolonial theory or in philosophies of the Global South. For many postcolonial scholars, “western” liberalism is the common enemy of the politics and ideas from the margins of global knowledge production. At times, one may be led to think that, without liberalism as a common target, postcolonial theory would lose its cohesion. Postcolonies are, after all, different, and the philosophies their intellectuals have espoused have likewise been varied. Without a positive notion of theory from the Global South, scholars have turned to denigrating “liberal” modernity.1

Of course, some anti-liberal scholarship has surfaced dark legacies of the European tradition. But even these turn critique into blanket dismissal. For example, the scathing work of Uday Singh Mehta (1999) proves how British liberal intellectuals like Jeremy Benthan, James and John Stuart Mill, and Lord Macaulay defended imperialism, particularly in India. The idea of Western tutelage for “backward” societies, he contends, stems from the liberal embrace of universal values to the exclusion of different cultures and belief systems. Hence, “the liberal involvement with the British Empire is broadly coeval with liberalism itself” (ibid., 4). Echoing Mehta, the sociologist Julian Go (2017, 74) contends that “civic-liberal nations” are “empire-states” (emphasis in original) because they “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not.”

These scholars are sympathetic to the concerns of postcolonies and the Global South. But they have unwittingly wedded themselves to the study of the Global North. In studying liberalism, they privilege the voices of liberals from Europe, while neglecting how liberalism has been articulated in postcolonies themselves. A global history of liberalism must acknowledge the contributions of colonial thinkers in its development. True enough, we may condemn thinkers like Mill for their defense of imperialism, but we must also celebrate their counterpoints from within the liberal tradition. We must celebrate thinkers like Rizal.

Rizal would have accepted many of the objections of scholars like Mehta and Go. He too knew how liberals from colonial metropoles could use their ideas to support colonialism. But Rizal would have rejected the reduction of liberalism’s vast history to the actions of colonizers. In this book, I hope to have shown that, while Rizal criticized Spanish liberals, he never abandoned the liberal project. Rather, he believed that liberalism could be renewed, even purified, in the colony, through the painful experiences of colonials like himself.

Rizal too would not have dismissed liberalism simply because it could create “Others.” For he knew that any political community needs to have an inside and an outside: nations have foreigners, religions have non-believers, and socialist movements have class enemies. In this regard, liberalism is no different from other political ideals that form bonds of community. Rizal knew, however, that the bonds of community within liberal republics could be expansive and cosmopolitan. He saw how the category “Filipino” could expand from only referring to creoles to include all those who identified with the emergent nation. He believed in communities not bound by race or religion, but adherence to Enlightenment philosophy.

Such a worldview is simple, but it comes to us with a certain urgency today, at a time when “illiberal democracy” is one the rise. For much of the post-Cold War world, progressive and radical thinkers insisted that there was more to human political development than the mere liberal “end of history.” There had to be more radical ways to imagining politics. Amid this desire, much anti-liberal thinking became nihilistic, and those who condemned liberalism rarely thought of concrete alternatives. At worse, they denigrated the basic tenets of liberalism, without care for the possible repercussions.

The disillusionment with liberalism is, of course, nothing new. Even as Rizal was articulating a liberalism for the colonized in the nineteenth century, many Europeans were already becoming sick of the liberal project. Francois Furet (2000, 11) explains that many radicals from that period had come to believe “that modern liberal democracy was threatening society with dissolution because it atomized individuals, made them indifferent to public interest, weakened authority, and encouraged class hatred.” This disillusionment would eventually lead to the twin illiberal philosophies that dominated the twentieth century: fascism on the right and Communism on the Left.

History, of course, does not repeat itself. But there are echoes of the illiberal early twentieth century today. If the present moment prompts comparisons with the 1930s and 1940s, it is not because we are about to enter another period of global warfare. Rather, it is because, our present, like those years, teems with illiberalism. And, like the early twentieth century, intellectuals in the West have been averse to defending liberal values, preferring instead utopian visions of politics that can neither be tested nor implemented. For much of the twentieth century, as Hollander (2016) explains, the illiberalism of intellectuals was evident in the hero worship of dictators in places like Germany, China, Cuba, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, and Venezuela. Western intellectuals looked to strongmen on both the left and the right as figures of inspiration because of a “painful awareness of the inability of Western, pluralistic, capitalist societies to deliver sustaining values and beliefs that would enable them to confront and weather the endemic crises and frustrations of life, and especially modern life” (ibid., 294).

These same frustrations not only led Western intellectuals to admire dictators; they also brought them to nihilistic positions against Enlightenment traditions like liberalism. The identification with authoritarian figures and the rejection of “Western liberalism” are impulses of what Pascal Bruckner (2010, 21) calls a masochistic “penitential class,” who, because of their guilt about colonialism, turn their back on the values of the Enlightenment. Today, radical scholars from the Global North seek to theorize the Global South in opposition to a static, liberal North/West. Some are so cavalier that they dismiss even the most humane of Enlightenment traditions such as human rights. For example, Jean and John Comaroff (2001, 39–40), purveyors of “theory from the south,” diminish the value of human rights by comparing rights-based thinking to contemporary capitalism, contending that “If law underpins the langue of neoliberalism, constitutionalism has become the parole of universal human rights, a global argot that individuates the citizen and, by making cultural identity a private asset, rather than a collective claim, transmutes difference into likeness.”

Such purple prose is merely academese for the tired argument that individualistic human rights are incompatible with collectivist societies. In fact, the same argument was better phrased by the spokesperson of the authoritarian Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, when he was justifying the murder of thousands of drug suspects. “The liberal Western values being imposed upon an Asian nation that places premium on common good,” he argued, “is both insensitive and displays a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (Quoted in Esmaquel 2017). Western intellectuals do not always directly endorse demagogues, but they are tempted by cool detachment to speak like them.

Hollander (2016, 9) contends that many pro-dictatorship intellectuals endorsed authoritarianism from a distance, and many of them “had little to gain, or lose” in their judgments. Until today, many illiberal commentators on the Global South from the Global North do so from far away, secure that constitutional rights do not collapse overnight in places like the United States or Europe—Donald Trump and the European far-right notwithstanding. Unfortunately, for those of us in places like the Philippines, a human rights regime may disintegrate overnight, as in the case of Duterte’s Philippines. Rizal’s country was once a broken, if relatively stable, liberal democracy. After the collapse of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship in 1986, it slowly inched its way toward some semblance of a liberal democracy, where regular elections occurred, civil society movements focused on institution building, and relatively open elections occurred (Quimpo 2008; Curato 2015; Thompson 1996). In 2016, the country was taken over by a murderous demagogue.

This collapse of liberal democracy occurs amid thunderous applause, with Duterte remaining popular despite a drug war that has killed thousands. Because Duterte has devalued his country’s human rights tradition—“If it concern human rights, I don’t give a shit”—he once claimed (Quoted in Holmes 2016)—he has also devalued life. Survey data shows that the majority of Filipinos believe that extra-judicial killings are occurring under the drug war, yet a significant majority remain supportive of the government’s draconian campaign (Pulse Asia Research Inc. 2017). Such is the moral crisis that Duterte has created.

When Rizal argued that pain purified liberalism, he was expressing a profound but obvious insight: Those who have had liberty denied them value it even more. Those who believe that liberty may slip away are more cautious in their criticisms of basic freedoms. For a liberal in the Philippines, the truth of this message can be found in the most quotidian contexts. Many liberals in my country have had to fight for liberal values in religious schools, patriarchal families, and other conservative institutions. Under Duterte , they fight amid an electorate that is increasingly proving susceptible to the temptations of authoritarianism. It is an everyday struggle for everyday changes.

Liberalism continues to be pragmatic. It is pragmatic for those who see the concrete needs of postcolonies, for thinkers like Rizal who seek evolving modernities for their nations. For Nigerian philosopher Olúfẹmi Táíwò (2014, 10), seeking these modernities requires being less concerned with the provenance of ideas and more with their usefulness. He contends “that the countries of Asia and Latin America that have transformed themselves for the better are precisely the ones that have wised up to the idea that—regardless of what they think of modernity and the West, which has most benefited from its proliferation—a good way to improve their lot in the world is to borrow some pages from the West’s playbook.”

While liberalism is an inadequate philosophy—it constantly has to grapple with its bourgeois origins—many of its principles are necessary checks against the excesses of political power. The fault of liberalism’s critics has been to view it as an ends in itself instead of a system of guarantees, a bare minimum of treating citizens in a political community with what Orwell called “common decency.” The history of liberalism has shown how many ideas can be grafted onto the liberal project. Social democracy, for example, represented liberalism coming to terms with class inequality. And, indeed, as Tony Judt (2010, 52) has argued, it was the welfare that bound citizens to the state’s liberal institutions.

Liberalism grows. Liberal America once had slaves. Liberal countries from across the world refused women the right to vote. And many liberal states once had colonies, which they exploited. But because of anti-colonial liberals like Rizal, we now recognize colonialism as a contradiction of the liberal project. This recognition is a gift of the Enlightenment, and someone like Rizal had no qualms about appropriating what he saw in Europe, and grafting them into colonial contexts. He would have agreed with Bruckner (2010, 28) who contends that “There is no doubt that Europe has given birth to monsters, but at the same time it has given birth to theories that make it possible to understand and destroy these monsters.”

The rise of global populism and authoritarianism means we can no longer dismiss liberal principles as lightly, since anti-liberalism feeds into the rhetoric of present-day dictators. The Philippine liberal tradition runs deep, but it is always in a precarious position, especially now. For those of us who seek comfort amid the tribulations of the present, we may return to Rizal’s enigmatic vision of liberalism being a “plant that never dies.” The liberal tradition may be in tatters, but we only need to replant its seeds and await its resurrection.

#### Abdicating a defense of lib-ism’s self-correcting capacities leaves the vacuum open for authoritarianism while removing any checks on its rise

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In all the criticisms cited above, critics reduce liberalism to a static idea, holding it up to the most stringent criteria, which are not equally applied to other existing political models. (To muster such vitriol against Marxism would certainly elicit accusations of fascistic anti-Communism). But any nuanced history of liberal thought must acknowledge the steady expansion of liberalism’s political and ethical horizons. Edmund Fawcett, for example, has shown how liberalism, which began as a credo of the elites (liberty for a select few) grew into liberal democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and thus became a grammar for mass politics (2014, 143). Thus, while we may concede that liberal ideas have previously marginalized women, the poor, and various racial others, we must also note its historical capacity for self-correction. Scholars like Mehta or Go are quick to point out liberalism’s sins but neglect how relatively quickly some of these sins were rectified.

Liberalism’s expansiveness is present even in the US-based civic-liberalism that scholars like Go deride. For, as Richard Rorty reminds us, while the United States has had a history of subjugation and hypocrisy, its greatest minds, such as Walt Whitman and John Dewey, constantly infused their critiques with a vision of what a more inclusive US society could be in the future (1997, 8). The liberal experiment, always in the process of becoming, was premised on “replacing shared knowledge of what is already real with social hope for what might become real” (18). Liberalism is an idea centered on progress, and progress assumes that mistakes were once made. Otherwise, what are we to progress from?

Much of anti-liberal postcolonial theorization is built on straw men [straw persons], based on incomplete histories of both Northern and Southern liberalisms, and on assumptions about political models that have not or cannot be tested. More importantly, these critiques do not seriously consider their implications in the Global South, where problems like poverty and violence are immediate and pressing, making ameliorative reform more urgent. Moreover, the institutional blueprint of a liberal democracy is necessary to maintain a baseline of politics that prevents the excesses of authoritarianism and the ethical relativism that enables it. As Dipesh Chakrabarty prosaically yet correctly concedes, “we do not in modernity and as yet, know of desirable institutional arrangements in public life that could be seriously built on principles other than those of liberalism” (emphasis in original, 2001, 126). When those desirable institutional arrangements collapse, polities enter periods of violent crisis. This is currently happening in the Philippines.

Duterte and the Attack on the Liberal State

Anti-liberalism in aid of authoritarianism has a long tradition in Asia. Pitting “Asian” communal values against Western individualism has served to justify various repressive measures, from racist bumiputra laws in Malaysia to press censorship in Singapore. In India, the communalist rhetoric of the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People’s Party) positions itself against the “foreign” liberalism of intellectuals. For this final section, I want to examine how this same rhetoric has been reproduced in the Philippines by the populist strongman Rodrigo Duterte, who has not only prosecuted a bloody war on drugs, but has also denigrated and weakened the liberal democratic institutions of his country.

As we saw earlier, the anti-colonial liberalism of figures like Rizal birthed the Philippine nation. The prominence of liberal intellectuals continued throughout the American colonial period and the postwar period of independence. Educators pushed for pedagogy that was informed by John Dewey’s liberal internationalism (Claudio 2015a), diplomats were integral to the formation of a global human rights architecture at the United Nations (Claudio 2015b), and economic debates were centered on the liberal management of an export industry (Claudio 2017, 45–71). For many Filipinos, the claim that their country represented the success of a US-style liberal democracy in Asia was more than postcolonial lip service.

The country’s liberal experiment ground to a halt in 1972, when President Ferdinand Marcos implemented martial law to perpetuate himself in power. The dictator padlocked congress, arrested activists and opposition leaders, and shut down what many considered the freest press in Asia. Marcos’s downfall in 1986 restored liberal democracy, but this restored democracy was fragile. Thirty years after the fall of Marcos, another budding dictator has emerged to challenge the country’s liberal tradition. As a candidate in 2016, Rodrigo Duterte ran on a wave of popular disillusionment with the liberal reformism of his predecessor, Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III (2010–2016)—son of former president Corazon Aquino (1988– 1992) and martyred anti-Marcos opposition senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Though President Aquino and his Liberal Party were consistently popular for the majority of his six-year term, a congressional corruption scandal and a botched military operation dented the president’s reputation during his final years in office. Moreover, quotidian problems such as worsening traffic in the already gridlocked Metropolitan Manila area raised frustration with government.

Duterte emerged seemingly out of nowhere, a little-known mayor from the southern city of Davao. Commentators thought he would fail to compete with the popularity and machinery of the three leading mainstream candidates, which included the daughter of the country’s most famous action star, the incumbent vice president, and Aquino’s interior secretary. Duterte’s rise was first a blip that became unstoppable, and it caught Filipino pundits off guard. Yet his campaign tapped into multiple dormant impulses in the electorate: authoritarian nostalgia, a disdain for Manila-based politicians, and impatience with reformism. His campaign tagline, “change is coming,” as Anne Applebaum correctly notes, had “the same empty appeal as ‘make American great again’” (2016). Like the United States’ Donald Trump, it was this emptiness, couched in unbridled anger, which turned Duterte into an empty canvas for various forms of disaffection.7

From the fall of the Marcos in 1986 to Duterte’s assumption of power, the Philippines had been involved in a slow if uneven process of redemocratization. Within this period, memories of the bloodless EDSA “People Power” revolution that unseated Marcos became the organizing mnemonic template of the post-Marcos state.8 Its heroes, particularly Corazon Aquino (widow of a slain opposition senator and Marcos’s successor), became enshrined as the secular saints of the post-authoritarian republic in a Manichean divide that separated the forces of democracy and those of the dictatorship (Claudio 2013). During this period, the country developed a robust, grassroots democratic culture—largely a product of the various civil society organizations that emerged from the ashes of the anti-Marcos opposition. Despite the vibrancy of what political scientist Nathan Quimpo labeled the Philippine “contested democracy,”—led by a free-flowing, non-Communist Left—certain problems remained intractable (2008). In particular, violent political dynasties and local machine politicians continued to dominate regional politics. As Benedict Anderson explains, the end of the Marcos regime may have ended authoritarianism, but it brought back the system of oligarch-led “cacique democracy” (1998). Many voters and commentators saw Duterte as a cure to the dominance of the oligarchs. That Duterte himself came from a local oligarchic background became irrelevant. His anti-elitism manifested in a rough-talking rhetorical style that separated him from the cultivated candidates of the “establishment.” The violence began even before Duterte took office, with drug-related vigilante killings spiking mere days after the election. As president, Duterte has overseen the bloodiest display of state power in Philippine history. Conservative estimates place the death toll at 7,000 as of August 2017 (Kine 2017). Although there are no accurate statistics for the death toll under Marcos (the mass killings occurred in remote provinces), the velocity of killing under Duterte is unprecedented. Beyond the violence, Duterte has also poisoned public discourse and damaged political institutions. Apart from destroying the reputation of Aquino’s Liberal Party, he has also challenged the country’s liberal tradition by glorifying the late dictator Marcos, whose remains the president buried in the country’s hero’s cemetery. As with most populists, it is sometimes difficult to determine what Duterte stands for. It is clear, however, what he is against. For Duterte, notes Walden Bello, “the target is liberal-democracy—the dominant ideology and political system of our time” (2017, np). Much like Trump and Vladimir Putin, Duterte’s propaganda machinery relies heavily on networks of social media trolls who share fake news and promote conspiracy theories. A primary target of trolling operations and presidential pronouncements has been the beleaguered Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent constitutional body that seeks to investigate the state’s alleged human rights violations. In late 2017, the Duterte-controlled House of Representatives (the lower house) voted to allocate a mere P1,000 Philippine pesos (20 USD) for its annual budget, a stunt celebrated by Duterte’s online supporters (Cupin 2017). Though the defunding was soon corrected by a more circumspect Senate (upper house), it sent a message that the liberal constitutional framework of the Philippines was collapsing with thunderous applause. Duterte and his allies represent institutions that promote human rights as hindrances to the president’s mission of national renewal. When the United Nations special rapporteur on summary executions requested to investigate the killings, Duterte’s government rejected the offer. The president’s spokesperson justified the decision by claiming that the UN was seeking to impose “liberal Western values” on “an Asian nation that places premium on common good” The UN was, he concluded, “both insensitive and display[ed] a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture” (quoted in Esmaquel 2017, np). Always more pithy, Duterte himself claimed that, “if it involves human rights, I don’t give a shit” (quoted in Holmes 2016, np).

Alas, Duterte’s rhetoric has worked. Into his second year in office, the President enjoys over 80% approval rating (“Pulse: Duterte...” 2017), largely from a population that does not care how many die as long as it does not affect them. The triumph of what commentators have called “Dutertismo” is complete, and it proves that there are, indeed, alternatives to liberal politics. Whether these alternatives are desirable is a different matter.

Conclusion

Global liberalism is in crisis. Duterte’s rise in the Philippines is just one example of the illiberal, populist backlash triggered by multiple causes, including the inequalities of economic globalization, the smugness of the liberal elite, and the appeal of strongman rule.

It would be extreme and certainly false to claim that anti-liberal postcolonial theory or theory from the South caused or even contributed to the rise of global populism. Doing so would confuse the symptom for the cause. Yet we must also hold intellectuals to task for failing to rise to the defense of basic common principles anchored on liberal ideals of dignity, tolerance, human rights, and, yes, a certain degree of universalism. For the historian Tony Judt (1988), what is necessary is a renewed moralism in intellectual life—the responsibility to confront political excesses and intellectual flights of fancy. Such an approach would temper the cynicism, cool detachment, and disdain for the Enlightenment that defines much writing on the Global South.

The anti-liberal theorizing on the Global South by scholars working in the Global North may be a safe exhaust valve for their frustrations and boredom with the liberal democracy they experience every day. Trump notwithstanding, liberal institutions are stronger in places like the United States and Europe and can therefore be taken for granted, even maligned. But the same cannot be said of the Global South, where liberal democratic institutions can collapse almost overnight, as they have in Duterte’s Philippines. To put things in blunt and moralistic terms: my president is slaughtering my countrymen by the thousands, justifying the murders by dismissing liberalism and human rights as “Western.” I do not have the luxury of “problematizing” human rights as symptomatic of the era of “neoliberalism.” Scholars should be careful of the illiberalism they wish for in the Global North, because we in the Global South just might get it in the form of a bloodthirsty autocrat.

A restoration of liberal democratic principles in my country is urgent—a matter of life and death. And it is with this sense of urgency that we must rethink liberalism in the Global South, not as an endpoint of political development (“end of history”), but as the bare minimum of democratic politics. A liberalism for the Global South must be simultaneously anchored on realism and hopefulness. A moralist’s liberal stance must be anchored on, to corrupt what Gramsci said for Marxist ends, a pessimism of the intellect conjoined with an optimism of the will. Except, since liberalism refuses to foreground a revolutionary break along the horizon, it leaves more room for optimism. As modus vivendi, liberalism has no telos; it is never fully complete. Hence it is never fully a success or a failure.

The Global South, like liberalism, is a provisional and syncretic project, built on imagined networks of solidarity yet anchored on the necessity of everyday political praxis. They are both open, because they are both in perennial translation. As Arjun Appadurai contends, it is in liberalism that we find seeds of cosmopolitanism, because it is premised on “self-expansion” (2005, 434). This self-expansion may lead us into new theoretical horizons (even new forms of socialism), but it will remain anchored on basic principles: the respect for autonomy, the tolerance of other opinions, and the primacy of human rights. We uphold these values in both the Global North and the Global South.

#### Their Ks of lib-ism lack scholarly rigor and have it backwards—lib-ism’s failings come from it not being vigorously defended enough and historical anti-colonial resistance explicitly reflected liberal values—their K independently dooms positive reform in the Global South

Claudio, 17—Associate Professor at De La Salle University Manila's College of Liberal Arts (Lisandro, “Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte's Philippines,” The Global South, Volume 11, Number 2, Fall 2017, pp. 92-107, dml)

First is the claim that liberalism is a universalizing Enlightenment idea that has imposed itself on colonial societies. In displacing other forms of non-Western thinking, critics say it creates a hierarchy between a civilized/liberal subject and an uncivilized/illiberal one, thus allowing for the violence of colonialism. The most prominent writer in this vein is Uday Singh Mehta (1999), who argues that imperialism was not a contradiction within liberal thought but inherent in it.2 Through colonialism, he contends, liberalism “found a project, with all the grandeur of scale, implicit permanence, purposefulness, and the absence of a need to negotiate with what is extant” (12). Mehta based his account largely on a critique of British liberalism and its effects on colonial India. But others have applied his arguments to other liberal empires. By examining the United States’ colonial expansion in the late nineteenth century, Julian Go challenges the narrative of an inclusive liberal nationalism in the US. He contends that one must think of “civic-liberal nations as liberal empire-states” (emphasis in original, 2017, 74). Drawing from the influential anti-liberalism of Losurdo (2014), Go claims that both “are predicated upon a core hierarchized binary of citizen and Other—that is, between those who are members of the community because they are rational, mature, and civilized, and those who are not” (74). It is in this manner, he concludes, that US liberalism has excluded various subaltern groups, from African-American slaves to colonial-era Filipinos.

To the critique exemplified by Mehta and Go, I offer two replies. First, liberalism’s universalism does not necessarily lead to colonialism. In fact, is it reasonable for a liberal who believes in rational deliberation to violently impose a set of beliefs on entire peoples? Scholars like Mehta are wont to emphasize the universalizing desires of liberalism (its first face), but they have neglected its other face, what Gray calls liberalism as modus vivendi—a liberalism that allows for “common institutions in which many forms of life can coexist” (2000, 6). A modus vivendi cannot be colonialism. And neither is colonialism a way of ordering liberty through institutions that enhance individual and collective freedoms. I must concede that at various points in liberalism’s history, the pendulum has swung towards its more universalizing tendencies. Yet to contend, as anti-liberal postcolonial theorists do, that liberalism is a universalizing project that imposes itself on divergent belief systems relies on an incomplete vision of the liberal project.

A second reply relates to simple logic. It is, of course, true that liberalism creates “others.” But what political movement is bereft of an inside and outside? Marxism constructs the proletariat in relation to the bourgeoisie, nationalism has foreigners, various forms of identity politics insist on the primacy of specific subject positions over others, and religions have non-believers. In the sense that it sees the world through a political subject, liberalism is no different from other philosophies that create bonds of community. And while philosophers have theorized more fluid conceptions of political belonging— Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhizomatic” subjectivity (1988), which inspired Hardt and Negri’s conception of the amorphous “multitude” (2005)—it is not clear that these ideas have produced long-term movements or concrete agendas, especially in the Global South.

The second claim is that liberalism is a modernist credo external to the experiences of the Global South and postcolonies and thus out of sync with the necessities of today. We have already noted how de Sousa Santos views the “indifference” of liberalism as anathema to the radical needs of the South. And we have also examined how the Comaroffs view liberalism as a “parochial” remnant of Euro-American modernity inapplicable to the Global South, both because it comes from Europe and America, and because it is anchored on outdated beliefs about the rule of law. Elsewhere, the Comaroffs contend that the liberal belief in “the capacity for constitutionalism and contract, rights and legal remedies to accomplish order, civility, justice, empowerment” is a form of legal “fetishism” that is ultimately “chimerical,” especially in postcolonial contexts. This kind of politics, then, becomes nothing but a pyramid scheme: “The more it is indulged, the more it is required” (2001, 38).

Again I offer two replies. First, a history of liberalism shows that its potency as a political credo is not limited to the West. Of course, we cannot deny that much of liberalism’s early history lies in Europe and that the US became a major hub of liberal experimentation; liberalism’s place in what the Comaroffs label the “Euro-American” past is not up for debate. But because liberalism may encompass shifting subjectivities, political actors have been able to redefine liberalism within colonial contexts. Mehta is correct that imperialists deployed liberal rhetoric to justify expansionist policy. Nevertheless, the earliest anti-colonial movements were likewise liberal in nature, and, I would argue, more in line with the tenets of classical liberalism. Anti-colonial radicals in Spanish America, as Richard J. Evans notes, corresponded and collaborated with European liberals, forming a liberal and radical “international whose connections spanned the Atlantic” (2016, 17).

Spain was a crucial node in this liberal internationalism; its various patriotic societies, which emerged after the Napoleonic wars, inspired similar organizations throughout the continent (Evans 2016, 39). It is thus unsurprising that European liberalism spread to Asia through the Spanish colony of the Philippines. Historians John Schumacher (1991, 31) and Nick Joaquin (2005, 24–35) have posited that the propaganda movement that paved the way for the Philippine revolution of 1896 (the first anti-colonial revolution in Asia) was birthed within a local liberal tradition that mixed with nationalist anti-colonialism. Recent evidence has shown, moreover, that, like the French revolution, the Philippine revolution was also liberal in character.3

Critics view liberalism through the eyes of “liberal” imperialists, but they are silent about how colonized actors themselves articulated concepts of liberty and human rights from their subaltern positions. Philippine national hero, the polymath novelist and polemicist Jose Rizal, saw in the liberal tenets of the French declaration of rights a blueprint for a society after colonialism, translating the declaration for his countrymen during a sojourn in Hong Kong (Schumacher 1997, 270). He was a liberal who criticized colonialism on liberal grounds and believed that liberals who abetted colonial rule were untrue to their principles. Writing in 1890, Rizal claimed that if Spanish liberals in the Philippines had “more faith in their ideals,” they would resist the colonial rule of Catholic friars and that “modern ideas” would not “be asphyxiated upon touching the shores of Manila” (1964, 289).

If it is true that the one consistent feature of liberalism’s history has been the “constant opposition to assorted tyrannies,” then the more authentic liberals were those in colonial contexts, who argued that colonialism was tyranny writ large (Ryan 2012, 28). For the Filipino propagandists, there was a sense that liberalism could be purified in colonial contexts.4 “Liberals” in positions of power more easily succumb to tyranny, thereby turning their backs on their very own principles. A correction of liberalism could thus occur in places of disempowerment. What prevents Global South thinkers from appropriating this liberal anti-colonialism today? This appropriation would not be a wholesale adoption of modernity and Enlightenment. Rather, as in the case of Filipino propagandists, it would begin by grappling with rights and liberties in the postcolony, seeing how these can be enhanced and purified in these new contexts.

My second reply to the argument about liberalism’s inapplicability to the postcolonial politics of the present rests on pragmatism. Modernist politics based on principles like constitutionalism may be wanting, but what are our alternatives? This is a trite response, but it bears repeating, especially in the context of the Global South, where people starve and immediate, even palliative, change is urgent. Reformism is not anathema to postcolonial societies. A fairer legal system that allows the poor to be treated equal under the law— one that affords them worthy defenses in criminal trials, one that prevents them from being kicked off their land and denied their property—is a sustainable goal that we must aspire for. And the Global South would do well to aspire for social services like state-sponsored healthcare (more dysfunctional in the Philippines than even the United States) that curb the worst violences of the “neoliberalism” that anti-liberals decry.

Presumably, the advocates of non-modernist anti-liberalism from the Global South anchor their vision of change on a renewed revolutionary politics that challenges the core structures of contemporary capitalist societies. For them, another world is possible. But what are political actors in the Global South left to do while the theoreticians figure out how and when the revolutionary break will occur? Liberalism promotes a baseline of slow yet functional politics that tempers the nihilism of much radical thinking. But, a stable base of political rights may open new possibilities that may also tickle our collective imaginations. Slow does not mean uninspiring.

## PERM

### Perm – Do Both

#### Perm: do both

#### NOT mutually exclusive

McDonald 17 Matt McDonald, Reader in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “Critical security in the Asia-Pacific: an introduction,” Critical Studies on Security, 5(3), 2017, pp.237-252, DOI [10.1080/21624887.2017.1420125](https://doi.org/10.1080/21624887.2017.1420125) /GoGreen!

There is also evidence to support the idea that in some instances, states are emphasising non-traditional security issues and cooperation associated with it as a mechanism for consolidating strategic partnerships driven by more traditional strategic concerns. This might be applied to the example of responses to the 2004 tsunami. Here, the United States, Japan, India and Australia established a coalition to coordinate aid delivery, in the process solidifying strategic relations while responding to regional disaster. Such a development suggests challenges associated with making clear distinctions between a traditional and non-security agenda, challenges heightened if non-traditional security is still viewed through the lens of state security.4

These issues raise important questions about the politics of security as applied to critical approaches, especially those that wish to contribute to debates about security practices: should our aim be to speak truth to power and articulate a bold vision for substantially different sets of approaches and actors, or to engage those institutions and actors with the capacity to enact change, attempting to encourage more progressive practices in the process? Of course, this is a simplistic binary in the sense that scholarship (and individual scholars) can do both. But it serves to remind us of the importance of engaging with the politics of security. This is central to Lee Wilson’s discussion of dynamics and practices of security in Indonesia in this special issue. Ultimately, we should be in a position to articulate grounds for incremental progressive change to those with the power to enact it, even while compelling ourselves to keep sight of a vision of security that is genuinely ethically defensible. This is a challenge for a critical approach to security, but one which intellectual openness, humility and reflexivity – combined with acceptance of a division of academic labour within the broad contours of such an approach – might go some way to addressing.

#### There’s no essential incompatibility between securitization and transformation – adding the ALT overcomes residual links, or it was never effective in the first place

Loader 7 Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology and Director of the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford; and Neil Walker, Professor of European Law in the Department of Law at the European University Institute, and the Tercentenary Professor of Law at the University of Edinburgh; *Civilizing Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-511-28506-6, pp.89-93 /GoGreen!

These critical observations on the current security constellation impart some valuable warnings, some of which, as noted, are shared by liberal critics of the ‘war on terror’. They suggest, first and foremost, that democratic societies risk spiralling into a vicious circle of terror–fear–repression whose all too likely consequence is the erosion, perhaps even demise, of democratic government and the rule of law (Rorty 2004). As political elites respond to acts of terror with ‘security measures’ that seek to assuage public insecurity (and anger) by further empowering police and military institutions, they do several things: not only do they direct the resources of the partisan state at already often unpopular and over-policed minority populations (both at home and abroad); they also institutionalize public anxiety in ways that make it difficult to envisage cultural conditions that will permit ‘temporary’ exceptional measures to be repealed, and leave themselves with little practical choice but to respond to the next terrorist attack with yet more – still tougher – ‘security solutions’. As each ‘ordering measure brings into being new ambiguities and ambivalences which call for further measures, the chase never ends’ (Bauman and Tester 2001: 79; see, also, Dillon 1996: 127).

For liberals the practical task is to find ways of responding to terror (and the fear and loathing that it generates, or reinforces, or renews) in ways that break out of this insecurity-heightening, democracy-corroding spiral (see, for example, Ackerman 2004; Ignatieff 2004; Dyzenhaus and Hunt forthcoming). This too, more broadly, is the impulse that informs this book – one that holds that it is possible in this field to envisage and create virtuous circles that both civilize security and release the civilizing potential of security. The variant of state scepticism we have been concerned with here presses, however, a more disquieting claim – one that presents a serious critique of such possibilities. From this perspective there is no obvious route away from a world in which exceptionalism has become what Agamben (2004a: 2 and passim) calls ‘the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics’ – and certainly not one which travels under the banner of security. We are faced with what looks set to become an unceasing war against terror in which partisan, exceptional states name and chase new enemies, fortify borders as they violate them, suspend law in the name of law, and undermine democracy in an effort to save it. How, in such a world, the leftist state sceptic asks, can we speak meaningfully about, let alone begin to construct, a socially coherent project of collective security?

Against security?

The strands of radical thought outlined in this chapter offer a cogent critique of the state and its securitizing practices. It is a critique that appears able to capture important aspects of a historical record that has seen states time and again, in both authoritarian and democratic contexts, allocate the benefits and burdens of policing in ways that systematically protect the security interests of powerful constituencies at the expense of those of the poor and dispossessed. It supplies, in addition, a cogent account of the dangers of placing security at the ideological heart of government, of the capacity of security politics to colonize public policy and pervade social life in ways that threaten democratic values and sustain fear-laden, other-disregarding forms of political subjectivity and collective identity. In these respects, this variant of state scepticism offers a critique of the operation and effects of state power that in many significant respects we share (N. Walker 2000; Loader 2002). But it also poses what are undoubtedly some profound challenges to the position we wish here to construct and defend. If we are to make a persuasive case for both the good of security, and the indispensability of the state to the production of that good, then we need to find a means of rising to them.

These objections then are far from trivial, and we have not devoted this chapter to them simply in order to knock them down. But they nonetheless arise from a standpoint that is not itself without shortcomings, as we hope to show in meeting them. As a prelude to the more sustained effort along these lines that we offer in part II, let us consider briefly what these shortcomings are. For analytic purposes, they may usefully be put into three groups.

This radical variant of state scepticism tends, first of all, to underplay the openness of political systems and the theoretical and political prospects that this affords. It displays, in particular, a structural fatalism that overlooks the overlap between the production of specific and general order, such that disadvantaged groups and communities have a considerable stake not only in controlling state power, but also in using public resources (including policing resources) as a means of generating more secure forms of economic and social existence. It also remains insufficiently attentive to how the mix between general and specific order (the extent, in other words, to which policing is shaped by common as well as factional interests) is conditioned by political struggle and the varieties of institutional settlement to which this gives rise, thereby varying over time and between polities. Much the same point, moreover, can be directed at the radical critique of the violence that underpins liberal political orders that aim to be free of such violence. One finds here a quite proper insistence on the troubling conundrum that democratic polities ultimately depend upon coercion to enforce collective decisions and protect democratic institutions. But this point is hammered home in terms that are overly sweeping and reductionist – often, as in the writings of Agamben (2004a), as a philosophical claim that invites but resists sociological scrutiny. If ‘there is always a violence at the heart of every form of political and legal authority’ (Newman 2004: 575), upon what grounds can we distinguish between, or develop a critique of, the security-seeking practices of particular states – and why would we bother?

Radical anti-statism evinces, secondly, a preference for social and political criticism over social and political reconstruction. It favours a politics that privileges the monitoring, exposure and critique of the systematic biases of state power (as, for instance, in the indefatigable efforts of the British-based NGO Statewatch), one that implicitly or expressly holds that ‘security’ is so stained by its uncivil association with the (military and police) state that the only available radical strategy is to destabilize the term itself, while contesting the practices that are enacted under its name (Dalby 1997: 6; see, also, Dillon 1996: ch. 1). There can, from this vantage point, be no progressive democratic politics aimed at civilizing security. Rather, one is left with a politics of critique, and a failure of political imagination, that leaves radically underspecified the feasible or desirable alternatives to current institutional configurations and practices, or else merely gestures towards the possibility of transcendent forms of non-state communal ordering – as in George Rikagos’s (2002: 150) claim that ‘the only real alternatives to current policing practices are pre-capitalist, non-commodified security arrangements’.

Finally, one finds what we think of as a one-sided appraisal of the sources of inequality and insecurity in the world today. This leftist anti-statist sensibility tends, in the ways we have demonstrated, towards an account of social injustice that views it as the product of the state’s malign and coercive interventions rather than of its impotence and neglect. Here one finds a curious parallel with the neo-liberalism considered in the last chapter – the state remains the problem. But one also encounters a critique of security politics that views it as tied to the production of authoritarian government – as if security is in some essential fashion inimical to democracy and human rights. Here the radical critic begins to inhabit similar ground to that occupied by what we characterized in chapter 1 as the ‘security lobby’. They assess the landscape very differently and commit to diametrically opposed political purposes. But they cling commonly and tenaciously to the belief that security stands opposed to liberty.

Our aim, in part II, is to move beyond these positions and oppositions: first, by retrieving the idea of security as a public good that is axiomatic both to the production of other goods (most directly, liberty) and to the constitution of democratic political communities; second, by arguing that the production of this good demands not the wholesale critique and transcendence of state forms, but more robust regulatory interventions by democratized state institutions. We must first, however, factor into our positive case two further critiques of the state, starting with the claim that it is a cultural monolith.

## ALT

### AT: ALT – Poststructuralism

#### The ALT solves nothing – BUT even if it did, transition wars outweigh

Jarvis 2K Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Senior Lecturer, Government & International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney, PhD University of British Columbia, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism: Defending the Discipline, University of South Carolina Press, 2000, ISBN 1-57003-305-6, pp.128-129 /GoGreen!

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recommends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley’s torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, modernism, or realism emanate a “violence” that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self-professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, published, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theoretical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even revolutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as “Down with positivism and rationality”? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of wrar in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocuous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations.

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any wray speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations?

On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problcmatize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.38

Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those w ho struggle at marginal places.

#### No purchase in academia nor outside

O’Callaghan 2 Terry O’Callaghan, Lecturer in the School of International Studies, University of South Australia, “Jim George and the Repudiation of Realism: Challenging Postmodern Wisdom,” Chapter 3, *International Relations and the “Third Debate”: Postmodernism and its Critics*, ed. Darryl S.L. Jarvis, Praeger, 2002, ISBN 0-275-96000-5, pp.80-82 /GoGreen!

There are also a host of technological and logistical questions that plague George’s scheme and make problematic his recommendations. For example, through what medium are those on the fringes of the international system going to speak to the world? Although it may be true that the third world has now been integrated into the global polity via the advent of technological innovations in communications, allowing for remote access to information sources and the Internet, it also remains true that the majority of those on the fringes continue to be disenfranchised from such mediums, whether as a result of a lack of economic resources, the prevalence of illiteracy, or social, cultural and political circumstances that systemically exclude, women (among others) from economic resources and certain political and social freedoms. Need we remind George that social, political, and individual autonomy is at a minimum in these parts of the world, and an intellectual approach as controversial as postmodernism is not likely to achieve the sorts of goals that George optimistically foreshadows. Indeed, on practical questions such as these, matters otherwise central to the success of postmodern visions, George prefers to be vague, suggesting instead that the intricacies of such details will somehow work themselves out in a manner satisfactory to all. Such a position reveals George’s latent idealism and underscores how George’s schema is an intellectual one: a theory of international politics written for other theorists of international politics. George’s audience is thus a very limited and elite audience and begs the question of whether a senior, middle-class scholar in the intellectual heartland of Australia can do anything of real substance to aid the truly marginalized and oppressed. How is it possible to put oneself in the shoes of the “other,” to advocate on his or her behalf, when such is done from a position of affluence, unrelated to and far removed from the experiences of those whom George otherwise champions? Ideals are all good and well, but it is hard to imagine that the computer keyboard is mightier than the sword, and hard to see how a small, elite, affluent assortment of intellectuals is going to generate the type of political momentum necessary to allow those on the fringes to speak and be heard! 1 .

Moreover, why should we assume that states and individuals want to listen and will listen to what the marginalized and the oppressed have to say? There is precious little evidence to suggest that “listening” is something the advanced capitalist countries do very well at all. Indeed, one of the allegations so forcefully alleged by Muslim fundamentalists as justification for the terrorist attacks of September I I is precisely that the West, and America in particular, are deaf to the disenfranchised and impoverished in the world. Certainly, there are agencies and individuals who are sensitive to the needs of the “marginalized” and who champion institutional forums where indigenous voices can be heard. But on even the most optimistic reckoning, such forums and institutions represent the exception, not the rule, and remain in the minority if not dwarfed by those institutions that represent Western, first world interests. To be sure, this is a realist power-political image of the current configuration of the global polity, but one apparently, and ironically, endorsed by George if only because it speaks to the realities of the marginalized, the imposed silences, and the multitude of oppressions on which George founds his call for a postmodern ethic.

Recognizing such realities, however, does not explain George’s penchant for ignoring them entirely, especially in terms of the structural rigidities they pose for meaningful reform. Indeed, George’s desire to move to a new “space beyond International Relations” smacks of wishful idealism, ignoring the current configuration of global political relations and power distribution; of the incessant ideological power of hyperindividualism, consumerism, advertising, Hollywood images, and fashion icons; and of the innate power bestowed on the (institutional) barons of global finance, trade, and transnational production. George seems to have little appreciation of the structural impediments such institutions pose for radical change of the type he so fiercely advocates. Revolutionary change of the kind desired by George ignores that fact that many individuals are not disposed to concerns beyond their family, friends, and daily work lives. And institutional, structural transformation requires organized effort, mass popular support, and dogged single-mindedness if societal norms are to be challenged, institutional reform enacted, consumer tastes altered, and political sensibilities reformed. Convincing Nike that there is something intrinsically wrong with paying Indonesian workers a few dollars a week to manufacture shoes for the global market requires considerably more effort than postmodern platitudes and/or moral indignation. The cycle of wealth creation and distribution that sees Michael Jordan receive multimillion dollar contracts to inspire demand for Nike products, while the foot soldiers in the factory eke out a meager existence producing these same products is not easily, or realistically, challenged by pronouncements of moving beyond International Relations to a new, nicer, gentler nirvana.

More generally, of course, what George fails to consider is the problem of apathy and of how we get people to care about the plight of others. What do we with the CEOs of multinational corporations, stockbrokers, accountants, ctory workers, and the unemployed, who, by and large, fail to consider the omeless and destitute in their own countries, let alone in places they have never isited and are never likely to visit? Moral indignation rarely translates into action, and apathy about the plight of others is a structural impediment as strong any idea, theory, or writing. What George’s treatise thus fails to consider is how we overcome this, and how we get others to listen. He needs to explain how the social, political, psychological, and moral structures that define the parameters of existence for the many millions of ordinary citizens in the first world, and that deflects attention from the marginalized and the oppressed can be broken down. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that George has thought much about this, suggesting that his commitment to postmodern theory is not likely to make much difference. In fact, in the academy the postmodern light is already beginning to dim in certain quarters, having registered scarcely a glimmer in the broader polity, where, if change was to ensue, it needed to burn brightly. Even among those versed in the nomenclature of scholarly debate, theorists of international politics remain skeptical of the value of postmodern discourse, by and large rejecting it. This does not portend well for postmodern visionaries and the future of postmodern discourse. But can George really be surprised by this? After all, his discourse indicts the “backward discipline” for complicity in crimes against humanity, calling for a repudiation of realism and with it a repudiation of the lifelong beliefs and writings of eminent theorists like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Stephen Krasner who have otherwise defined the parameters of the discipline, its projects, and research agendas. Can George really expect discipline-wide capitulation to an intellectual diaspora that would see theorists repudiate their beliefs and works in order to take up the creed of postmodernism, as vague, open-ended, and indeterminate as it is? Without a clear and credible plan of how to get from “incarceration and closure” to intellectual freedom, creativity, and openness, George’s postmodern musings have understandably attracted few disciples.

#### Poststructural analysis fails

Rodwell 5 Jonathan Rodwell, PhD candidate, Manchester Metropolitan University, post-graduate studies at The University of Birmingham, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson,” 49th Parallel: An Interdiscplinary Journal of North American Studies, iss.15, Spring 2005, <https://fortyninthparalleljournal.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/2-rodwell-trendy-but-empty.pdf> /GoGreen!

However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical.

My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value, post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding.

The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing.

To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse.

### AT: ALT – Abolish NATO

#### NATO isn’t going anywhere – refusal to participate doesn’t solve any of their impacts – nor do anything about emerging tech; regardless of the goal, security cooperation is a superior method to achieve it than NOT

Gilli 20 Andrea Gilli, Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College, former visiting and postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University, Johns Hopkins University, Columbia University, and Harvard University, ““NATO-mation”: preparing for technological transformation,” Chapter 2, *“NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence*, NDC Research Paper No.15, December 2020, pp.25-26 /GoGreen!

What are the implications of the growing capabilities and dissemination of AI, ML and BD for NATO? Is the Atlantic Alliance powerless when faced with this wave of technological change, or could it adopt some measures to handle and address the ensuing challenges and opportunities? And what should Allies do? Should they pursue arms control or promote research and development, address legal and ethical questions, or just focus on the tactical integration of these new technologies? How can the Allies exploit their combined, but diverse, set of skills, capabilities and experiences so as to harness the power of AI?

Building on the previous discussion of AI as a GPT, it appears that the challenge for NATO is subtle, multifaceted and significant. First, in an age of accelerating technological change and growing domain applicability, catching up with industry leaders and innovators becomes more and more difficult for those that lag behind.73 This means that waiting is not a solution – even though acting prematurely, in a realm of great uncertainty, is inherently difficult and risky.74 Second, governments cannot expect that individuals, firms and organizations will be able to embrace and successfully exploit the new wave of technological transformation alone, without advice, support, direction, vision or investments in infrastructure. Third, while some countries will have an advantage, others will find the transition more difficult. Regardless of this, technological transitions do not occur in a vacuum, as they require the alignment of incentives among a multiplicity of actors, organizations and institutions, as well as the provision of complementary services and goods for the new technologies to flourish and be adopted.75 Fourth, and more important for NATO, without coordinating and cooperating on their investments in the necessary complementary assets, goods and services, Allies could find themselves having to face additional hurdles.

What types of problem could emerge? Technology-generated efficiency gains in production lead to lower prices. However, lower prices lead to increases in demand – because the relative price of substitute goods (rivals) increases.76 Over the past decade, AI – and, in particular, ML – has made a particular activity, prediction, cheaper: it is reasonable to forecast that this trend will continue in the future.77 As AI becomes cheaper, however, the demand for AI-related services will increase, thus leading to more demand for related necessities like AI specialists, AI infrastructure (and 5G networks) and AI components (processors). This in turn might well lead to scarcity and higher prices, thus pitching actors against one another – not unlike the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, when individual self-interested actions led to collectively bad outcomes.78 In the context of a military alliance, the problem goes much deeper, as it can generate a beggar-thy-neighbour effect with allies competing for the same scarce resources.79 Moreover, without consultation and cooperation, Allies could end up developing different technological solutions, with the risk of undermining compatibility and interoperability. Similarly, they could end up prioritizing some problems over others, with the risk of developing multiple, different and redundant solutions while neglecting other points in need of attention.80 However, through intra-alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as dialogue and consultation, secondary market mechanisms and other approaches, NATO could provide an important contribution to identify and address this type of problems.81

## LINK

### AT: Threat Inflation

#### Our threats are real and objectively knowable – institutional incentives militate against threat inflation, NOT for

Ravenal 9 Earl C. Ravenal, Distinguished Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society, 21(1), 2009, pp.40-43 /GoGreen!

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly (not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates).

In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:

In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects—a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)

Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputations (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary.

So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision-making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:

Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop separate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.

There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.

This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.

Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.

My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.

Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations.

Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and transmitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.

My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are).

A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction.

For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious, “rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operate compared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testifies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

### AT: Objectivity Bad

#### Objectivity is good – ALT fails without it

Jones 4 Branwen Gruffydd Jonens, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, Goldsmiths University of London, Ph.D. Development Studies, University of Sussex, “From Eurocentrism to Epistemological Internationalism: power, knowledge and objectivity in International Relations,” paper presented at Theorising Ontology, Annual Conference of the International Association for Critical Realism, University of Cambridge, August 2004, <http://www.csog.group.cam.ac.uk/iacr/papers/Jones.pdf> /GoGreen!

The ‘common-sense’ view pervading recent discussions of epistemology, ontology and methodology in IR asserts that objectivity implies value-free neutrality. However, objective social inquiry has an inherent tendency to be critical, in various senses. To the extent that objective knowledge provides a better and more adequate account of reality than other ideas, such knowledge is inherently critical (implicitly or explicitly) of those ideas. 30 In other words critical social inquiry does not (or not only) manifest its ‘criticalness’ through self-claimed labels of being critical or siding with the oppressed, but through the substantive critique of prevailing ideas. Objective social knowledge constitutes a specific form of criticism: explanatory critique. The critique of dominant ideas or ideologies is elaborated through providing a more adequate explanation of aspects of the world, and in so doing exposing what is wrong with the dominant ideology. This may also entail revealing the social conditions which give rise to ideologies, thus exposing the necessary and causal relation between particular social relations and particular ideological conceptions. In societies which are constituted by unequal structures of social relations giving rise to unequal power and conflicting interests, the reproduction of those structured relations is in the interests of the powerful, whereas transformation of existing structured relations is in the interests of the weak. Because ideas inform social action they are casually efficacious either in securing the reproduction of existing social relations (usually as an unintended consequence of social practice), or in informing social action aimed at transforming social relations. This is why ideas cannot be ‘neutral’. Ideas which provide a misrepresentation of the nature of society, the causes of unequal social conditions, and the conflicting interests of the weak and powerful, will tend to help secure the reproduction of prevailing social relations. Ideas which provide a more adequate account of the way society is structured and how structured social relations produce concrete conditions of inequality and exploitation can potentially inform efforts to change those social relations. In this sense, ideas which are false are ideological and, in serving to promote the reproduction of the status quo and avoid attempts at radical change, are in the interests of the powerful. An account which is objective will contradict ideological ideas, implicitly or explicitly criticising them for their false or flawed accounts of reality. The criticism here arises not, or not only, from pointing out the coincidence between ideologies and the interests of the powerful, nor from a prior normative stance of solidarity with the oppressed, but from exposing the flaws in dominant ideologies through a more adequate account of the nature and causes of social conditions 31 . A normative commitment to the oppressed must entail a commitment to truth and objectivity, because true ideas are in the interest of the oppressed, false ideas are in the interest of the oppressors. In other words, the best way to declare solidarity with the oppressed is to declare one’s commitment to objective inquiry 32 . As Nzongola-Ntalaja (1986: 10) has put it: It is a question of whether one analyses society from the standpoint of the dominant groups, who have a vested interest in mystifying the way society works, or from the standpoint of ordinary people, who have nothing to lose from truthful analyses of their predicament. The philosophical realist theory of science, objectivity and explanatory critique thus provides an alternative response to the relationship between knowledge and power. Instead of choosing perspectives on the basis of our ethical commitment to the cause of the oppressed and to emancipatory social change, we should choose between contending ideas on the basis of which provides a better account of objective social reality. This will inherently provide a critique of the ideologies which, by virtue of their flawed account of the social world, serve the interests of the powerful. Exemplars of explanatory critique in International Relations are provided in the work of scholars such as Siba Grovogui, James Gathii, Anthony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Jacques Depelchin, Hilbourne Watson, Robert Vitalis, Sankaran Krishna, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 33 . Their work provides critiques of central categories, theories and discourses in the theory and practice of IR and narratives of world history, including assumptions about sovereignty, international society, international law, global governance, the nature of the state. They expose the ideological and racialised nature of central aspects of IR through a critical examination of both the long historical trajectory of imperial ideologies regarding colonized peoples, and the actual practices of colonialism and decolonisation in the constitution of international orders and local social conditions. Their work identifies the flaws in current ideas by revealing how they systematically misrepresent or ignore the actual history of social change in Africa, the Caribbean and other regions of the Third World, both past and present – during both colonial and neo-colonial periods of the imperial world order. Their work reveals how racism, violence, exploitation and dispossession, colonialism and neo-colonialism have been central to the making of contemporary international order and contemporary doctrines of international law, sovereignty and rights, and how such themes are glaring in their absence from histories and theories of international relations and international history. Objective social knowledge which accurately depicts and explains social reality has these qualities by virtue of its relation to its object, not its subject. As Collier argues, “The science/ideology distinction is an epistemological one, not a social one.” (Collier 1979: 60). So, for example, in the work of Grovogui, Gathii and Depelchin, the general perspective and knowledge of conditions in and the history of Africa might be due largely to the African social origins of the authors. However the judgement that their accounts are superior to those of mainstream IR rests not on the fact that the authors are African, but on the greater adequacy of their accounts with respect to the actual historical and contemporary production of conditions and change in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World. The criteria for choosing their accounts over others derives from the relation between the ideas and their objects (what they are about), not from the relation between the ideas and their subjects (who produced them). It is vital to retain explicitly some commitment to objectivity in social inquiry, to the notion that the proper criterion for judging ideas about the world lies in what they say about the world, not whose ideas they are. A fundamental problem which underlies the origin and reproduction of IR’s eurocentricity is the overwhelming dominance of ideas produced in and by the west, and the wilful and determined silencing of the voices and histories of the colonised. But the result of this fundamental problem is flawed knowledge about the world. Eurocentricity is therefore a dual problem concerning both the authors and the content of knowledge, and cannot be resolved through normative commitments alone. It is not only the voices of the colonised, but the histories of colonialism, which have been glaring in their absence from the discipline of International Relations. Overcoming eurocentricity therefore requires not only concerted effort from the centre to create space and listen to hitherto marginalised voices, but also commitment to correcting the flaws in prevailing knowledge – and it is not only ‘the Other’ who can and should elaborate this critique. A vitally important implication of objectivity is that it is the responsibility of European and American, just as much as non-American or non-European scholars, to decolonise IR. The importance of objectivity in social inquiry defended here can perhaps be seen as a form of epistemological internationalism. It is not necessary to be African to attempt to tell a more accurate account of the history of Europe’s role in the making of the contemporary Africa and the rest of the world, for example, or to write counter-histories of ‘the expansion of international society’ which detail the systematic barbarity of so-called Western civilisation. It is not necessary to have been colonised to recognise and document the violence, racism, genocide and dispossession which have characterised European expansion over five hundred years.

### T/N – Objectivity Good

#### The scientific truths that undergird our scholarship are real – poststructuralism is coopted by corporations and post-truth politicians to worse material effect than anything we said and turns ALT solvency

Gómez-Baggethun 20 Erik Gómez-Baggethun, Department of International Environment and Development Studies (Noragric), Faculty of Landscape and Society, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, and Norwegian Institute for Nature Research, “More is more: Scaling political ecology within limits to growth,” Political Geography, vol.76, January 2020, DOI 10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102095 /GoGreen!

Half a century ago, constructionist claims played an important role in critical scholarship, showing how analytical categories we take for granted as universal truths did not exist in other times and places, and exposing how these categories were exploited by elites to exercise power (e.g. Foucault, 1971). Authors like Wittgenstein, Benveniste and Lacan exposed the articulations between language and the way we understand reality, putting into question dominant forms of realism that magnified the absolute and universal character of scientific truths. In this line of reasoning, intellectuals associated with postmodern1 and post-structuralist thinking, like Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva, Foucault, Deleuze, Baudrillard, Jameson, and Lyotard challenged established beliefs surrounding scientific panaceas and the dogmas of modernity. In doing so they contributed to erode beliefs in certainties, allegedly emanating from reason, that shielded the exercise of power by endowing it with the unquestionable authority of scientific truth.

The deconstructionist machinery set in motion by these authors, however, soon proved double edged. Naïve realism –the original target of this criticism– fell in disgrace and social constructionism gradually became the mainstream in cultural studies. Eventually, and with some support of the media, vulgarized variants of this criticism contributed to expand a generalized climate of moral relativism, skepticism and cynicism that, in words by Lévy (1987: 20), installed us in an obsessively modest way of thinking that makes of uncertainty its last word, and which ‘extreme relativism has resulted in a generalized idiocy’ (cited in Naredo, 2015). In another critical account Sahlins (2002: 49) notes that ‘one of the more poignant aspects of the current postmodernist mood is the way it seems to lobotomize some of our best graduate students, to stifle their creativity for fear of making some interesting structural connection […] or a comparative generalization. The only safe essentialism left to them is that there is no order to culture’. Critics suggest that epistemic relativisms that reduce interpretations of reality to mere ‘narratives’, ‘discourses’ and ‘social constructs’ have been instrumental for today’s generalized skepticism and cynicism (Boghossian, 2007; Sokal & Bricmont, 1999; Zerzan, 1994). Naredo (2015) further notes that this epistemic climate, initially conceived as a healthy critique to established ideas, later came to be exploited by the status quo to mask the dark sides of progress –such as environmental destruction from economic growth–, behind a nebulous of uncertainty. Decades of scholarship devoted to deconstruct ‘truth’ paved the way for a golden era of relativism. Post-truth, a concept used to describe the disappearance of shared objective standards for truth and the undifferentiated blurring of facts, values, knowledge, opinion, and belief that characterizes today’s intellectual climate (Biesecker, 2018), may be looked at as the ultimate Frankenstein of this epistemological drift. According to Frankfurt (2005: 16), –who foresaw the post-truth coming long ago: ‘The contemporary proliferation of bullshit has deeper sources in various forms of skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality’.

Today this intellectual climate is successfully exploited by business power that, in the name of progress and growth, manufacture doubt and uncertainty to prevent the precautionary principle and undermine environmental regulations (Harremo€es et al., 2013; Michaels & Jones, 2005; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). In an era of ecological breakdown and post-truth, caricaturizing limits as fanaticism (Bruckner, 2013; Phillips, 2015) or banalizing their relevance as mere ‘constructs’ or ‘discourses’, serves the denialism of corporate power and the new authoritarianism. To Latour’s assertion that ‘context stinks’ (2005: 148, citing Koolhaas), in today’s post truth era time may be ripe to add that ‘(de)constructionism stinks’ too.

### T/N – Ontological Security Good

#### Their thesis is backwards – “Western” identity is locked in – attempting to destabilize it threatens ontological security, which flips their impacts – strengthening collective identity via security cooperation solves

Bahar Rumelili 15, Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of International Relations, Koc University, Istanbul, “Identity and desecuritisation: the pitfalls of conflating ontological and physical security,” Journal of International Relations and Development volume 18, pages52–74 (2015), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/jird.2013.22

With regard to ontological security, the distinction between security and insecurity is the more critical one. In a state of ontological insecurity, the Self experiences instability and uncertainty of being. Ontological insecurity refers to a state of disruption where the Self has lost its anchor for the definition of its identity and, consequently, its ability to sustain a narrative and answer questions about doing, acting, and being (Kinnvall 2004). It may arise from deep uncertainty (Mitzen 2006a) and/or from the failure to have its sense of Self affirmed by others (Zarakol 2010). Conversely, in a state of ontological security, the Self experiences a stable, certain, and consistent social existence, where it remains in control about its identity and capacity for action. While I do not rule out the possibility of a state of ontological asecurity, where the Self is simply not concerned with the stability and certainty of its identity, I do not explore this possibility and how it varies across different states of physical security in this article.

Having identified different states of physical and ontological security, I make the further assumption that since ontological and physical security are distinct, states of security do not vary uniformly across the ontological and physical layers of security. One can be at a state of physical insecurity while being at a state of ontological security, and vice versa. Consequently, Table 1 charts out the four possible states of security based on the conception of security as both ontological and physical.

The state of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security is one where the Self experiences concern about physical harm and the instability and uncertainty of its being. Ontological insecurity tempts actors to engage in practices that mark Others as not only different, but also as morally inferior and threatening (Campbell 1992). Ontological insecurity and physical (in)security reproduce one another. As actors seek ontological security through constructing Others as threats to their security-as-survival, they mobilise their physical defences in the pursuit of physical security through representing the sources of threat as different and morally inferior.

Similarly, in a state of ontological security/physical (in)security, actors experience stability and certainty of being in a relationship where the Other is constructed as threat to their security-as-survival. Consequently, they remain locked into conflict-producing routines to maintain their certainty of being (Mitzen 2006a). In protracted conflicts such as in Cyprus and Israel/Palestine, this state of security sustains a stable Self/Other relationship based on enemy roles. When in such a state of security, minority and majority groups, migrants and host societies perceive and represent each other’s identities as radically different and inherently incompatible, and reproduce these perceptions and representations through acts of securitisation in order to ensure their ontological security. The states of ontological insecurity/physical (in)security and ontological security/physical (in)security are both securitised states; however, whereas the former compels actors to construct new narratives of difference and threat and engage in the securitisation of new issues to regain their certainty and stability of being, the latter compels actors to reproduce the existing narratives and continue the securitisation of existing differences and conflicts to maintain it.

The state of ontological security/physical asecurity is certainly the most attractive state of security from a normative point of view. Security communities in international relations, and in particular, the European non-war community (Wæver 1998) and the Nordic community (Browning and Joenniemi 2012) constitute the best examples of such a state of security in international relations. A collective identity discourse makes it possible for states in security communities to maintain the us/them distinctions, which are necessary for the certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another (Mitzen 2006b; Browning and Joenniemi 2012). In this state of security, conflicts are sustainably resolved; issues that have propelled conflict in the past are either settled or have shed their physical security-ness, and are negotiated in normal political channels. Yet, identity differences maintain their ontological security-ness as groups reproduce their distinct identities through various social and cultural practices.

#### Hybrid warfare in particular disrupts NATO’s ontological security – the AFF solves by insulating NATO from existential fear

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Hybrid warfare indicates a multitude of possible contingencies, generating anxiety about one’s ability to remain oneself and to continue to act. It is thus linked to “anxiety over the vulnerability of [Western] power” (Bell 2012, pp. 230–231), threatening the West about losing its particularistic form of existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 455). Anxiety, in contrast to fear, which per Giddens (1991, p. 43) constitutes a response to a specific threat, concerns “perceived threats to the integrity of the security system of the individual” (Giddens 1991, pp. 44–45, cf. Browning and Joenniemi 2017, p. 38; Rumelili 2015). OS-seeking aims to mitigate the effects of such hard uncertainty, bringing it within bearable limits (Mitzen 2006, p. 346). Routines are instrumental here, as they “pacify the cognitive environment … ‘inoculating’ individuals against paralytic, deep fear of chaos” (Mitzen 2006, p. 347).

Being able to survive the “hybrid threats” is directly pertinent to the survival of the EU and NATO as particular kinds of organisations, underpinned and driven by specific values – which cannot be sacrificed or diluted in the struggle for physical and institutional survival. Yet, hybrid warfare disturbs the OS of the EU and NATO in subtly distinct ways. Due to the particularities of their institutional set-ups and historical foundations, the OS drives of the two organisations are somewhat distinctive. NATO’s history is occasionally told through its surpassing of a sequence of crises, albeit the end of the Cold War and the collapse of its original enemy created a situation of unprecedented uncertainty and ontological insecurity for the Alliance. Meanwhile, the EU’s ontological insecurity is a more recent phenomenon, stemming mostly from the Eurocrisis and the looming possibility of a Grexit a few years ago; the refugee/migration crisis in Europe of 2015 (Dingott Alkhoper 2018; Mitzen 2018); the actual UK decision on Brexit in 2016 (Browning 2018); and the rise of populist politics within the EU (Kinnvall, Manners, Mitzen 2018) and the United States. NATO as a military alliance has been historically more accustomed to the othering practices of concrete geographical places, whereas the EU is generally regarded as an organisation that has risen above geopolitical othering, juxtaposing itself to Europe’s dark past instead (Rumelili 2018, Subotic 2018, and Della Sala 2018). Accordingly, the EU might be more at home with hybrid threat management due to its historically broader conceptualisation of security through the paradigm of intertwined risks rather than being focused more strictly on “the threat, use and control of military force” in the manner of a traditional defence alliance (Walt 1991, p. 212; Manners 2002). Regardless of its perpetual transformer’s self-image, hybrid threats represent the uncomfortable “hard” or “fundamental” uncertainty for NATO (cf. Mitzen 2006, p. 346) and are thus ontologically disturbing for the security of its self as a traditional alliance with a collective security pledge bound to “armed attack” against one or more of its member states.

In order to achieve OS, actors strive for “routinizing their relations with significant others” (Mitzen 2006, p. 342). Routines help to keep ontological fears at bay, out of everyday discursive consciousness (Mitzen 2006, p. 348). From this perspective, NATO’s naming and shaming strategy vis-à-vis Russia as part of its hybrid warfare countering strategy links the uncertainty emanating from the hybrid nature of the new threats to the known and routine relationship with its traditional antagonist.8 The incapacitating difficulties related to planning ahead in anticipating and countering hybrid engagements are thus somewhat alleviated by the latter’s attachment to a known rival. Russia’s hybrid intervention in Ukraine has concurrently provided NATO with the familiar parameters of the cognitive “cocoon” (Giddens 1991, pp. 39–40) which enables the alliance to reproduce its cognitively “knowable” world. A Mitzenian reading of NATO’s emerging response to hybrid threats/warfare thus points at the renewed routinisation of the “programmed cognitive and behavioral responses” to Russia as the alliance’s original nemesis.

Restoring traditional vigilance vis-à-vis Russia, buttressing the forward defence along the Alliance’s eastern flank with the respective military reinforcements, contingency planning and exercises, the emerging response of NATO to the hybrid menace could also be read as an attempted restoration of a known normative order for the North Atlantic Alliance. Hybrid warfare endangers the basic features of the said normative order (or that of the broadly conceived Western security community in general, including the EU as well) as its efficient countering would likely compromise the underlying principles for this order’s particularistic existence (cf. Creppell 2011, p. 450). As a threat of subversion, hybrid warfare exposes the internal vulnerabilities in the body of the traditional security alliance (NATO) and a self-proclaimed post-modern security actor (i.e. the EU; cf. Cooper 2004). This concerns, in particular, the ever-elusive (and contested) balance between national/organisational security and individual liberties (cf. Waldron 2003, Neocleous 2007), as strategic communication is inherently at odds with free speech as a core value of Western liberalism. Countering hybrid warfare is conducive of generating a security predicament of perpetual pre-emption which, by definition, would indicate pre-emptive gathering of all sorts of data, thus likely infringing on the privacy of the individuals for the sake of the organisational/regional/national security. This precautionary logic resonates with the risk society approach which characterises the struggling with a sheer volume of risks with potentially fundamental consequences as a key feature of modernity, implying that “decisions are … made not in context of certainty, nor even of available knowledge, but of doubt, premonition, foreboding, challenge, mistrust, fear, and anxiety” (Ewald 2002, p. 294).

### AT: L – Generic

#### “Justifies” is NOT “causes” – the link oversimplifies – securitizaton’s more likely to fizzle out in the face of contestation and budget constraints than result in their impacts

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Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that securitization has failed to gain traction in North America. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a causal account. But its mechanisms remain obscure, as do the conditions under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, speech acts often seem to be magical incantations that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why some securitizing moves resonate, while others [are ignored] fall on deaf ears. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that conflict with China is inevitable, yet China has over the last 25 years been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—despite these vigorous and persistent securitizing moves. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has hardly begun to offer acceptable answers to these questions. Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The audience itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is stripped of all agency. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, does not sweep this politics away. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security does not crowd out all other spending priorities—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. Nor does simply declaring something a matter of national security guarantee its funding—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

### AT: L – AI: LAWS

#### No impact to securitization – hybridization and grafting undercut legitimation effects and extreme responses

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A securitizing move is, according to the original definition by the Copenhagen School, a specific rhetorical structure or discourse – or, more precisely, a speech act – that frames an issue as an existential threat, i.e., a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 25–26). The central goal of this chapter is the identification and analysis of such speech acts because speech acts have indeed been the main means by which the Campaign has increasingly sought to securitize AWS. Since other means have also been employed, we will draw intellectual resources from other approaches to securitization theory too. There is still more, however, that we can borrow from the Copenhagen School. Wæver (1995) pointed to the performative dimension of the move: ‘the utterance itself is the act [emphasis added]’. He even defined the process as ‘[t]he performance of the security act’. Huysmans (2006: 147) accurately spotted the linguistic practice turning from mere description to performative acts as one of the organizing principles in social and political relations. One important caveat is that performativity is not the same thing as a theatre performance, but is about the ways in which the discourse is reiterated and networks are created (Ringmar 2019). In this chapter, we systematically illustrate how a particular communication within a distributed network produces and reinforces a shared understanding of insecurity. What deserves special note is that the emergent security issue is not necessarily linked to a real existential threat but has to be constructed and presented as such a threat (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 24). There have been insights showing that it does not stop with a politically and socially constructed threat. Discourses of insecurity are often about representations of ‘danger’ with material consequences (Campbell 1992). This concept is important for us too because the kind of threat we examine here has been constructed through, inter alia, discourses and representations of danger.

A person or a group that performs the speech act is a securitizing actor. Success depends to a great extent on the authority position held by the actor. Only a few actors and groups do in fact have ‘the power to define security’. Among them are political leaders, governments, bureaucracies, lobbyists, and pressure groups (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 31 and 40). Therefore, the Copenhagen School gave us a hint as to the nature of securitizing actors. Wæver (1995: 57) insisted specifically, however, that ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, [typically] by elites’. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 21) reaffirmed the principle in their joint book: ‘Traditionally, by saying “security,” a state representative [emphasis added] declares an emergency condition.’ The limitation of the approach of the Copenhagen School is that it restricts the actors who can legitimately construct security primarily to political leaders. Also, the Copenhagen School provided initial instruction on how to assess the role the audience plays in constructing insecurity, yet this is another limitation. Success, in their view, depends on the audience being convinced that the issue is an existential security threat. The issue is securitized only if and when emergency measures that go beyond standard political procedures are accepted as justified (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998: 23–25). The audience’s role is, therefore, limited to the mere fact of their accepting the truth of the discourse. Other approaches to securitization theory will allow us to compensate for these limits.

Another major contributor to securitization theory has been the Paris School, situated within the emerging field of international political sociology and mainly represented by Didier Bigo and Thierry Balzacq. Their ideas further advanced the understanding of securitizing actors endowed with the authority to securitize. New actors appeared on the stage who were professionals with expertise in a given field. The Paris School put emphasis on expert security knowledge and the ‘authority of statistics’ (Bigo 2006). Security professionals and security agencies, the ones who routinely collect and analyse data, were recognized as having the authority to determine what exactly constitutes security (Bigo 2000: 176). Particular attention was drawn to bureaucracies that serve as an ‘intermediary’ with the central government and are directly involved in the provision of security services (e.g., military and police services, border guards and customs agents, intelligence services, risk assessment experts, etc.) (Bigo 2006). Increasingly, security professionals, both researchers and military personnel, are becoming facilitators for the success of securitization, as we show in this chapter. Bigo (2002: 83) specifically highlighted that, even if NGOs intervene, ‘they can do so only by turning professional’. Our analysis here illustrates, among other things, the trend towards professionalization in NGOs, themselves collecting, distributing, and efficiently utilizing professional knowledge. The success of the securitizing move is, consequently, linked to the structural position of the speaker within a relevant institution (Bigo 2002: 73–74). Bigo (2006) also noted that such institutions can overstep national boundaries and form transnational bureaucratic links. Transnationalization represents, in his view, yet another source of knowledge and ‘symbolic’ power. The transnational advocacy Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which is the focus of this chapter, is perhaps the best illustration of how it can play out in everyday practice. Balzacq (2005: 178–179) listed the very same attributes of authorized security speakers: knowledge, trust, and the speaker’s power position, formal or symbolic. One of his key points was that ‘effective securitization is power-laden’. In addition, he carved out a more central role for the audience, focusing on ‘the power [emphasis added] that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction’ (Balzacq 2005: 171–172). This insight is still not enough to accurately define the role of the audience for the purposes of this chapter, but it brings us closer to the task.

The conceptualization of the securitizing move itself extends beyond the single speech act, as claimed by the Paris School. Bigo (2002: 65–66) stressed the importance of bureaucratic practices performed by security professionals and involved in the creation of administrative knowledge (e.g., population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, etc.). Therefore, practical work, discipline, and expertise are certainly no less important than the discourse (Bigo 2000: 194). Here we concentrate less on bureaucratic practices and more on different discursive frames in play. However, we still note, for example, that the Campaign has also drawn quite heavily upon surveys done by the market research company Ipsos. The most significant observation that comes out of it, however, is different: the Paris School broadened the definition of the securitizing move beyond the single, typically political, speech act. Balzacq (2005: 191) also focused on the ‘manner’ in which the securitizing actor makes the case for the point and drew attention to two basic principles ensuring ultimate success: ‘emotional intensity’ and ‘logical rigor’. He also reminded us of the role of analogies, metaphors, stereotypes, metonymies, lies, gestures, and even silence as effective tools of persuasion (Balzacq 2005: 172 and 179). In this chapter, we illustrate the significance of such tools for creating the terrifying image of ‘killer robots’. The increasingly blurred lines between fact and fiction, rationality and emotion are of particular significance to our understanding of that image. Last, but not least, the Paris School pointed to the existence of numerous stakeholders with heterogeneous profiles who do not share the same logics and are often in competition with each other (Bigo 2006). In such ‘power struggles’, securitizing actors align to eliminate alternative voices and swing the audience’s support towards their preferred course of action (Balzacq 2005: 173 and 179). It is a relevant observation, but a careful analysis of such struggles between the ban Campaign and its opponents is the subject of the next chapter.

Other, especially more recent, supplements to securitization theory contributed to the development of a more sophisticated set of assumptions regarding the authority of securitizing actors and the practice of threat construction. Stritzel (2012: 553) summarized the general tendency as the development away from static understandings of the authority to securitize and single speech acts to more complex processes of authorization and more dynamic representations of existential threat. Pointing out such complexities is one of the key objectives we set for ourselves in this chapter. Vuori (2008: 76) assumed that even those actors who fall outside official authority, but have sufficient ‘social capital’, can become securitizing actors. Social capital is a special kind of asset available, for example, to NGOs. In this chapter, we deal directly and specifically with the ways in which such capital is being mobilized. Berling (2011: 386) convincingly argued, in addition, that science co-determines the status of the securitizing actor. He called it the ‘authority of objectivity’ (Berling 2011: 393). Brauch (2009: 94) also drew attention to the significance of scientific ‘reputation’. Unsurprisingly, then, there is a strong focus on raising a scientific profile within – and in association with – the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots. This is achieved, inter alia, by joining forces with senior scientists and larger scientific communities. The so-called ‘epistemic communities’ can indeed draw on their knowledge and expertise to influence the outcome of securitization moves ‘through reason and facts on the basis of (objective) knowledge’ (Floyd 2020: 12). An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines with recognized scientific expertise and competence in a particular domain, according to the original conceptualization of the term (Haas 1992: 3). Haas (1992: 18) conceptualized epistemic communities as a separate category, inherently distinct from interest groups, social movements, and bureaucratic coalitions. Even though he equipped us with the appropriate concept, the definition is problematic. It is increasingly difficult to draw definitive dividing lines between scientists, political activists, and activist bureaucrats, as we clearly show here. A closer look reveals two serious problems: scientific facts are selectively used, twisted, or suppressed by political activists to serve their political purpose; and scientists themselves become willingly and directly involved in policy making and political manipulation. Berling (2011: 392) assumed that ‘scientific capital’ co-determines ‘the hierarchy [emphasis added] in the field of security and the chances of winning’. Yet the opposite is the case in this chapter. Hierarchies are being replaced with more horizontal heterarchies, as we will demonstrate. Science contributes significantly to the chances of success and successful claims for legitimacy, but scientists do not necessarily play a central role in the process of securitization.

There has, at the same time, been greater awareness that the audience can reinforce the authority of the securitizing actor. Salter (2008: 321–322) conceptualized interactions between the securitizing actor and the audience as ‘iterative’. He studied the process of ‘audience-speaker co-constitution [emphasis added] of authority and knowledge’. McInnes and Rushton (2011: 117) even introduced the idea that original audiences can, at some points themselves, act as securitizing actors. These insights help us conceptualize and, more importantly, analyse a much more active engagement on the part of the audience and the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences. We call it hybridization, as explained below, and show how it works in practice. We also clearly demonstrate that such hybridization has no clear boundaries. Floyd (2020) drew our attention to the role of ‘functional actors’, often confused with the audience but, in fact, seeking to positively or negatively influence the trajectory of securitization. The concept itself, though originally underdeveloped, is borrowed from the Copenhagen School. Floyd (2020: 10) stressed that media outlets can prioritize certain issues over others, decide how information is relayed, and, therefore, control what becomes public knowledge. Vultee (2011: 77–93) showed practically how the media ‘speak security’. Our intention through this text is to once again demonstrate that the media play a crucial role in shaping public threat perception and disseminating stereotypes. The very idea of ‘killer robots’ caught public attention and imagination through broad media coverage. Foreign politicians can, in turn, either provide or withhold external legitimation, according to Floyd (2020: 10). The most important consequence, as we show, is peer pressure, i.e., attempts by the truly pro-ban states to push the blocking coalition towards adopting the ban on AWS. Members employed in the relevant industry can equally facilitate or impede securitization by presenting reasoned arguments for one side or the other (Floyd 2020: 11). We have a perfect illustration here: many technology companies have supported the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and publicly committed not to engage in the development of AWS. Clearly, such statements have significantly strengthened the spirit of the Campaign. Floyd’s (2020: 12) interpretation also suggests that even ordinary people can affect the dynamics of securitization, for example, through social media activism. Here we illustrate how ordinary people can facilitate securitization by partaking in surveys and voicing their concerns about the perceived threat. We also highlight that the Campaign has closely aligned with a broad wave of public concern, which has further reinforced its legitimacy in the eyes of the general public.

Numerous studies have also sought to develop a more nuanced understanding of the core of securitizing moves. First of all, there has been a general awareness that scientific models, data, and facts ‘can be mobilized strategically’ (Berling 2011: 393). Stritzel (2012: 560) explored the link between power politics and popular culture as ‘a principal background of meaning’. In particular, he inquired into the use of pop culture and cultural myths by securitizing actors. Williams (2003: 526–527) suggested that images and other visual representations are also part of ‘a broader performative act’ and do play a significant role in the process of securitization. This chapter shows how scientific facts and cultural imaginaries, visual and discursive frames are all mobilized simultaneously to construct the threat of so-called killer robots. Some scholars have even sought to highlight the supposed links between different security agendas such as the ‘migration-terrorism nexus’ (Ihlamur-Öner 2019), the ‘terrorism-asylum nexus’, or even the ‘terrorism-immigration-asylum nexus’ (Tsoukala 2006: 612 and 618). This is an important, yet undeveloped, argument. It is a good starting point for us to properly conceptualize processes of grafting involved in a securitizing move, as further elaborated below. Salter (2012: 934), at the same time, reminds us of the fact that ‘securitization is a constant process of struggle and contestation’. In accord with his interpretation, the so-called securitizing move in fact consists of ‘overlapping … language security games performed by varying relevant actors’ (Salter 2012: 931). The same author noted elsewhere (2008: 321) that there are also distinct types of audiences and that the move may be successful with some of them, but not others. It is a reminder for us: systematic hybridization between different types of actors acting at different stages in the securitization process, as we illustrate, does not necessarily lead to greater homogenization. We show it here too.

Building on this rich and diverse body of knowledge, the insights we borrow primarily include the significance of scientific reputation, the varied and dynamic identities of securitizing actors, the increasingly blurred line between securitizing actors and their target audiences, and the diversity of ways in which the threat can be constructed and presented. Yet we also go beyond to inquire into the process of over-securitization. There have already been efforts to understand and theorize over-securitization, so the term itself is not new. However, the existing literature approaches the problem from the perspective of referent objects of security. Hammerstad (2008: 1–2) was the first to point out that a security issue can ‘become over-securitised to the point where it is in danger of creating threats [to the referent object] where before there were none’. Ihlamur-Öner (2019: 210) concurred: ‘The securitization of irregular and forced migration has reached to the point that it can be described as over-securitization, which creates more threats where there were none, while putting the lives of migrants and refugee protection at risk.’

We take a different approach still and explore the dynamics of over-securitization from the perspective of securitizing actors and securitizing moves. In doing so, we distinguish two mechanisms through which over-securitization operates at these two levels: hybridization and grafting, respectively. Through the former, we demonstrate how complex hybridization of securitizing actors and target audiences produces circulatory, transepistemic, and post-truth configurations of security. When making this argument, we are inspired by Aradau and Huysmans. They accurately determined that ‘transepistemic relations create greater symmetry between various knowledges and dilute the superior authority of science in truth telling and factual knowledge about the world’ (Aradau and Huysmans 2018: 49). The same authors (2018: 54) defined the condition of post-truth as ‘a less hierarchical and more horizontal transversal practice of knowledge creation and circulation’. We have a practical illustration of their statements and argue that, when the tipping point is reached, the diffusion of authority decreases the likelihood of successful securitization. The concept of ‘grafting [a new norm onto existing norms]’ stands for a well-established legal practice and is borrowed from Price (1998: 617). Here it helps us conceptualize how a new security agenda can be grafted, through both discursive and visual representations, onto other security issues of immediate importance and even science fiction imagery. Such grafting techniques, as we show, reinforce the sense of insecurity but, quite counter-intuitively, can in some cases impede instead of facilitate the securitization process. The imprecise focus and reductionist paths make it more difficult to name the threat clearly, which is a precondition for successful securitization. Salter (2012: 938–940) gave an example of what it means if ‘the threat remains vague [emphasis added]’.

Here lies the paradox: success in broadening the stakeholder base and generating the sense of insecurity does not necessarily mean the success of securitization. In a nutshell, greater efficiency does not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness. Hence, over-securitization is about securitization efforts that are too intense and too ubiquitous, to the point of becoming counter-productive.

### AT: L – Arms Regulation / Prolif

#### No arms regulation link – desecuritizes and spurs identity transformation, NOT Otherization – empirics flow AFF

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STABILITY AND CHANGE Arms Control: Conservative or Transformative? As the "impact” discussion indicated, Arms Control can be looked at from two opposite perspectives concerning stability and change. Arms control aims at stability; critical security approaches have thus labeled arms control as a conservative, status-quo orientated strategy (Krause & Cooper, 2011; Krause & Latham, 1998). This school has also ascribed certain attributes of the concept to Western culture, thereby reifying the West as completely American without accounting for the considerable differences within the West (which shows, for example, in the related EU strategies [EU, 2003a, 2003b, 2016]). In this spirit, critical scholars have labeled as Western such attributes as the “necessity of deterrence," a “preference for one's own preponderance," and a “focus on proliferation” as if the Soviet Union had not shown the same traits all throughout the Cold War, and as if Russia had not followed the Soviet predecessor in this respect as well. But there is also a transformational perspective: Arms Control as a vehicle for inducing, accompanying, and reinforcing a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between two or more states; the template for this approach is, as will be discussed later, the years from 1985 to 1992, when the Cold War dissolved. Naturally, the concept of disarmament shows the greatest affinity to the transformational approaches. This transformational perspective leaves the dogmatic connection between arms control and stability behind. Stability by arms control is itself an instrument to foster dynamic change, just as homeostasis in young organisms is the condition for dynamic growth. This perspective opens the broader view on the relation of Arms Control and historical time. A reading of the history of arms control results in three models to conceive this relationship. Arms Control Through Time: Three Models. The first model corresponds to the enlightenment intuition of steady progress: Arms Control, once started, will create islands of cooperation in a still formidable sea of self-help. But successful agreements have an impact beyond technical constraints or limited cooperation gains. The factor of “learning,” enabled by agreements and their institutional settings, changes the relationship between former rivals and antagonists incrementally, but potentially profoundly (Nye, 1989). New information mitigates the security dilemma, as both capabilities and intentions of the partner become better understood and more predictable. Admitting transparency on agreed level of forces, which reduce opportunities and incentives to attack first—whether conventional or nuclear—build down the image of the enemy as a nefarious and implacable antagonist poised to devour neighbors and enemies. Arms Control works as a conduit for reassurance; the reassured party imputes more benevolent intentions on. its opposite. Institutional settings—domestic, bilateral, and multilateral—create new bureaucratic routines, produce more information, help to solve problems of ambiguity and suspicions of non-compliance, and inculcate cooperative practices in the daily work of decision makers and bureaucrats. Moreover, successful Arms Control agreements set incentives to try more daring ones. In the process, states might redefine their own security interests. Of course, Arms Control is not able to drive this process alone. Rather, its political effects help to encourage steps in other areas of the conflicting relationship, arid such steps (and their domestic repercussions) stimulate in turn new efforts in Arms Control. Throughout this development, increasing transnational communities (epistemic and otherwise) connect the national discourses of the participating countries by importing common knowledge, serving as interpreters of the ''other’s” views and actions, and working as advocates of cooperation (Nye, 1987, 1989) The Gorbachev years of 1985 to 1991 provide an impressive example for this dynamic. In the best case, it might turn islands of cooperation into a continent (Evangelista, 1999; Risse, 2000). The second model is a significant modification of the first one. It preserves the long-term vision of a cooperative world, but (informed by the historical experiences of the last 60 years) understands the Arms Control process as a series of waves, each of which leaves the world in a more cooperative state than the previous one: a pure self-help system gives way to an arms-control driving detente constellation, followed by a new political ice age in which, however, some of the Arms Control achievements of the detente period survive. A second Arms Control wave, followed by another ice age ensues, with again a few new lasting gains for cooperative security, and so on. This model accounts for the multifactorial political environment in which Arms Control has to operate. Power shifts among nations, national revolutions, or domestic polarization, can replace elites well socialized into the concepts and practices of Arms Control with nationalist, unilateralist, and supremacist elites, who see the only way to security and status in absolute superiority or even aggression and conquest. This account of the process toward more cooperation through ups and downs reflects better the experiences since 1960. A tentative success after the Cuban missile crisis, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, was followed by five years of stagnation, caused by the toppling of Khrushchev in Moscow, alienation through the Vietnam War, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of the negotiations on the NPT toward the end of 1968 opened the first wave of Arms Control in the period of detente. After the— supposedly hawkish—presidency of Richard Nixon had installed itself, strategic arms negotiations started quickly. The next decade saw four agreements of strategic nuclear arms, two on testing, two multilateral treaties to prohibit biological and environmental weapons, and a couple of confidence-building measures to avoid severe crises between the superpowers, plus those in the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the “Helsinki Document”). However, this period came to a halt at the end of the decade when conservative concerns about perceived growing Soviet nuclear superiority and cheating, and Soviet inroads in the developing world produced a climate no longer conducive to Arms Control—SALT II remained observed by the two parties, but unratified. The early Reagan years were confrontational, with unfettered armament, and token Arms Control talks in order to pacify a concerned Western public on both sides of the Atlantic. Gorbachev’s ascendancy to power changed the situation (Arnett, 1990; Evangelista, 1999). Starting with new CSCE confidence-building measures in 1986 (the “Stockholm Document’' later dramatically enhanced by the series of “Vienna Documents”), a cascade of bilateral (INF Treaty, START I, START II), multilateral regional (CFE Treaty and the unprecedented Open Sky Treaty, which grants the parties mutual information-gathering overflight rights), and multilateral global (Chemical Weapons Convention, Ottawa Convention on anti-personal land mines, and the indefinite extension of the NPT) measures followed in close sequence. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was the last hurrah, but failed to attract the necessary “advice and consent” in the U.S. Senate, which was already dominated by archconservative forces led by Senator Jesse Helms, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation Committee. From 1997 on, the political climate cooled down. Arms Control froze with the George W. Bush administration. The Moscow Treaty on strategic nuclear arms—a treaty without specifications, with a termination date of 2012 and no verification—was the only achievement, neutralized through the far more weighty abrogation of the ABM-Treaty by the Bush administration, which led to the prompt abrogation of START II by Russia, followed by Moscow's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty; the multilateral Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions succeeded only because the United States, opposed to this agreement, did not possess a veto position. Obama's revival of Arms Control yielded the New START Treaty, the agreement for the reduction of weapons-grade plutonium with Russia, and the Arms Trade Treaty, in. an all too brief period of new detente that ended at the latest with the Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. The notion of waves has a lot of empirical evidence to support it. One interesting indicator is the titles of writings on the subject that have appeared over time. A Farewell to Arms Control? (Young, 1972), "Arms Control: The Possibility of a Second Coming” (Freedman,1982), “Farewell to Arms Control?” again (Nye, 1986), “The Death of Arms Control” (Sullivan, 1987), The Future of Arms Control (Ball & Mack, 1987), “The Folly of Arms Control” (Schell, 2000),7 “The Rise and Fall of Arms Control” (Bohlen, 2005), all indicate a shifting between the highs and lows of the theme. It also indicates that experts did not always agree on whether they were feeing a high or a low. Young's book was written during the years of the first big Arms Control wave. Freedman’s "second coming" was authored in the first years of the Reagan Administration’s dark years for Arms Control. Nye s “Farewell” and Sullivan's “Death,” written from quite different positions, appeared when Gorbachev moved Arms Control on its path of greatest success, as acknowledged by the more optimistic Nye. Curiously, “The Death of Deterrence” (Dando & Rogers, 1984) falls between the “second coming" and the "death” of Arms Control. That these waves lead toward ever-increased security cooperation in a spiral-shaped process, however, is not self-evident. Consequently, the third model drafts a circular process. Progress is only temporary and will be overtaken by the eternal, harsh forces of the international power struggle. Of course, this is the view of the more pessimistic version of realism: Arms Control ebbs and floods alternate, but Arms Control achievements are fully or almost fully lost in each ice age: “progress” does not hold. Security cooperation and its legal and institutional sediments are a marginal phenomenon, dependent on temporary interest constellations. When interests shift, or when a power shift changes the hierarchy of the international system, the achievements of the past period will erode or explode, and the system returns to the dangerous competition, including its military aspects, which is its natural state (Mearsheimer, 1995; see also Mearsheimer, 2001 for the theoretical background). Among the three models, the “spiral model" has most to show empirically. As Joseph Nye (1987, 1989) observed already in 1987, even the icy early 1980s left much of the Arms Control achievements intact, such as the NPT, naval confidence-building measures, and the CSCE process with its confidence-building (the European allies prevailed over U.S. preferences). During the George W. Bush years, NPT, CWC, and BWC continued (the latter one after heroic rescue activities by the Europeans), the mutual reductions pursuant to the Moscow Treaty took place, the INF Treaty remained in force, as did CSCE confidence building, and even the Open Sky Treaty. The same applies to all global multilateral treaties. A second observation: Phil Farley counted, in his contribution to probably the best book on Arms Control that has ever been written, eight negotiations that had failed before 1987 (Farley, 1988, pp. 620,627-629). During the 28 years that have since passed, six of these eight have been successfully concluded.8 Up to now, the "spiral model" appears to hold, despite setbacks in the early 1980s, the years of the George W. Bush Administration, or the present impasse; thus, the hopeful Kantian vision of ever-closer security cooperation is still on the table.

#### No disarm trade-off link – there’s ZERO uniqueness since it’s NOT on the table now – BUT our reps snowball to it, which is offense

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The Permissive Effect of Prohibition Norms. One of the criticisms of critical security studies scholars has been that the prohibition of some weapons has had the effect of legitimizing non-prohibited weapons (Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011). Indeed, there is the ‘‘permissive’’ effect, which results from the stigmatization of the prohibited weapons as inhuman, which implies in turn that weapons not banned simultaneously are not equally inhumane. For material and psychological reasons, the focus on banning a specific weapon system will very probable prevent efforts to ban other weapons with comparable effects at the same time: The campaign to get rid of incendiary weapons (napalm) in the 1980s postponed action on landmines and cluster munitions for one and two decades, respectively. The material factor is the resource restraint (financial, time, diplomatic capital) of ban proponents (NGOs and like-minded governments), which makes it difficult to tackle more than one item at a time. The psychological effect is the impossibility of focusing and maintaining attention of both activists and the public (media and people) on more than one issue in a certain time-span (Rosert, 2015, 2016). As the sequence from incendiary weapons (prohibited in 1983), to anti-personal mines (prohibited in 1997), to cluster munitions (prohibited in 2009) demonstrates, however, this permissive/preventive effect is determining only temporarily. In the long-term, the opposite effect can be observed, “issue cascading”: the successful subjection on one type of weapon under the anti-humanitarian stigma makes it easier for a follow-up campaign to frame the next candidate for a ban in a way that promises success. The framing of a weapon type in analogy or comparison with an already stigmatized one (grafting) becomes easier as more weapons fall under a ban, and more characteristics and attributes are available to draw parallels to a weapon that is still permitted (Price, 1998, pp. 627-631). If permissive or preventive effects mean that old Arms Control stands in the way of new Arms Control, the cascading effect shows that old Arms Control can engender new Arms Control. Real World Effects. So far, the discussion has dealt with the effects of Arms Control on state behavior. Changed state behavior, of course, has effects on the physical world: Due to the implementation of Arms Control agreements, there are fewer nuclear weapons (between 15,000 and 16,000 instead of more than 60,000, at the height of the Cold War), fewer chemical weapons, fewer biological weapons, and fewer states possessing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the world, and fewer conventional weapon systems in Europe than would have been the case otherwise. The most impressive numbers come from humanitarian Arms Control groups: According to the Red Cross, the number of victims of landmines was at 20,000 the year before the Ottawa Convention. It has gone down to 3,500 per year since. By the end of 2015, international production and transfer of these weapons had commensurately shrunk, including by some non-members producers, quite a remarkable external effect of the norm; even 48 non-state armed groups have renounced the use of mines on the initiative of the NGO Geneva CalL Twenty-nine states were declared to be mine-free through efforts under the Ottawa Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). By the end of 2014, 3.68 million anti-personal mines had been destroyed in operations pursuant to the Convention (Landmines Report, 2009, p. 1; Landmines Report, 2015, p. 2). Surprisingly, in light of so many lives saved, some scholars belonging to the Critical Security Studies school contend that humanitarian Arms Control constitutes a well-concealed submission of civil society to the imperatives of Western militarism (Beier, 2011; Cooper, 2011; Mathur, 2011, 2012, 2014). This assessment of the mine campaign as "reconstitution of the West (and Western interest)” having “played a crucial (even decisive) role in the construction of the 'landmine crisis’” (Krause & Latham, 1998, p. 44) remains mysterious: First, both the Ottawa and the Oslo conventions were opposed by the quintessential Western power, the United States. Second, both were enthusiastically supported by the main victims of the prohibited weapons, namely the countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (Price, 1998, pp. 640-641). One could suspect that, based on ideological doctrine, some scholars are critical of all but their own perceptual biases, a strong similarity to some of the realist and neo-conservative critics of arms control, which they so enthusiastically condemn. Back to the independent-dependent variable relationship: The structurationist school of constructivism, orientated to the work of Anthony Giddens, takes the middle ground by constructing a dialectical relationship by which processes of Arms Control and processes of broader policy would mutually influence each other. As Arms Control has been conceptualized as a way to mitigate the security dilemma, its likely effects should be tangible there. Measures that reduce the ambiguity of intention and capabilities, and measures that, notably, reduce the capability for large-scale, speedy offensives should have strong positive impacts on mutual perception and help to foster security cooperation on a broad scope (Peters, 1992). They give signals of the absence of aggressive intentions and thereby help overcome the fundamental uncertainty, which is at the heart of the security dilemma (Lamb, 1988, pp. 225-234). The "Gorbachev effect” on the West was exactly that. ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSES Academic and political discourses on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation in general, as well as in specific political fields of action, are framed in four different perspectives: deterrence, defense, disarmament, and humanitarian discourses.2 The deterrence approach is dominated by nuclear weapons: The regulation of arms is seen as maintaining a stable deterrence relationship, understood as the mutually assured capability to strike back after a first strike, accompanied by measures that make a first strike as unlikely, unprovoked, and unattractive as possible. Consequently, nuclear weapons, seen as embodying the greatest deterrence value, enjoy a legitimate existence (e.g., Quinlan, 2009; Riihle, 2009; Tertrais, 2011), though the idea of conventional deterrence has also been pursued (Gerson, 2009; Mearsheimer, 1985). Where the deterrence discourse prevails, certain Arms Control measures fall in disregard. For example, de-alerting (putting strategic nuclear forces on low alert) or even de-mating the nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, could be seen as destabilizing deterrence against a first strike. Shifting to a no first-use doctrine could be interpreted as opening one's nuclear forces for a first strike conducted by non-nuclear means. Arms control in a deterrence discourse could even advocate, under •certain circumstances, a build-up of nuclear forces if numbers have diminished below a perceived minimum that is seen as vulnerable to the combined offensive capabilities of potential enemies. The Chinese aversion against transparency is also stability-motivated, lest transparency could facilitate first-strike targeting against Bejing s comparably small arsenal. Arms control is a servant of deterrence and is limited by the perceived requirements of the latter. The defense discourse means the capability to react once deterrence fails and a ruthless enemy pursues conquest or extermination. Arms control, in this discourse, must recognize the need and serve the maintenance of a robust defense posture, which nowadays must inevitably include defense against missiles. At the conventional level, the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) Treaty came closest to the ideal arms control agreement: By reducing, and establishing an exact balance for, those five weapon systems needed for a large-scale, territory-grabbing land attack, while not touching those weapons indispensable for defense (like air defense or anti-tank systems), it granted the two participating alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a chance for successful conventional defense This formula, however, is hardly applicable to the nuclear sector: deterrence can only be upheld through the offensive capability to strike even after having suffered an attack. Effective defenses could annihilate this capability for the party forced to strike second. It is hardly possible, therefore, to achieve conventional defense and nuclear deterrence on the basis of the same discourse, but only by combining the two. The defense discourse on Arms Control is structured in a way that Arms Control advocates must always fight an uphill battle against the argument of military utility/necessity. This burden of justification has hampered and frustrated advocates of international humanitarian law in the context of the Geneva Protocols and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) time and again (Mathur, 2012; see below). The disarmament discourse has a moral overtone in that weapons are seen as immoral and dangerous items that, whatever their military value, must be dismantled. They are framed in discourses of stigmatization (Shamai, 2015), in which the stigma is connected to their destructive power (WMD as threat to [human]mankind), cruelty that causes unnecessary and lasting suffering (chemical weapons, incendiary weapons), and indiscriminate effects on civilians (all WMD, antipersonal mines, cluster munitions) (Borrie, 2009; Price, 1998,2007; Rosert, 2015,2016). Stigma is not confined to WMD, but can be glued to other weapons systems as well; hence, weapons singled out for disarmament discourses are not dependent on the particular strategic value; to the contrary, part of the discourse consists of contesting this value to disempower arguments of military utility, which are usually deployed by opponents of the prohibition. Proponents of disarmament are even busy denying the utility of nuclear weapons for both warfare and deterrence (Harrington, 2009; Wilson, 2007, 2008). Today, disarmers rely strongly on humanitarian arguments; the disarmament and humanitarian discourses tend to amalgamate. The humanitarian discourse; finally, asks for measures that serve best the goal of human security: the survival, well-being, and integrity of individuals, notably civilians; consequently, the weapons that have the most devastating effect and discriminate least between combatants and civilians are subject to the demand for elimination, notwithstanding their ascribed military value. It is noteworthy that today's humanitarian discourse, manifested in a broad array of weapon types from antipersonal mines to nuclear weapons, has evolved from the tradition of the legal discourse on the humanitarian law of war that prevailed into the 1990s. There, the basic formula was to weigh humanitarian concerns and military utility. The humanitarian discourse was thus dominated by the defense and deterrence discourses. Today’s humanitarian Arms Control discourse gives priority to human concerns over military utility and links humanitarianism with disarmament, not with constraints on weapons use. Given the weight of military considerations in the attitudes and decision making of nation-states, this does not eliminate completely the weighting of military aspects. But, the burden of proof has shifted. In the old humanitarian law discourse, humanitarians had to argue against "military utility." In the new discourse, opponents of prohibition have to argue for indispensability and irreplaceability of the weapons in question (Price, 1998, p. 632). As a consequence, in the nuclear weapons field, a majority of states is not satisfied anymore with small steps of arms reduction, transparency measures, and confidence building; rather, they push for a fast elimination of nuclear weapons, preceded by the conclusion of a nuclear weapons ban (Borrie, 2014; Kmentt, 2015). The reason for the conservatism of the classical discourse on humanitarian law is not so much the past practices of the legalistic discourse of international humanitarian law (Mathur, 2012) as the result of the balance of political power, with great powers prevailing that wanted their utilitarian concerns (fighting and winning wars) to weigh heavily in the resulting treaties. The new discourse, in contrast, was created by a coalition of humanitarian and disarmament NGOs, and smaller and middle powers that push their causes because they have more moral concerns than stakes in fighting and winning wars, or in the weapons needed for war or for deterrence (Borrie, 2014). The intrinsic nature of the discourses has not engendered the change, but shifts in coalitions and discursive power (Mathur, 2012).

#### No prolif link – empirics disprove and it’s NOT racist to say others are just as likely as we are to make mistakes and argue pragmatically that more prolif is worse

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES AND ARMS CONTROL Arms Control does not completely discard self-help as the basis of national security, but entrusts a more or less significant piece of it to cooperation with potential enemies.3 For this reason, Arms Control is a difficult subject for (purist) realism and neorealism, but also for post-modernism. Realism and neo-realism expect states to pursue self-help as the only reliable basis for their national security. Cooperative security efforts admit that at least part of one's own security is dependent on the partners' compliance with agreed rules. Arms Control also requires a more relaxed attitude toward the problem of relative gains, the somehow unequal distribution of gains emerging from cooperation (Grieco, 1990). Since it is extremely difficult to (define exact balances (numerical balances, for example, neglect differences in geopolitical situations, qualitative aspects, or intangibles like differences in training, etc), relative gains are not only certain to occur, but difficult to assess exactly. Even the notion of an exchange of renunciation, in exchange for a security guarantee, is implausible in the face of the security dilemma, as the guarantor might defeat or may mutate into the enemy of tomorrow. That Arms Control happens in reality is thus somehow puzzling. For post-modernists, Arms Control is only thinkable as a hegemonic project to maintain power differentials, not as a non-hegemonic common endeavor that serves all participants well. Both realists and post-modernists are only at ease with unilateral, hegemonic Arms Control imposed on others, notably on defeated states after war (for example, Iraq in 1991). For post-modernists, post-colonialists, and critical security scholars, non-proliferation is the paradigm of hegemonic Arms Control as an attempt to prevent others from obtaining the weapons that oneself possesses, and the conceding of the difference by middle powers like Canada or Sweden is only explainable by the discursive hegemony of the nuclear weapon states (Keeley, 1990). These critics are right to see roots of non-proliferation thinking in the racist ideology of the colonial era, parts of which have been transported into the 20th century and resonate still in the "rogue state” discourse, with the thrust that “civilized” states must keep “barbarians” at bay by maintaining the difference in military power (Barkawi & Laffey, 2006; Gusterson, 1999; Mathur, 2014). This critique, however, has several weaknesses. It ignores that non-proliferation was deployed first with Germany and Japan, then already members of “the West,” as the primary targets,4 that the first victims of U.S. export controls in the 1970s were advanced European states and Japan, and that controversies over the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the first two decades of the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) were between Western governments more than between the West and the non-aligned (Bccker et al., 2013); moreover, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a main organ of Western nuclear export controls includes today Brazil, China, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and South Africa, non-Westem members that are more than fig leafs. It is the United States that is pushing the membership of India and has terminated “nuclear apartheid" as far as India is concerned. Conversely, most European states have not joined the “rogue state" discourse, and many Western Arms Control and non-proliferation experts have never accepted the distinction between “reasonable" Northern nuclear weapon states and “irrational” Southerners. To the contrary, they have warned against the risks in South Asia because of the proven risks of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, where only a lot of luck saved [human]mankind from a global nuclear holocaust (e.g., Gavin, 2010; Muller, 2013a).s It should also be noted that multilateral Arms Control treaties apart from the NPT have been negotiated in a North-South forum such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions (BWC/CWC), and that recent conventional disarmament treaties such as the Ottawa Convention (anti-personal mines) and the Oslo Convention (cluster munitions) were initiated and pushed by coalitions of Western and Southern middle powers against the express will of Northern and Southern great powers (United States, Russia, China, India). The simple categorization of West against South is no less ideological and misleading than the traces of racist thinking in a limited part of the Arms Control discourse. In contrast, Arms Control presents a solvable puzzle for rationalists with their emphasis on absolute gains and their acceptance of positive sum games and the-information and transparency providing function of institutions that manage and administer Arms Control agreements (e.g., the classic Axelrod & Keohane, 1985). The exchange of renunciation and guarantee appears more plausible to a rationalist when the guarantee is embedded in institutions that render faithfulness more probable (like institutionalized alliances), or in deployment patterns that make use of armed forces in response to an attack more likely (e.g., tripwire-type deployment). Rationalist liberal institutionalism finds good empirical confirmation in Arms Control regimes. Indeed, most agreements are endowed with organizations that serve as channels for communication, arenas for sorting out behavioral ambiguities of members and clarifying ambivalences in the language of prescriptions and prohibitions, and supply transparency by reporting and verification and can, after all, take decisions. Not only multilateral treaties have such organizations (like the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] working for the NPT or the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons [OPCW] working for the CWC), but even the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are usually managed by bilateral standing commissions.

### AT: L – Biotech

#### No impact to securitizing dual-use biotech

Edwards 14 Brett Edwards, PhD candidate, Politics, Languages & International Studies, University of Bath, The Ethics and Governance of Dual-Use Synthetic Biology within the United States and the United Kingdom (2003 - 2012), PhD thesis, February 2014, <https://purehost.bath.ac.uk/ws/portalfiles/portal/187955815/Edwards_Brett_PhD_Thesis_05_07_14_Final_Corrected_1.pdf> /GoGreen!

8.3 Dual-use Governance and Securitization Theory

Dual-use governance has proved an interesting issue area for the application of securitization theory. First, this research has drawn attention to the role of epistemic communities and scientific consensus positions on given issues in the context of complexity and uncertainty (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998, 72–73). In particular, this work has emphasised the fundamental impacts of the emergence of these factors on agenda setting and problem definition. Added to this, the work has drawn attention to the idea that systemic risks are made governable rhetorically with reference to complex webs of collaboration between institutions in the development and implementation of risk governance activities. This includes, for example, bio-preparedness models of governance which have developed in the US and Europe. However, the work also draws attention to the idea that such collaboration faces a series of political challenges, particularly in the context of anticipatory modes of governance which attempt to deal with challenges beyond the scope of existing risk management structures.

Second, this work has outlined that it is in this context that actors (including state and nonstate institutions) engage in two key modes of engagement with security politics. The first is the primary mode, which involves engagement in activities designed to set the rules for future policy making processes in relation given issue. This includes, for example, deciding which institutions are in charge of developing and implementing policies, and the nature of collaboration between actors within these processes. Within this work, it has been argued that the epistemic communities embodied in the NSABB and Sloan report processes, for instance, have been central to such processes.

The other mode of engagement is secondary, which involves engagement in the context of agreements about the overall process of policy development. Within this mode of action, actors seek to impact directly on the policies which are being developed and implemented. This may include initiating, advocating, facilitating or resisting specific initiatives.

Third, this work has outlined the extent to which policy models are useful to those who study processes of securitization in the context of systemic risks. In chapter three, it was argued that these models could provide focus, structure and limits within analysis, which are of central importance in interdisciplinary studies, as well as in multi-level approaches, and that this could help the analyst to identify which activities, discourses and actors are and are not relevant with regard to policy outcomes.

It is certainly the case that these models performed these roles in two important senses. First, they provided a central narrative for the life and death of single initiatives and policy proposals. For example, they allowed for the exploration of the extent to which forwardlooking oversight proposals have been rejected within political and policy streams within the US. A case in point is recommendations made by the NSABB in relation to synthetic biology research and technology, which have often struggled to garner federal US support. Another example was the 2004 bio-hazard non-proliferation proposal of George Church, which was dropped in favour of other governance options developed within the academic channel of polynucleotide synthesis policy development.

It was also argued in chapter three, that such policy models could provide a straightforward institutionally, historically and politically situated ‘environment’ for discourses and ‘speech-acts’ to occupy within an overall process of securitization. Such claims were made in the context of the concern that analysts studying securitization processes who rely on a linguistic approach may struggle to adequately account for the socio-historical context of speech acts, and to sufficiently trace the impact of such acts on policy outcomes. Simply put, it was argued that some approaches focus much more on those ‘speaking’ security in relation to an issue, and much less on those actually developing and implementing security policy. During the analysis process, policy process models provided a framework to help understand why actors were speaking security in some contexts, and what the actual implications of this was for emerging policy. A key example related to the NEST domain, where the scientific community, as well as associated social scientists, have been identified as a first line of defence in dealing with dual-use issues. Placing these assertions in a broader political context, however, revealed the extent to which these claims were contested, as well as the extent to which such assertions often belied low levels of action. Further to this, reasons were given to explain why NEST initiatives were struggling within both a US and UK context to transform innovation practice, as well as to encourage key regulators to engage pre-emptively with broader dual-use concerns.

#### Our biotech reps are a criticism of – NOT complicit with – racist scientific epistemologies – calling for entangled responsibility facilitates expanded political imagination

Chandler 18 David Chandler, Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster, “Biopolitics 2.0: Reclaiming the power of life in the Anthropocene,” Contemporary Political Theory, 9-20-2018, DOI: 10.1057/s41296-018-0265-9 /GoGreen!

Biopolitics was once the preserve of critical Foucauldian-influenced theorists. This is no longer the case. The rise of new materialisms, networked and object-oriented ontologies and demands for the ‘renaturalization of politics’ (Grosz, 2011; Sharp, 2011) have turned the political into the biopolitical in much of radical contemporary political theory. Here, the biopolitical is often in tension with the Foucauldian discourses of the last few decades, affirming alternative possibilities rather than merely critiquing regimes of power (Malabou, 2008; Kirby, 2011; Taussig, 2018). One factor in this shift has been the impact of anthropogenic climate change and global warming on the contemporary political imagination, increasingly refracted through conceptualizations of the Anthropocene (Tsing, 2015; Cohen et al., 2016; Chandler, 2018). A second factor has been that the life sciences no longer appear to support understandings of deterministic differences but rather to cast evolution in sympoietic and entangled ways, making biology appear as no longer essentialising but as increasingly importable into politics, in ways which disrupt modernist or liberal conceptions of the culture/nature divide (Haraway, 2016). Two important but very different engagements, which reflect these affirmative readings of biopolitics, are reviewed here, from the fields of postcolonial literature and gender and race in international politics. I’d like to start by laying out the insights and framing of Stephanie Fishel’s The Microbial State. This book is a well-worked deployment of the new materialist thesis of the world of ‘lively matter’ (the cover and publicity blurb feature a ringing endorsement from leading political theorist Jane Bennett). Fishel locates her work firmly in the camp of posthumanism, counterposing the modernist, ‘anthropic’ account of the state as ‘the body politic’ to one that takes into account the ‘biospheric’ and the ‘microbial’ (p. 2). The key conceptual point is to highlight that the biological is crucial to the bounded imaginary of the state as a community analogous to the human body. Both these conceptions of the bounded political subject – the individual in liberal political theory and the state in international theory – are products of the biopolitical blurring of culture and nature in atomising and essentialising ways. Fishel critically uses the life sciences as a lens for alternative political imaginaries of complex and overlapping communities, which seek to overcome the homogenising ‘body’ metaphors of contemporary political discourse and the ‘autonomous and autarkic’ subjects of the biopolitical they produce (p. 15). Thus we move well beyond Foucault’s Biopolitics 1.0, where biopolitics is a technology of management and control. Instead, Fishel provides a ‘reversal of biopolitical critique, one that emphasizes vitality connection and entangled responsibility’ (p. 21): ‘This book takes life as a creative intensity that can offer new solutions, and new ways of engaging with the world’ (p. 21). In the inversion or ‘reversal’ of biopolitical critique, the world and its entangled relationality becomes a potential cure for the dangerous ‘immunitarian’ and essentialising biopolitical logic of individual and state rights and interests (p. 27). The metaphors of entanglement, contamination, sympoeisis and intra-active becomings can facilitate and enable a new (multi-species) politics, capable of addressing the crises of global warming and species extinction in the Anthropocene. Perhaps the most important conceptual move, in a range of interesting treatments, is the importance attached to the ‘microbial’ of the book title. Modernist, or human-centred, views of development and security treat the human or the state as separate and distinct entities and therefore as the referent for politics, through metaphors of conflict and militarism – with treatment as ‘intervention’, germs as ‘enemies’ or the ‘war’ against cancer (p. 49). Microbial and other entangled or relational metaphors enable alternative ontologies of being and becoming. If we seriously want to tackle contemporary problems, perhaps the starting point should instead be to ask, ‘What would a microbe do?’ (p. 56) Microscopic bacteria may seem ‘small and simple’ but they are what enable life to exist and highlight that living organisms are enmeshed in their environments, inside and out, enabling us ‘to envision political community as an assemblage of multispecies groupings’ (p. 56). Microbes enable us to go beyond binaries of self and other and to bring ‘system-based understandings of complex processes’ to the political realm, enabling ‘different forms of practice for sustainable, ethical, global living with one another, and with other life forms, as a bodies politic’ (p. 61). Processual and entangled ways of understanding politics change our attitude to problems and their governance; the questions become ‘more about various ecological relationships and balance, rather than resistance to invasion’ (p. 63). Key to microbial political possibilities is the removal of the keystone of modernist politics – the individual as subject – which ‘places the separateness of the human being as its most important trait’ (p. 69). ‘Biologically, at least, we are not intrinsically individuals, but collective super-organisms, assimilating multiple species and millions of individual organisms’ (p. 68). Microbial worlds enable us to question liberal and rationalist approaches that prioritise the individual over all other entities and collectives (this chimes well with other feminist science studies-informed work, equally suspicious of a liberal rights framework, for example, Clarke and Haraway, 2018). Microbially-imagined or posthuman forms of governance enable creative awareness that ‘[I]n Kantian and humanist terms, an individual is always an end, not a means; therefore, the will of the individual cannot be sacrificed without consent’ (p. 69). Thus in Fishel’s reworking of the biopolitical, key targets are liberal conceptions of ‘freedom’ (p. 69), ‘sovereignty, law and democracy’, which will need to be redefined. Microbes enable us to see the artifice behind the distinctions of liberal political theory, of separate entities with distinct rights and interests: ‘From this perspective it is impossible not to see the similarities between relationships in the internal relations between members of microbiotic communities in the human gut and the relations between member of a political society’ (p. 75). Rather than conflictual self-interests – the stuff of human-centred political communities – microbes enable us to imagine a politics of collaboration: ‘the human gut, in this book… is exemplified as a community in which very few relationships are pathogenic’ (p. 87). The microbial message of multi-species becoming is clear, with ‘new definitions of health for the state based on expanded notions of health through plurality… plurality and stimulation, not autonomy and purity, lead to strength’ (p. 90). Fishel is well aware that what I am calling ‘Biopolitics 2.0’ – with its affirmative use of biological metaphors – runs the risk, associated with all imports from biology into the political, of carrying ‘illiberal and conservative connotations’, but she stresses that ‘modern biology and current biological thinking’ are different, ‘no longer based on static equilibrium or a bare struggle for survival expounded by neo-Darwinist theories of evolution’ (p. 101). Rather than fixed entities fighting for distinct interests, microbial imaginaries are ones of collective and sympoietic becoming. This is a process of constant change and transformation, of ‘posthuman becoming’ and ‘biocultural hope’; entanglements with others make all of us ‘co-evolved symbionts’ (p. 102) where ‘the world is a joint product between the human and the non-human… composing the world together’ (p. 105). Fishel’s thesis of ‘the reversal of biopolitics’ claims to ‘open a space to reformulate biopolitics more positively by affirming life as vital and relational rather than a purely mechanical reaction against that which is Other’ (p. 108). Fishel is keen to flag up that in ‘mining the hermeneutic potential of the life sciences’ (p. 113) she is not forwarding ‘science as a Western imperial project’ (p. 116) – but seeking rather ‘to redesign, traverse, and complicate the body politic’ through using ‘alternate visions of science’ to ‘demonstrate that hybridity and heterogeneity are necessary elements for understanding the nature of the individual and the individual’s connection to the larger world’ (p. 116). The contemporary biological turn – with its rejection of Darwinist conceptions of ‘survival of the fittest’ and imaginaries of the ‘tree of life’ with separate and distinct lines of evolution – here provides a powerful critique of liberal imaginaries of security and development, with the underlying deterministic telos of hierarchy, competition and progress. The ideas of the contemporary life sciences – which are rewriting nature as creative and interactive rather than as passive and determined and emphasise hybridity, transference across species boundaries, symbiosis and sympoietic becoming – would seem a vital source of inspiration for alternative political imaginaries. The second book under review, Deepika Bahri’s Postcolonial Biology, engages the biopolitical moment from the angle of rereading and deconstructing embodied themes of transformation, hybridity and transference across racialized boundaries in postcolonial literature. It is productive to read her book alongside Fishel’s as Bahri both complicates and reinforces the points made above regarding the political and conceptual productivity of biologically-informed political imaginaries. Bahri states from the outset that her book ‘claims biology as a valid – indeed a crucial – area of interest for critical postcolonial studies’ as ‘[T]he socio-political challenges of the twenty-first century require us to look beyond biologically deterministic conceptions of racialized difference to porous, pliable, and plastic bodies and psyches as critically embattled zones of conflict in the wake of imperial modernity’ (p. viii). Bahri’s point is that the blurring of the nature/culture divide and the view of life as hybrid, processual, disruptive and transformative – rather than differentiated, deterministic and static – is not simply the preserve of contemporary posthumanist theorists but was already present in colonial discourses of governance with the ‘implicitly reincarnative politics of the so-called civilizing mission in imperial modernity’ (p. 2). Whilst it is easy to cast modernity as hegemonised by a Darwinian ‘racist science’ which ‘assumed that genetics locked in differences between races’, the colonial gaze, in fact, ‘implied an as-yet scientifically unverified but implicit belief in human bioplasticity and aesthetic reformation’ (p. 3). Ideas of distinct bounded bio-social political communities – or bodies politic – ‘were complicated by imperial designs on impressionable, plastic body-minds at the level of ideology as well as the micromanagement of the subject’s bio-physiology’ (p. 3). For Bahri, today’s new materialist or posthuman ontologies of human and non-human entanglement of nature and culture can be read as already implicit in, and also as a response to, colonial discourses of civilizing mission (p. 3). Bahri highlights that Darwinian perspectives, with their implied lines of genetic determination, were not as dominant in the early twentieth century social sciences as socio-biological discourses of indeterminism, with Lamarckian views of acquired characteristics the bridge between culture and race (p. 152 n. 25). Colonial and postcolonial views of the bio-social thus become an ‘instructive precursor to the nexus of capital, corporation, and the biopolitics of hybridity in the global present’ (p. 5). While old biological determinism produced ‘bad science and even worse politics’ (p. 6), the construction of the body as ‘pliant, bio-mentally plastic and permeable’, for Bahri, ‘is a battlefield no less worthy of our urgent attention’ (p. 6). Thus the contemporary revisiting of the biopolitical – Biopolitics 2.0 – is perhaps more usefully understood as a struggle waged on the grounds of a Lamarckian creationism, where bottom-up ‘bio-cultural hope’ stands as an open and creative counter to top-down views of the manipulation of hybrid becomings, central to the colonial mission. Bahri examines how colonial discourses operated not on a strict separation between biology and culture, but rather on the construction of a sliding scale interconnecting nature and culture, which imbricated both the life sciences and the humanities, constructing them as distinct and yet flexibly co-constitutive disciplines. It was this continuum that enabled ideas of racial distinction and genetic determination to easily morph back and forth with ideas of social, cultural and environmental hybridity and transformation. The colonial civilizing mission inevitably overlaid views of fixed genetic distinctions and determinations with bio-social discourses of epigenetic transformation, which blurred the distinction between culture and nature, enabling colonial hierarchies to be constructed and played out through transformative imaginaries that biologized cultural attributes. Bahri draws out well how these colonial discourses exposed the ‘weak link’ of modernist or Enlightenment thought, in politicizing the biological as the keystone of Otherness. In the bio-social construction of the Other as inferior there is the implication that the outside is always already present on the inside, as more real or ‘authentic’. Thus, in her citing of Fanon, for the colonial mind, it is always the Other who is the ‘bringer of biology’ or the one who ‘symbolizes the biological’ (p. 29). Bahri’s book engages with three novels, all of which deal with postcolonial framings of hybrid becoming: Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children; Hari Kunzru’s The Impressionist; and Julian Barnes’ Unofficial Englishmen, Arthur and George. The key characters in these novels all aspire to becoming other, confronting postcolonial biology through discourses of culture and aesthetics with the body as the site or battleground of bio-cultural adaptive transformation. It is the ‘biological body, its sounds, odours, excretions, urges, emissions, and expressions’ upon which the ‘civilizational project’ is expressed and measured (p. 11). Culture and nature are conflated at the same time as they are constructed as two poles of the human and the non-human. The key point being made is that the politics of race is an epiphenomenon of a deeper and more essential aspect of modernist and Enlightenment thought, the distinction between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which overcodes racial and colonial discourses of ‘civilization’ and today’s ‘developmental aesthetics’ (p. 135). Bahri’s work is also useful to understand today’s import of the contemporary life sciences into radical political imaginaries, as she seeks to draw from the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, who maintained the colonial ‘sliding scale’ but used this to critique the empty and ‘hollowed subject’ of the bourgeois rationalist Enlightenment (p. 31). The continuum and interplay between the biological and the socio-cultural-political was maintained, but the radical goal was to return to an awareness of the interdependencies, interconnections and entanglements of the ‘biological’. While the colonial civilizing mission sought to develop a bio-social science of transformation and hybridity to enable ‘becoming modern’ or ‘becoming liberal’, the radical response was to flag up the artifice and hubris of modernity’s attempt to repress or erase our entangled biological being. Thus for Biopolitics 2.0, with a more affirmative framing of nature and the biological, the weak link – exposed by the colonial discourse of ‘civilizing mission’ and blurring of the biological and cultural – can be turned against the advocates of the modernist episteme. Having understood the inherently oppressive logic of ‘instrumental rationality’ and the human/non-human, nature/culture hierarchical divides, the way is then clear for the return of biology as an alternative way of conceiving ‘life’ without modernist/colonial binaries and bifurcations (p. 142). Thus it is possible for the colonial discourses of plasticity with their ‘vague sociobiological indeterminism’ (p. 152 n. 25) to become repurposed for imagining creative and open alternative futures. The underlying stakes in biologically-inflected discourses of transformative and hybrid becoming were inevitably imbricated within universalist and modernist paradigms of development and progress. This is still the case today, except that the idea of the ‘sliding scale’ of civilization is transposed. In the Anthropocene, ideas of the superiority of the ‘human’ over the ‘nonhuman’ or of ‘culture’ over ‘nature’ or of ‘civilized’ over ‘indigenous’ have lost their credence. It is little surprise that the crisis of modernity has enabled the inversion of hegemonic, modernising and colonial frames of transformation. This fundamental shift, nurturing a new and affirmative assessment of the life that was previously repressed or excluded is well reflected in the two books reviewed here. Whereas Foucauldian-informed biopolitical critique railed against the reduction of the human to ‘bare life’, or of political life to biological existence, Biopolitics 2.0 inverses the assumptions, seeking to reinvest ‘mere life’ with meaningfulness and value: even life in its smallest and simplest microbial forms can make the human look insignificant and facilitate more creative political imaginaries.

### AT: L – Bioweapons

#### Securitization of bioweapons attacks doesn’t result in militarization, only effective preparedness and response

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The Threat of Biological Weapons: A Justification of Biological Weapons Securitization 1. Introduction In 2001, when attacks were carried out in the United States involving Bacillus anthracis, the bacterial agent that causes anthrax, the threat of biological weapons came into sharper focus for the American government. These attacks were not the beginning of the biological weapons threat, but rather a point along a continuum of increasing risk. Article 1 of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention defines biological weapons to include the “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes” as well as the “weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict”1. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries, but the fear of biological weapons of mass destruction, here defined as weapons that pose an existential threat to the target, is relatively recent2. Much of it is attributable to the rapid advances made in the biological sciences over the past decade, particularly with respect to the field of genomics, where there is a growing ability to manipulate genes3. This knowledge has a variety of applications in the field of bioweapons. Additionally, while states use of biological weapons was a concern through much of the 20th century, the possibility that rogue states or non-state groups would use biological weapons was largely ignored until the start of the 21st century1. Therefore, the threat of biological weapons has been framed as a security issue4. This essay examines whether, and to what degree, the threat of a biological weapons attack has been overstated with respect to the government’s response by drawing on securitization theory, which critically evaluates the process through which an issue comes to be viewed through a security framework. In addition, the essay will also use the precautionary principle, described by the 1998 Wingspread Statement as the notion that “when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”5. Though more often applied to considerations of environmental risk, in the case of biological weapons, the principle could be used to justify caution even in the absence of consensus surrounding the probability of an attack, simply due to the severity of the consequences if an attack was to occur. It will be argued that the biological weapons threat has not been overestimated and that the biodefense measures expressed in current policy and funding decisions are warranted. Despite measures such as likelihood-adjusted mortality, which may suggest the U.S. government response is an overreaction, other characteristics of the bioweapons threat justify its securitization and resulting prioritization in the government agenda. To do this, the essay provides a discussion of how the potential consequences of an attack pose an existential threat to the United States, how there is an inadequate degree of preparedness for such an event, how the mere possibility of an attack is enough to warrant high spending on preventive and preparative programs, and how the response has been appropriately measured given the threat. The focus will be on the United States government because it has taken such a prominent role in bioweapon securitization and biodefense funding. A single country, the US, was chosen as a point of focus to avoid confusion due to differing levels of threat and response across countries. Additionally, any exaggerations that may exist in how the media or the public portray and view the biological weapons threat will be ignored; though this could be related to the government’s decision to securitize bioweapons, this is a separate issue from government policy decisions in response to the security threat and is outside the scope of this paper. 2. Securitization Theory and Biological Weapons Securitization theory is a constructivist approach informing how certain issues become framed through a security lens6. It offers a useful analytical framework for understanding how, why, and what issues come to be viewed as security threats. Securitization is an active process wherein a securitizing actor, in this case the American government, presents and addresses an issue as an existential threat to a particular group, or referent object7. In these situations, emergency response measures and extensive resource commitments are considered justified7. Securitization theory generally promotes desecuritization as preferable because it avoids the negative consequences of securitization, including a heavy-handed state response, reduced democratic accountability, and the narrowing of public choice8. However, it also recognizes that securitization is sometimes appropriate. Recent considerations of securitization theory identify three criteria that, if fulfilled, justify securitization: an objective, existential threat, a referent object whose protection promotes human well-being, and a response appropriately measured to the particular threat6. In the case of bioweapons securitization, the second criterion is less controversial, given that the referent object is human population; thus, any harm to the referent object would directly reduce a human well-being. However, the question of whether securitization of biological weapons meets the other two criteria is more contentious. Skeptics may point to Colin Powell’s 2003 address to the United Nations as a case where the biological weapons security threat may have been exaggerated and securitization was promoted for political ends, thereby calling into question the legitimacy of the securitizing actor, the U.S. government. In his speech, Powell made the case for an invasion of Iraq by claiming Iraq had capabilities to produce biological weapons of mass destruction, including mobile bioweapons labs, a claim that later turned out to be false9. Critics also target the policies resulting from securitization, arguing that the capacity of aggressors to carry out large scale attacks causing mortality has been overestimated, calling into question whether an existential threat truly exists and whether the response has been appropriately measured10. Government funding may be seen as unjustifiably skewed in favour of biodefense, defined as the capacity to respond to a biological weapons attack, to the neglect of other key areas, such as endemic and pandemic diseases. For instance, Klotz calculated what is referred as the “likelihood-adjusted mortality” for biological weapons, pandemic diseases, and endemic diseases by multiplying the probability of occurrence by an estimate of mortality were an event to occur11. By comparing these values with government funding allocated to each category, he demonstrated that biodefense receives more funding than its likelihood-adjusted mortality estimate would suggest is warranted11. However, objections have been raised to this argument. Supporters of biodefense prioritization point to the fact that focusing solely on potential fatalities ignores other issues, such as the negative social and economic fallout from an attack12. Additionally, they point to the possibility that it is more expensive to combat intentional threats, where there will be an explicit effort to circumvent current practices by exploiting weaknesses12. It should also be considered that the probability of one attack is not independent from another, and that an increasing probability of success may elicit more attempts12. To follow will be an examination of whether government spending and policies constitute a justified response to the threat of biological weapons. Securitization is relevant in that it was a way for decision-makers to implement the policies they want and is justifiable to the extent that the programs themselves are necessary and appropriate. Despite other consequences of securitization, such as public fear, political manipulation, and a heavy-handed response, which may give the impression of an overreaction, the reality is that securitization was a means of enabling the implementation of certain policies and programs necessary to respond to the threat of biological weapons. 3. Consequences of an Attack A government’s decision to securitize an issue is a strategy to make extreme responses seem justified, and it centers on the perceived existential risk a threat poses to the population7. Beginning with a brief history of biological weapons use, this section will aim to defend the framing of biological weapons use as an existential threat by examining their ability to cause mortality or to generate negative social and economic fallout. A brief discussion of the potential catastrophic consequences of a smallpox attack will illustrate the argument. The use of biological weapons dates back centuries. Examples include the Tatars catapulting plague-infected corpses over city walls at the siege of Kaffa in the 14th century, the deliberate triggering of a smallpox epidemic among Native Americans via contaminated blankets in the 18th century during the French and Indian War, and the contamination of salad bars with salmonella at a restaurant in Oregon in the 20th century2. However, with the development of the germ theory during the 19th and into the 20th century, there was an increase in scientific knowledge about biological weapons10. States became increasingly interested in such weapons, with Japan establishing a bioweapons program between 1932-1945, the United States in 1942, and the Soviet Union in 197313. In 1972, in response to increasing concern about the threat of biological weapons, the United Nations proposed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological Weapons Convention (or BWC)14. The treaty came into effect in 1975, and banned the development, acquisition, and stockpiling of biological weapons1. However, it failed to halt the research and development of biological weapons, which have continued into the 21st century. Those who argue that government response to the biological weapons threat has been overstated point to very low mortality in previous attacks11. The anthrax attacks of 2001 in the United States, for example, resulted in only 5 deaths15. This argument could be used to urge governments to instead invest resources in areas that consistently cause higher mortality, such as infectious diseases like AIDS or even the seasonal flu. However, in carrying out a threat assessment, it is also important to look at the potential for mortality. Here it has been suggested future attacks may not be on the same relatively small scale as those in the past15. It is difficult to produce reliable estimates of fatalities that might result from an attack; there is huge variation in estimates and, often, little statistical evidence to support the predictions11. That said, it is agreed that, in theory, even small amounts of a dangerous biological agent could cause significant mortality if prepared and disseminated effectively16. For instance, the WHO estimates that 50kg of B. anthracis distributed upwind of a population of 500 000 would leave 95 000 people dead and 125 000 more incapacitated17. Other sources suggest that 100kg of B. anthracis, disseminated via a crop-sprayer, could kill as many as three million people, and comparable values have been projected for other agents2,18. Another concern is that a contagious biological agent will result in person-to-person transmission, creating a self-sustaining effect not present in any other weapons class10. While mass casualties are possible, it is also important to note that, even in situations with few casualties, biological weapons attacks may have profound social and economic ramifications3. Such attacks could lead to widespread social panic and disorder, resulting in self-destructive behaviour and creating what is called a “societal autoimmune effect” involving increases in crime and looting19. While there is little evidence to predict this would occur based on previous disaster situations (such as the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, where the public reaction is described as effective and adaptive, rather than panicked and disruptive), it must remain a consideration20. The effects of a largescale attack involving biological weapons are unknown, and epidemics of highly fatal diseases may cause serious social disruption20. The economic consequences of biological weapons attacks are severe and suggest that investing in defense makes good economic sense. While there were only five deaths in the 2001 anthrax attacks, those attacks resulted in tens of billions of dollars in government spending21. Also, the financial sector may be negatively impacted if investor confidence plummets3. Similarly, an attack on the agricultural sector, which accounts for 15% of the United States GDP, could have severe economic ramifications3. If the biological agent being used is contagious, there could also be implications for trade and travel restrictions3. The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed the economic consequences of a highly infectious disease, essentially “crippling” some of the most dynamic cities in the world4. The Center for Biosecurity has estimated the economic cost of a biological weapons attack in the U.S. could exceed one trillion USD15. In short, there are social and economic consequences that, considered in conjunction with the potential for catastrophically high mortality, justify the framing of biological weapons as a significant existential threat to the United States. This is illustrated by considering the specific case of smallpox. The Variola virus, which causes smallpox, is an example of an agent that, if weaponized and used in an attack, would pose a serious existential threat to the United States22. It is highly contagious; in a 1972 outbreak in Yugoslavia, even with routine vaccinations, which are no longer carried out, the disease spread rapidly, with each affected individual infecting 11 to 13 others23. It is also lethal, with a 30% fatality rate1. Human populations are highly susceptible because, since eradication, vaccinations have not been given for 20 years24. Other features make smallpox an appealing option for bioterrorism: it has no treatment once symptoms occur; it would not be detected for 7-17 days; it is physically disfiguring; and the virus is stable in aerosol form1,24. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of smallpox is that those infected are contagious before symptoms appear. Simulations have been carried out, including a 1999 exercise by the Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies at Johns Hopkins University, where a terrorist release of Variola virus grew into a global outbreak, which the health and emergency response system was unable to control22. Here it could be suggested that prevention efforts promoted by securitization are the only option, given the apparent inability to contain a global outbreak after an attack has occurred. While the dangers posed by the Variola virus are not contested, skeptics argue that it is too difficult to acquire to be a real danger10. However, there is significant concern over unaccounted Soviet Union smallpox samples, and a 1999 U.S. report pointed to evidence that secret stockpiles of the virus are held by North Korea, Russia, and Iraq1,25. It has also been suggested that the terrorist organization Aum Shinrikyo holds quantities of the Variola virus22. Threat and risk assessments should not rely solely on the worst-case scenarios of biological weapons attacks, especially since practical challenges still limit terrorists’ ability to conduct attacks that will have the greatest possible effect. However, it is equally crucial to be aware of the wide range of consequences of such an attack. This section has argued that there could be serious ramifications on several dimensions, ramifications which justify the framing of biological weapons as an existential threat to the United States and warrant investment in an appropriate response capacity. Securitization, therefore, played an important role encouraging policy responses that were justified and appropriate. 4. Preparedness for an Attack This section will examine the capacity of the United States to mitigate the consequences of an attack, a primary aim of biodefense. For government action to be justified, the response must be appropriate to the given threat level. The argument will be that this is the case with biodefense programs, which must seek to address key weaknesses in the preparedness system. There is a general consensus that the United States has insufficient capabilities to respond effectively to a biological weapons attack3. Three primary components of preparedness will be addressed: the ability to detect an attack, the preparedness of the health care and emergency response system to respond, and the medical countermeasures that currently exist. It will be shown that there are important deficiencies in all three of these areas, further suggesting that programs aimed at developing a more appropriate response capacity are not overestimating the threat but are both justified and necessary. Biological weapons are a unique class from conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons because their effects may not be felt immediately26. It could take days before it becomes apparent that an attack has taken place; this is problematic as immediate treatment may be crucial to survival27. Oral antibiotics for inhalational anthrax, for example, should be administered within 48 hours of exposure, which leaves little time for detection and delivery1. Any delay in detection could result in a large number of casualties. Additionally, if the weapon agent is contagious, failure to detect and respond the attack may result in a greater spread of the infection. For this reason, adequate detection capabilities are essential to bioterrorism preparedness. Unfortunately, while funding for biodefense has led to improvements, such as biosurveillance systems that seek information on disease outbreaks, there are still weaknesses in the system15. The systems are still quite rudimentary, relying on a time-consuming process of clinician reporting, laboratory diagnostics, and the phoning, mailing, or faxing of reports15. To improve, biosurveillance must be modernized. We need more effective electronic reporting, quick, cheap, and reliable diagnostic tests, and the integration of public health surveillance data with that from other sectors such as law and intelligence agencies26. Currently, however, detection systems are not able to detect biological agents at relatively low concentrations, or to detect multiple biological agents with a single system, and they are not sufficiently portable and user-friendly26. Detection ability is further compromised by poor diagnostic capabilities in hospitals. One U.S. study found that 91.2% of U.S. hospitals surveyed lacked the necessary diagnostic technology to analyze and identify biological agents28. Hospitals have been targeted as the weakest link in the preparedness chain, in particular due to their inability to accommodate a sudden influx of mass casualties29. It has been found that 60% of hospitals lack such resources as the supplies, equipment, beds, and staff to respond to a mass casualty situation28. Consequently, hospitals lack the surge capacity to attend to patients; this could be disastrous in terms of victims not receiving life-saving treatment, the failure to quarantine infectious individuals, and the possibility of social disorder as a result of public frustration. The problem is that hospitals need far greater resources to respond to a bioterrorist attack than they do for everyday functioning30. Practice scenarios have demonstrated this resource shortage problem on more than one occasion. A simulated attack on a U.S. city that involved the pneumonic plague resulted in antibiotic shortages after just three days; the situation worsened until, at the end of the weeklong simulation, 3700 cases of plague had been identified and 2000 “deaths” had been reported31. Also of concern is the overall inadequacy of medical countermeasures for biological weapons, identified as one of the areas in greatest need of attention15. Of the twelve biological agents identified as posing the highest threat to the United States, only anthrax, smallpox, and botulism receive substantial funding for medical countermeasure development and acquisition15. One reason for this is that pharmaceutical companies are not as motivated to fund research and development addressing biological weapons since there is not as great a commercial market as there is for chronic diseases and influenza15. Even such practices as decontamination require funding and improvement. The decontamination procedures for B. anthracis, previously used in the 2001 anthrax attacks, while effective, were also slow and expensive, and could not be replicated in a situation with mass casualties15. In the discussion above, it was argued that high government funding is not overestimated but is appropriate and justified to implement biodefense initiatives required to improve response capacity. This was done by demonstrating that the United States is ill-equipped to deal with a significant biological weapons attack, and that this lack of preparedness risks further exacerbating the already potentially catastrophic consequences of a biological weapons attack. Securitization was useful in helping justify prioritizing funding to address this issue. 5. Probability of an Attack The potentially disastrous consequences of an attack and the lack of preparedness for such an event have been demonstrated, but perhaps none of that would matter (or justify prioritizing biodefense) if the probability of an attack by states or terrorists was negligible, due to an absence of capacity or will to carry out a biological weapons attack on the United States. This section will consider the likelihood of a biological weapons attack in the United States by states or terrorist groups. This issue is hotly contested, with some groups arguing that the chances of an attack are much lower than popular fears and perceptions would suggest, while others, like CIA Director Gross, believe it is “only a matter of time”, and predict another biological weapons attack on the United States before 202028,32. As noted earlier, this essay’s focus is not on whether media rhetoric is inflated or public perceptions unrealistic. Rather, it will be argued that the increasing availability of biological weapons and the documented intent of various hostile groups to acquire such weapons make an attack more likely. This is where we see the relevance of the precautionary principle, as an uncertainty surrounding the probability of an attack encourages us to adopt the principle, promoting caution where funding is allocated in light of the dire consequences that may arise were an attack to occur. Officially ratified in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention addressed concerns relating to the increasing biological weapons threat1. While commendable, the convention had important flaws including an absence of any formal verification of compliance by states. For instance, after signing the declaration, the Soviet Union continued to develop their biological weapons program (unbeknownst to the global community)33. Soviet defectors later confirmed the scale of their program, describing a massive, covert operation34. Other countries have also been alleged to have biological weapons programs, including Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria33,35. While Iraq has since claimed that its biological weapons were all destroyed, this has been impossible to verify2. Additionally, with the recent emergence of biotechnology industries in low and middle-income countries, most notably Brazil and India, more states are gaining advanced scientific capacity that could potentially be applied to biological weapons development and production3. The key here is that many states now have the scientific and technological capacity to develop biological weapons, but there is a limited capacity for national states or international organizations to monitor such a process36. In the BWC definition of biological weapons, the primary focus is on intent—both in terms of the purpose of the microbial agent and the delivery system1. Intent is the determining factor in the classification of biological weapons, but this is extremely difficult to measure or prove until after an act has been committed. In the biological sciences, much research is readily applicable to justifiable ends (vaccines), as well as hostile ones (biological weapons). The United States will often accuse other states of hostile intent based solely on the presence of pharmaceutical and biotechnological expertise necessary for biological weapons development35. This can be viewed as an area of overreaction to the bioweapons threat, illustrating how securitization processes seem to legitimize some bad policy responses as well as good ones. Despite the fact that most states could use this expertise to develop biological weapons, the majority does not. This suggests that, while capacity is present, the intent to use biological weapons is limited. In fact, over the past century, there is only one confirmed case of a biological weapons attack by one state on another: Japan’s striking against China in the 1930s and 1940s1. It has been suggested that reasons for this may stem from fear of retaliation or the difficulties of controlling effects on civilians and combatants1. Most countries possessing biological weapons claim their purpose is to deter attacks or biological weapons use by others35. In the past, the prospect of terrorists using biological weapons received little attention3. It was generally believed that terrorists would not be able to engineer biological weapons because they lacked access to the necessary biological agents, the technological capabilities, and the specialized knowledge to weaponize and disseminate a biological weapon10. Skeptics still believe that the advanced genetic capabilities required to produce biological weapons will not be available to terrorists in the near future3. For instance, the ability to process a biological agent into aerosol form, the most effective delivery method, requires expertise across a wide range of scientific disciplines32. Also suspect is their ability to account for environmental and meteorological conditions that may disrupt weapon dissemination10, 32. However, a changing global and scientific landscape has led to a greater potential for the acquisition of biological weapons capacity by terrorist groups. For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviets reportedly employed approximately 55, 000 scientists and technicians at 6 biological weapons research labs and 5 production facilities37. Among other things, smallpox was weaponized into ballistic missiles and bombs38. In 1997, the United States conducted a visit to one of these research labs to find that the facility was half empty, poorly guarded, and that most of the scientists had left39. It is, therefore, possible that the biological agents, the equipment, and the human knowledge and expertise have since fallen into the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations. Additionally, methods of biological weapons production are now freely accessible via the Internet, and the technological requirements are not beyond the means of a determined, well-funded terrorist organization2. Moreover, recent scientific advances may support biological weapons production by enabling the production of a higher yield of high-quality product36. They may also support more effective weaponization, by making agents more resistant to environmental hazards or by making agents targetable against specific biochemical pathways36. As these capabilities spread across the globe, there will be a greater potential for terrorists to harness and use these techniques. While the capabilities of terrorists to engineer biological weapons may have been overstated in the past, this can no longer be said to be the case. It has been argued that two of the preconditions for assessing the threat of bioterrorism, vulnerability to an attack and terrorist capability, are in place; the only remaining consideration is intent40. It is important to determine whether the intent to acquire and use such weapons is present among terrorist groups. While terrorist groups have not often used biological weapons, it is unclear whether this is due to insufficient capabilities or lack of intent1. There are a variety of reasons why they may not be interested in the use of biological weapons, including viewing such weapons as illegitimate in military combat, risks of tactical failure, perceptions of high technical difficulty, and concerns about the indiscriminate nature of a biological weapons attack3. That said, various terrorist groups, including Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have a documented interest in the acquisition of biological weapons, and with advances in biotechnology and weaponization, their use may become more attractive2, 41. Experts also point to a shift in terrorist intent: “post-modern” terrorism aims to inflict the highest mortality rather than make political statements through violence33. This makes biological weapons an attractive option for such groups; one estimate suggests that the cost to cause civilian casualties is only one dollar per square kilometer for biological weapons, compared to 800 and 2000 dollars per square kilometer for nuclear and conventional weapons, respectively42. In a similar vein, the recent “war on terror” has created an increasingly decentralized terrorist threat; biological weapons are particularly well-suited to this form of smaller, more informed terrorist groups28. In short, while the intent to use biological weapons has been documented in terrorist groups in the past, present circumstances may make the acquisition and use of biological weapons more attractive. To conclude, it is difficult to either predict or prevent a bioterrorism attack, which makes any assessment of attack probability, by necessity, subject to a high degree of estimation. However, due to the potential severity of consequences of an attack, the precautionary principle justifies the government decision to allocate spending according to the severity of consequences, recognizing a situation where it is better to overestimate than to underestimate the probability of an attack. As argued by Michael Moodie of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, “The odds (of bioterrorism) are increasing…we have to walk a fine line between hyping the risk…and trying to convince people that it is a possibility for which we need to invest resources”2. 6. Biodefense Funding The essay’s previous sections have argued that a biological weapons attack would pose an existential threat to the United States, that there is an inadequate capacity to respond to such an event, and that the possibility exists for such an attack to occur. This would suggest that a substantial amount of government funding should be allocated towards addressing this threat. The decision to securitize bioweapons facilitated this process. Critics who believe the threat has been overstated often argue that the government should not invest so heavily in biodefense, but instead, improve other sectors, such as reducing mortality from endemic disease11. Meanwhile, proponents may argue that a securitized issue should receive more funding than issues that are not framed as an existential threat4. This section will argue that the response, in terms of government spending, is justified in that it seeks to protect the public and has not exaggerated the threat of bioterrorism. This will be demonstrated by examining the degree of investment in biodefense, showing that a relatively small amount is allocated specifically to biodefense. In 2000, the United States federal budget proposed that 10 billion USD be allocated to counterterrorism programs, an increase of 3.3 billion dollars from the previous year10. This covered all forms of terrorism, but there was a greater focus on biological terrorism than in the past, with spending on medical countermeasures and defense measures increasing fourfold from 91 million USD in 1998 to 336.6 million in 20002. These trends intensified after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent “Amerithrax” scare. While estimates vary, the consensus is that, since 2001, the United States government has invested between 50 and 100 billion USD towards research and development in response to the perceived threat of a biological weapons attack43. One calculation posited that the U.S. allocated 54.39 billion USD to civilian biodefense programs between 2001 and 201044. This did not include allocations to Bioshield, a program designed to address the lack of adequate medical countermeasures for terrorist attacks; 8.7 billion USD has been allocated since 200445. However, of civilian biodefense funding, 42.57 of the 54.39 billion USD was directed towards programs with multiple goals beyond biodefense improvement, such as basic infectious disease research, programs to improve public health planning and operations, and improving preparedness for a range of disasters44. One example is the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Hospital Preparedness Program, which seeks to improve surge capacity in healthcare facilities44. Some estimates suggest that up to 92% of biodefense funding has been directed to programs that serve secondary purposes, such as improving preparedness for disease pandemics and natural disasters15. One could argue that the amounts dedicated to biodefense as a percentage of entire budgets are not very substantial given the existential threat posed by an attack. The DHHS, the largest recipient of federal biodefense funding, has a budget of 879 billion USD, of which biodefense made up only 0.5%44. Similarly, biodefense makes up less than 1% of the Department of Homeland Security budget, and only 0.10% of the Department of Defense Budget44. Accordingly, it could be argued that the bioweapons threat does not, in fact, take as high a priority in terms of government funding as one might expect, given the associated security risk. Additionally, almost all of the increases in investments have arisen from new funding; other sectors are not suffering at the expense of biodefense prioritization12. High funding is appropriate independent of any controversy relating to estimates of attack probability, as the precautionary principle would suggest that decisive action is warranted given the potential for dire consequences, even with a low probability of the event occurring. These figures show that the funding response is not an overreaction but has been justified and appropriate given the documented threat of biological weapons, targeting programs that are likely to protect the public. 7. Conclusion The anthrax attacks of 2001 are a case where biological weapons were used against the United States in the absence of any direct provocation. Since then, though the issue is controversial, biological weapons have been considered an important threat to U.S. security. This essay has defended the securitization of the biological weapons threat as a means to an end. It is a process to engage in where it is necessary to get approval for policies that are, in themselves, necessary and justified. By analyzing the existential threat posed by bioweapons, the lack of preparedness by the United States for such an event, and the possibility of an attack, evidence presented in this essay suggests that these policies and the overall government response were appropriate. Taking these issues into account, the essay concluded that the threat of bioterrorism has not been overestimated; it warrants securitization and the resulting response measures. Moving forward now, government must recognize and respond to the reality of an increasing bioterrorism threat.

### AT: L – China

#### China threat discourse doesn’t cause war – BUT the ALT does

Hagstrom 14 – PhD, Swedish National Defence College, Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership (Linus, “East Asia's Power Shift: The Flaws and Hazards of the Debate and How to Avoid Them,” Asian Perspective, 38.3)

Pan argues that the "China threat discourse" is "always intrin- sically linked to how US policymakers/mainstream China special- ists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example)" (2004, 306). Hagström demonstrates how the discourse on Japan's "abnormality" and "weakness" reproduces a standard of "normality" in world politics that is centered on the ability to go to war. Postwar Japan is socially constructed as deviant from this norm and thus as a threat to itself. This discourse, which emerges in both Japanese and Western academia and in Japanese political debate, legitimizes a road map for a more "realistic," "active," "responsible," and "nor- mal" Japan (Hagström 2014).∂ The power of the power-shift discourse does not stop at the production of identities and standards. The point is that identities and standards produce effects. Pan illustrates this by showing how the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 was often understood as "further objective proof of the long-suspected 'China threat,'" but few acknowledged that "the 'China threat' discourse itself had played a constitutive role in the lead-up to that crisis" (2004, 323, 320). Moreover, standards in Japan's "normalization" discourse have enabled Realpolitik changes in its foreign security policy. Chinese vigilance vis-à-vis Japan and the United States might also be interpreted as discursive phenomena-the theme of national reinvigoration is a product of the lingering notion that China has been continually humiliated and victimized by the great powers since the nineteenth century. As these examples illustrate, the ulti- mate power of discourse is the production of self-fulfilling prophecies. When self-fulfilling prophecies occur on both sides of a dyad, we might end up with a socially generated security dilemma (Johnston 2004).∂ Much research has warned of self-fulfilling prophecies in the East Asian context. Some observers suggest that US or Japanese discourses about China might produce policies of containment, Japanese "normalization" and "remilitarization," and US "rebal- ancing" toward East Asia (Pan 2004; 2012; Hagström 2012; Turner 2014a; 2014b). Nonetheless, Japan and the United States have not yet embarked on containing China. Instead, both countries have on the whole accommodated China's rise (Christensen 2006; Jerdén and Hagström 2012). In a similar manner, perceived increases in bellicose or nationalistic representations in Chinese discourses led some observers to jump to the mistaken conclusion that this had already resulted in a more assertive Chinese foreign policy (Jerdén 2014). As important as it is to remain vigilant against the emergence of socially constructed security dilemmas, we need to bear in mind that there is no deterministic connection between discourse and policy-just an enabling one. Dominant discourses create propensities for action but do not make any action inevitable. More empirically informed theorizing is needed to address the questions of how, when, and why discourses make some actions politically conceivable, easy to communicate, and sometimes even coercive (Holland 2013).∂ Reflecting on the possible power exercised through the alter- native approaches introduced in this special issue is also neces- sary. In this article we raise analytical and normative concerns about the ideas of a more "powerful" and "threatening" China, a "weak" Japan, and a "declining" United States. We argue that such representations risk offsetting balancing policies and a secu- rity dilemma in East Asia, in line with the self-fulfilling prophecy logic discussed above. These arguments clearly belong to another site of discursive power production. That we have not seen any obvious balancing policies in East Asia thus far might arguably be interpreted as one of its effects.∂ In fact, our critique of the power-shift debate might itself be criticized as denying or playing down Chinese power, which could have two effects: (1) China appears less powerful and thus less threatening, which allows it to arm itself with impunity and behave aggressively; and (2) the Chinese government can ignore calls to take on more international responsibilities with reference to the limited scope of its power. As William Callahan points out, attempts to counter the "China threat theory" within China often "refute 'Chinese' threats as a way of facilitating the pro- duction of an American threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on" (2005, 711). Adopting a nonintentional power con- cept allows us to see how even critical scholars, inside and out- side China, who profess no interest in exaggerating threats against China but rather "seek to deconstruct the discourse of 'threat,'" might play a role in accelerating this process (Callahan 2005, 711). In other words, intentional attempts to prevent the emergence of a self-fulfilling prophecy may actually play an unintentional part in creating one.

### AT: L – Cybersecurity

#### No impact to securitizing cyber threats

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According to some, advancements in technological and organizational capabilities among capable state and stateaffiliated actors over the past decade increase the likelihood that offensive cyber operations (OCOs) might soon produce destructive physical effects (Saltzman 2013; Healey 2016). Expectations of real-world damage inflicted through cyberspace reinforce the “cyber doom” narrative that digital insecurity might result in a massive failure of social and economic processes across societies dependent on new information technologies and that dread of such failure permeates public perspectives on cyber issues (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).

For those who study public opinion surrounding foreign policymaking, the “cyber doom” type of narrative is not especially uncommon. Environmental circumstances of sufficient visibility and meaning, such as the trauma-inducing experiences of 9/11 or the Cold War, often take on life of their own and affect opinion formation independent of an individuals’ priors or the cues of elites. Oddly, however, the oft-referenced notion of “cyber doom” appears paradoxical, even despite the link some scholars make between OCOs and physical effects.

Presently, conflict in cyberspace is characterized by persistent-yet-limited effects and a condition of apparent restraint exercised by cyber-capable actors (Maness and Valeriano 2016; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2018a). Moreover, the unabated integration of vulnerable information systems across all aspects of modern societies raises the question of whether or not a sense of dread associated with the exploitation of cyberspace is as severe as commonly portrayed (Jarvis, Macdonald, and Whiting 2017). Most damningly, the idea that “cyber doom” is most visible in Western national experiences as a fear appeal employed by politicians to galvanize support for policy in no way explains these curious logical shortcomings.

At the heart of the “cyber doom” narrative is the assumption that information about cyberattacks released to the public—particularly information about sophisticated cyber operations of foreign countries and organized crime1— produces anxiety about the digital health and security of a person. Ironically, this assumed relationship between cyber operations, their portrayal in public-facing media, and individual impact is often discussed in unclear terms by scholars than is the determining role of techno-strategic conditions.

Despite the recent turn by some to consider the societal impact of OCOs (Lin and Kerr 2017; Lindsay 2020; Whyte 2020), most research on cyber conflict continues to emphasize logic-of-the-domain explanations for the behavior of cyber-capable actors.2 This makes a certain sense because the domain is human-made and malleable. However, it is also puzzling given the scope of cyberspace and the degree to which digital action impacts both private industry and civil society across numerous levels. Though the mechanisms of interaction may be less precise than is the case with other forms of state power, the literature on public opinion, morale, and psychology in foreign policymaking tells us that popular perceptions of threat are shaped by a host of factors that then impact the formulation and implementation of state security policy.

In this article, we take aim at the “cyber doom” narrative logic as an initial step toward clarifying the relationship between cyber conflict, its portrayal, and public thinking about digital insecurity. Consequently, we align with critics of the narrative itself but argue that such criticisms make overly simplistic assumptions about public opinion and national security that do little to enrich and undergird evolving cyber conflict research. The logic of the core argument about digital disaster aside, the broader “cyber doom” argument— i.e., that the rhetorical and cognitive prospect of doom has some effect on a population—is undertheorized and understudied. This point is particularly important because scholarship aimed at explaining the sources of state public policy on cyberspace makes the curious misstep of holding domestic population preferences constant while focusing on third image determinants of strategy development. Authors argue that publics cyclically react with some fear to emergent threats and that, therefore, public policy is best explained by the incidence of cyber conflict or steps taken by state peers. Given that such assumptions are clearly far from safe on the merits, this article aims to ascertain whether or not negativity among the general public associated with malicious behavior in cyberspace is as salient as broadly claimed. We add evidence to the argument that the “cyber doom” narrative is unrealistic (Lawson 2013) by showing that the assumptions found therein are misleading.

Our study finds that sensitivity to cybersecurity threats is situationally shaped by exposure to negative reporting but that the onset of associated dread is not a given. Instead, it is influenced by expectations of the role of technology in modern society. Respondents dependent on such technologies are not as prone to negative effect as are those who remain not so deeply embedded in the fabric of digital society. Both groups become more sensitive to cybersecurity threats to their person as the information they consume becomes more negative, and this personal concern facilitates a heightened sensitivity to threats to the polity. However, the dread predicted by the “cyber doom” narrative is only weakly predictive of this dynamic and has no effect on the threat sensitivity of those who do not respond emotionally. Finally, in both cases, the link between concern for society is not a clear result of negative information so much as it is the result of initial sensitivity to threats at the personal level.

Consequently, we make two contributions. First, we show that the impact of novel environmental circumstances on individual opinion formation is shaped by issue embeddedness, suggesting that long-term exposure to any invasive development mitigates the affective response it is associated with. Second, we present evidence suggesting nevertheless that the unique characteristics of such a development matter in opinion formation, as sensitivity to digital threats to the polity is clearly premised on personal threat sensitivity.

These findings suggest that not only “cyber doom” is strategically and functionally unrealistic, but the effects of the idea’s securitization are also minimal and prone to diminishment over time. In doing so, they speak to the broad research program on public opinion and audience dynamics in foreign policymaking. More specifically, in line with recent work (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017), our study suggests that citizens are far more capable of responding to threat stimuli absent elite cues. Significantly, our work joins research that locates responsiveness to policy issues in the interaction of cognitive priors and social context with incoming information about new events. Judgment is rarely as linear as the “cyber doom” narrative suggests in its linking of negative reporting, fearful response, and sensitivity to threat inflation. Instead, individuals are conditioned by social circumstances such that even novel threats are incorporated into the horizon of issues the public encounters.

### AT: L – Disease

#### Disease securitization’s good – key to effective cooperation NOT militarization

Davies 17 Sara E. Davies, Griffith University, “Advocating Global Health Security,” *Global Insecurity*, eds. Anthony Burke and Rita Parker, Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2017, pp.253-272, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-95145-1 /GoGreen!

For the last two decades a strategy employed by health professionals, scientists, and diplomats has been to play the ‘health security card’ to achieve particular trade, diplomatic, strategic, and development goals (Elbe 2011). The presumption has been that the securitisation of health will harness global political leadership and resources. This marriage of health issues to security logic has been met with a mix of applause, caution, and critique (Feldbaumet al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Hanrieder and Kreuder-Sonnen 2014). But the presumption has remained that, for the most part, the marriage of health issues to security will ‘harness political leadership and resources for various international health issues’ (Elbe 2011: 220). In the last 15 years, there have been three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions that have specifically referred to health matters – S/Res/1308 (2000), S/Res/1983 (2011), both concerning HIV/AIDs, and S/Res/2177 (2014) in response to the Ebola viral disease outbreak in West Africa. In December 2012, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed resolution A/67/L.36, Global Health and Foreign Policy, the fifth resolution on global health and foreign policy resolution to pass in the UNGA since the adoption of the first resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy in 2008 (A/63/33). The UNGA also adopted resolution A/69/1 giving support to the measures recommended by UN Secretary-General to contain the Ebola outbreak (A/69/389 2014). The decision of the UNSC to adopt three resolutions on health matters in 15 years and the UNGA sessions on global health and foreign policy have received mixed views. Some point to these events as illustration of the weakness of the global health security narrative (Youde 2014). In particular, it has been noted that the Ebola outbreak in 2014 was initially met with no international capacity outside of the World Health Organization (WHO) to respond to this crisis. The creation of the UN Mission on Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) in September (2014) was the first, and some argue should be the last, effort to respond to a viral outbreak (Panel of independent experts 2015). Others contend that, given that there is no procedure under the UN Charter for the General Assembly or Security Council to examine health matters – let alone develop a mission like UNMEER – broader UN engagement in health beyond the WHO could point to the success of the global health diplomacy (McInnes 2015). The question is what does successful global health diplomacy look like? Do we see in practice the securitisation of health as essential to pursue international diplomatic engagement in global health? There have been recent claims that the successful international engagement in health initiatives such as the Global Fund for AIDS, TB, and Malaria (Global Fund) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been achieved without asserting their necessity ‘primarily on security considerations’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013: 16; see also Sridhar 2012; Gagnon and Labonte 2011). However, the assumption remains that linking health issues, specifically health emergencies and infectious disease outbreaks to security discourse will create more opportunities for diplomatic cooperation and engagement (see Feldbaum et al. 2010; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). This chapter explores this argument beginning with the period where the phrase ‘global health diplomacy’ and ‘global health governance’ began to gain usage in international relations in the 1990s. In the first part of the chapter I briefly present the conceptual history of health security and its relationship to ‘global health diplomacy’. I explore the argument that the success of global health diplomacy has come from the preponderant use of security language, referents, and discourse (cf. Elbe 2011; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Kickbusch et al. 2007; McInnes and Rushton 2013). In the second part of the chapter I examine two cases, one where a type of security logic was deliberately employed to frame the ‘health emergency’ (Framework Convention on Tobacco Control or FCTC) and one where human rights logic was initially deployed when advocating for its creation (the Global Alliance for Vaccine Immunization or GAVI). I evaluate what ‘health security’ looks like in these global health initiatives and explore the presumption that ‘security discourse’ must be present in comparing these two major, successful global health initiatives. HEALTH SECURITY States have a history of formal international agreements addressing health matters and health threats, particularly infectious diseases, from the Decree of Quarantine in Ragusa-Dubrovnik in 1377 (Mackowiak and Sehdev 2002) to the International Sanitary Conference in 1851 (Fidler 2003) and the revised International Health Regulations in 2007 (Davies et al. 2015). However, the treatment of health as a ‘low politics’ priority at the international level remained the case through most of the formative years of nation-building in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Fidler 1999). This was in spite of its great strategic benefit for colonial era expansion, winning wars and rapid industrialisation (Diamond 1997). In contemporary politics, a range of actors – such as foreign governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), pharmaceutical companies, private donors, and international organisations – drive a variety of different health agendas that influence priorities within individual states and affect the resources that are available to individual health workers and opportunities for patients (Youde 2012). Likewise, the post–Second World War Bretton Woods system had a profound influence upon health-care policy and practice around the world, with key lending institutions like the World Bank promoting particular health-care systems and policies in their lending programmes (Sridhar 2012). In this period, key discourses such as ‘Health for All’, the Essential Medicines List, and Right to Health emerged in the absence of linkage to security. These discourses brought in a range of actors including international organisations,NGOs and transnational corporations with the power to shape health opportunities and outcomes within and amongst states (Gagnon and Labonté 2011). In the 1990s, however, foreign and defence ministries became increasingly interested in global health policy – particularly infectious diseases – which would be referred to as having a ‘securitising’ effect on health (McInnes and Lee 2006). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 255 During the 1990s, key events combined with a paradigm shift in International Relations (IR) and security studies (particularly in Western developed countries with the end of the Cold War) (Paris 2001) to connect security to health (Enemark 2007; Collier and Lakoff 2008). Acute awareness was growing amongst Western states that they were not immune to health events such as infectious disease outbreaks. The outbreak and spread of HIV across developing and developed countries during the 1980s; fear of biosecurity attacks with the breakdown of security in laboratories across the former Soviet Union (Koblentz 2010); sudden outbreak of the plague in India in 1995 and the arrival of West Nile virus near New York City in 1999; and the return of ‘slow-burn’ diseases thought eradicated such as Tuberculosis (TB), measles and meningitis in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia (Price- Smith 2002). As well, new strains of disease, such as haemorrhagic dengue fever and drug-resistant malaria were on the rise due to significant climate change impact in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Pacific (Kim and Schneider 2013). Andrew Price-Smith argues that prior to President Clinton’s appointment of the National Science Council on Emerging and Re-Emerging Infectious Diseases in 1995, developed states had grown complacent to the fact that ‘despite their enormous technological and economic power, it is extremely unlikely that developed countries will be able to remain an island of health in a global sea of disease’ (2002: 122). Clinton’s move created a wave of interest in other developed countries, particularly the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, all shifting to appreciate and contextualise health threats in foreign policy terms (McInnes and Lee 2012: 32). Until then, on the rare occasion that health policy was discussed at the international level it was in relation to (mostly) infectious disease outbreaks such as plague and cholera, or large-scale efforts such as the mass immunisation programme led by WHO to eradicate smallpox. During infectious disease outbreaks, emphasis had been squarely placed on the responsibility of the host state and regardless of the capacity of its public health system to effectively respond (Fidler 1999). Meanwhile, the spread and scale of HIV/AIDS raised fears about its potential to threaten state cohesion and national economies. There was a particular focus on military forces being at risk of HIV infection, and the political insecurity these infectious could bring in societies (Singer 2002; Elbe 2006). The apparent potential for HIV/AIDS to cause state collapse or serious disruption that could ricochet throughout neighbouring states 256 S.E. DAVIES was considered a realistic scenario in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as some parts of South and East Asia and the Pacific (Shisana et al. 2003; Ramiah 2006; Price-Smith et al. 2007). It was specific reference to the threat of HIV/AIDs on peacekeepers that led to the first resolution on health, Resolution 1308, being passed in the UN Security Council in 2000 (UNSC 2000). In response to these developments, a host of analysts, including Solomon Benatar (1998, 2002), Peter W. Singer (2002), Robert Ostergard (2002), called for IR to engage with the economic, humanitarian, political, and security ramifications of the AIDS epidemic. At the same time, David Fidler and Andrew Price-Smith called for equal attention to the economic, political, and social insecurity that stems from a range of infectious diseases already prevalent in countries (Fidler 2003; Price-Smith 2002). Using quantitative analysis of the relationship between infectious diseases and state capacity, Price-Smith claimed that ‘infectious disease [already] constitutes a verifiable threat to national security and state power’ (Price-Smith 2002: 19). Health security, Price-Smith (2002: 9) argued, referred to the threat of the disease on particular populations as well as the country’s economic and political stability becoming unsustainable as a result of a pathogen wiping out the core population base. While a disease may have a different impact in different states: [I]ncreasing levels of disease correlate with a decline in state capacity. As state capacity declines and as pathogen-induced deprivation and increasing demands upon the state increase, we may see an attendant increase in the incidence of chronic sub-state violence and state failure. State failure frequently produces chaos in affected regions as neighbouring states seal their borders to prevent the massive influx of disease-infected refugee populations. Adjacent states may also seek to fill the power vacuum and may seize valued territory from the collapsing state, prompting other proximate states to do the same and so exacerbating regional security dilemmas. (Price-Smith 2002: 15) In a similar vein, David Fidler’s seminal 1999 book International Law and Infectious Diseases argued that with the increased risk of drug-resistant microbes in the twenty first century, as identified by public health officials (Institute of Medicine 1992; Heymann 1996), it will become important to ‘understand the international politics of infectious disease control, or microbialpolitik’ (Fidler 1999: 19). Microbialpolitik, argued Fidler, was ‘wrapped up not only in traditional concerns such as sovereignty and power but also in the implementation of scientifically sound infectious disease policies at the national and international levels’ (ibid.). Both Fidler and Price-Smith argued that the risk of newly emerged infectious diseases and drug-resistant infectious diseases required that all governments engage with the problem as if they were threats to national security. Likewise, Laurie Garrett argued in 2001 that ‘a sound public health system, it seems, is vital to societal stability and, conversely, may topple in the face of political or social stability or whim. Each affects the other: widespread political disorder or anti-governmentalism may weaken a public health system, and a crisis in the health of the citizens can bring down a government’ (Garrett 2001: 5). These ideas continued to influence the global politics of health into the twenty-first century (Fidler 2009; Davies 2012). In a 2010 study on the influence of global health on foreign policy, Feldbaum and his colleagues found that most discussion and policy from diplomatic engagement focused on the interplay of national interests and security, which meant that most diplomacy focus and discussion was on the containment of infectious diseases (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). At the time, WHO also immersed itself in the health security argument: Collaboration between Member States, especially between developed and developing countries, to ensure the availability of technical and other resources is a crucial factor not only in implementing the [International Health] Regulations, but also in building and strengthening public health capacity and the networks and systems that strengthen global public health security will. (WHO 2007: 13) Of course, health diplomacy refers to the pursuit of international health cooperation on matters of concern to states (Kickbusch et al. 2007). It is the amalgam of cooperation in areas where there is the possibility of genuine technical cooperation for a diverse range of diseases (Youde 2012: 25). However, because health diplomacy involves the interplay of national interests, power and diplomatic compromise, ‘state interests have been critical to either the success or obstruction of such agreements . . . and issues of national security remain atop the foreign-policy hierarchy’ (Feldbaum et al. 2010: 87). The counter-narrative to the health security discourse described above is that the securitisation of health promotes an instrumental pursuit of health. To capture foreign policy interest and engagement, global health discussions produce a ‘hierarchy of illnesses’ whereby some health issues receive interest and resources whilst other equally deadly health matters do not (Youde 2012: 160). Jeremy Shiffman’s (2006: 411–420) work on the peaks and troughs of investment in global health initiatives has revealed that despite disease burden to a population, some infectious diseases (i.e. HIV/AIDS) consistently attract stronger short-term investment from donor states – primarily those that are contagious or linked to the national security interests of donor states. However, it would be a mistake to assume that the threat of infectious disease alone encapsulated all diplomatic engagement with health issues at the turn of the twenty-first century. The rise of non-traditional security has also been attributed to the increased influence of the introduction of different social science methods and theories to International Security Studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 188). This has influenced research into the subject matter of security studies and IR. If insecurity and grievances amongst the population played a large part in the civil wars that gripped the 1990s (Fearon and Laitin 2003), engagement with health is not just a security concern for developed states but also for developing states. In other words, appreciations of health security were not one-dimensional. It was possible to advocate for a vision of health security that sought to protect individuals as much as states. Indeed, a human centred appreciation of security – coined ‘human security’ by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (see MacFarlane and Khong 2006) – sought to redefine the ‘traditional’ security with issues and concepts under the umbrella term ‘non-traditional’ security, including health (Chalk 2006). Thus, there does appear to be a significant relationship between international health events and the direction of research and policy engagement (Davies 2012). In the last decade, events such as the United Nations Security Resolution on HIV/AIDS (S/Res/1308) and SARS create an explosion of IR engagement with global health governance, particularly in the area of health security. This ‘phenomenon’ has been witnessed again with the Ebola outbreak (Youde 2014). Amongst all these engagements, two key approaches have emerged. First, those who accept the inevitability of a ‘narrow’ approach to health and IR, focused on infectious diseases and bioterrorism as security threats (Koblentz 2012). Alternatively, there are those who articulate a broader vision related to development, state capacity, and cross-national health issues (Shiffman 2006; Nunes 2014; Rushton and Williams 2012). One of the central claims of the former approach is that health securitisation is an effective way of galvanising diplomatic engagement amongst states and other actors, resulting in the allocation of political will and material resources (Collier and Lakoff 2008; Elbe 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2013). In the next part of the chapter I examine this core assumption. In particular, I explore whether the effectiveness of health initiatives is tied to their securitisation, focusing on the examples of two major health initiatives. I examine the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and the GAVI. Interest in these two cases comes from exploring the above presumption that security and health, particularly concerning infectious diseases, drives, and delivers policy momentum. While there is debate about whether that momentum translates into ‘real’ policy progress or whether it is mere rhetoric deployed at particular crises/events with no lasting impact, there is no debate that health security has dominated global health and foreign policy discourse (Feldbaum et al. 2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013). Below, I briefly examine the dominance of health security in successful global health initiatives – one where you would expect it to be deliberately deployed (GAVI) and one where it was not (TFI). TFI and GAVI, I contend, are interesting cases precisely because they confound the issueframing conventions about the relationship between health and security. CONFOUNDING EXPECTATIONS A global health initiative is defined in this chapter as ‘an emerging and global trend in health. They are usually focused on state, international organisation and public–private partnerships. Global initiatives typically target specific diseases and are supposed to bring additional resources to health efforts’ (WHO 2015). Case Selection and Discourse Analysis This section briefly compares two international health initiatives: the TFI and GAVI. The TFI sought to reach an international agreement under international law that countries would adopt to regulate the sale and production of tobacco. This global health initiative was in aid of preventing the unchecked rise of tobacco related illnesses – non-communicable diseases – including cancer (various), emphysema, heart disease, stroke, and diabetes (to name a few). In the case of the TFI, and in light of the 260 S.E. DAVIES literature discussion concerning health security above, it would be expected that there was little to no presence of security discourse in the early days of this initiative. It was (and is) about introducing tobacco control legislation, addressing unregulated sale and distribution of tobacco to address preventable tobacco-related diseases in young populations in already over-burdened public health-care systems (Roemer et al. 2005). In contrast, the GAVI is a public and private partnership between states, international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and philanthropic donors that sought cooperation amongst this diverse group of actors to manufacture, purchase and deliver life-saving vaccines against deadly infectious diseases in the most remote, dangerous and impoverished locations around the world. GAVI is, ostensibly, the initiative where it would be expected to see initial employment of ‘security’ rhetoric given it is addressing the health insecurity of under five children in need of vaccination from, mostly, contagious infectious diseases. In fact, the immediate previous iteration of GAVI – the Child Vaccination Initiative – used security type discourse such as ‘mission’, ‘operation’, and ‘threat’’ under the steerage of a former US defence army medic (see Muraskin 2002). These cases were also selected because they shared some important features. Both the TFI and the GAVI are concerned with one specific health concern – tobacco and immunisation; both were launched within a similar time where health security discourse was gaining policy attention; both initiatives required the involvement of multiple stakeholders, including national governments, to enjoy success. The main difference, of interest to this chapter, is that the association of security with the health issue confound the type of cases analysed to date in the IR literature on global health security. I reveal below that the non-communicable, ‘slow moving’ health threat engaged more securitised discourse than the high morbidity communicable health threat. The comparison of the two cases was organised around a common framework involving three steps. 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 261 First, understanding the rhetoric and concepts used to frame the initiative. Each initiative has produced a significant volume of material outlining its purpose, scope and mandate. For the purposes of this chapter, I focused on the ‘founding’ document for each initiative. In the case of TFI, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003, 8 years after the Convention was first proposed in the 1995 World Health Assembly. The Framework Convention was the outcome of the TFI and details ‘a regulatory strategy to address addictive substances; in contrast to previous drug control treaties, the WHO Framework Convention asserts the importance of demand reduction strategies as well as supply issues’ (WHO 2003). Included in the Framework Convention document analysed is an Annex 2, which details the history of drafting the Framework from 1995 to 2003. For GAVI, the document analysed is the GAVI Meeting of the Proto-Board in Seattle, July 1999. This document details GAVI’s terms of reference, mission, objectives, functions, structure, milestones, and budget priorities. An interest in the discourse used in the founding document of each initiative is informed by the premise outlined in the above literature – to what extent security frames were employed to justify, conceptualise, and operationalise these two global health initiatives which remain, successfully, in place today. Second, once accepting the premise that securitisation is deliberately engaged the two documents were analysed to identify a set of ‘benchmarks’ to guide its assessment of the extent to which a health initiative has aligned with security. Both documents were examined in detail for the presence of ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) – the initiative itself or actors associated with the initiative identified an existential threat or risk and speech acts that called for the adoption of extraordinary measures. Was the initiative itself referred to as ‘security’, ‘threat’, or ‘risk’. Who was the ‘referent object’ identified – the group threatened; who was the functional actor capable of protecting the referent object from the identified threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 26–39); and what was the ‘scale’ of securitisation utitlised to emphasise the need for extraordinary measures (Buzan and Weaver 2009). Third, discourse analysis (Hansen 2012). In this case, the discourse within the two documents were analysed using NVivo Software. For the purposes of this chapter, I refer to three query searches conducted to analyse the perspectives being presented in the two documents concerning the threat the initiative is addressing, who the initiative is ‘protecting’ and 262 S.E. DAVIES who is responsible for such protection. To facilitate answering these three levels of inquiry, three query searches within NVivo of each document were conducted: (1) word frequency analysis, (2) text search of ‘security’ terms and, and (3) text search of ‘other’ normative terms (development, rights, economy). A word tree was then developed for the second and third text searches with a ‘in context’ search up to ten surrounding words (on either side) to enable understanding of the context and usage of the key words, i.e. ‘threat’ or ‘poor’ being searched in the document. The word frequency search assisted with identifying the primary actors discussed in the documents – i.e. who was identified as the referent actor intended for that initiative versus the functional actor necessary to give effect to the initiative. Findings Discourse analysis of the TFI and GAVI documents produced three key findings. The first, unexpected, find was that the TFI initiative was framed just as much in security terms as was GAVI. The number of securitisation ‘speech acts’ (Hansen 2012) searched and located in the Framework Convention was practically the same at GAVI – 0.08% and 0.07%, respectively (speech act terms: secure, threat, risk, mission, extraordinary, urgent). In both cases, the presence of security language was less than 1% of each document. What was significant was that in the search for ‘other’ normative terms (terms: responsible, rights, develop, needs, poor) – the Framework Convention was comparatively high at 1.05%, and a similar search for GAVI came at 0.4% references. However, given the Framework Convention is a legal document the presence of ‘right/rights’ partly accounts for high percentage compared to GAVI. Contextual analysis of these terms reveals further detail in how the documents framed the problem, the referent actor and the functional actor (see Table 14.1). In the Framework Convention – despite higher use of ‘other’ (nonsecurity) normative language than GAVI – there is a clear disposition towards identifying the state as the ‘functional’ actor responsible for taking measures necessary to protect the population from tobacco sale, use, and morbidity. The Convention directly refers to populations at risk (women and minors) and the need for member states to support civil society capacity to inform and educate tobacco awareness in these populations. Again, this is a legal instrument so the emphasis on member states is not surprising as they are the only signatories. However, even in ‘other normative’ references to rights, responsibilities and need – primary emphasis remains on the state as the functional actor protects the population at risk of addiction rather than alternative dominant frames such as the right to health, the right to information. The Framework Convention leans towards more ‘traditional’ security language in conceptualising the state–individual relationship concerning tobacco control: risk and risk mitigation; threat and protection. In the case of GAVI, the 0.07% security references in contrast with its 0.4% ‘other’ references hints at a different frame being brought to this initiative. However, it is not particularly clear until, again, the broader context of these terms is analysed. In the case of GAVI the focus is overwhelming on the ‘mission’ of the alliance and ensuring institutional clarity to support the primary focus – the right of the child to immunisation. This is clearly stated as seen above, particularly in the mission and responsibility statements (Table 14.1). The only time the roles of functional actors are associated with either security or other terms are in the context of securing commitment from actors (broad range of board membership from states to international organisations, pharmaceutical companies, and civil society), and development of health sector capacity. Despite GAVI addressing the containment of infectious disease, there is no threat language present. Securitised speech acts are practically absent – even when ‘security’ terms are located. The emphasis is overwhelming on rights and alleviating deprivation. Both initiatives confound the expectations prior to analysis – the infectious disease focused initiative is ‘under-securitised’ in comparison to the non-communicable focused initiative. Finally, hinted at above, the emphasis on primary actors in these two documents revealed key similarities – both focus on the institutional arrangements and the actors most closely associated with these arrangements. In the case of GAVI the board (comprised of international organisation, civil society, member states, pharmaceutical, and philanthropic members) is the primary functional actor; in the case of the TFI, the actor that looms largest is the organisation (namely, WHO) followed by signatory states to the Convention. Discussion about the population who are to benefit and arguably be empowered from these initiatives, is not discussed as much as the organisation and accordingly the implementation arrangements around the initiative itself. To some extent, given the nature of these two documents, this is not surprising. However, its presence in two documents for two very different initiatives may reveal that the pathology of organisations rather than the framing of an initiative requires further study when engaging with the comparative success and failure of global health diplomacy (Barnett and Finnemore 2003; Hanrieder 2015). 14 ADVOCATING GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY 265 CONCLUSION What is the value of securitisation when it comes to building and sustaining global political interest in health issues? Some contend that global health security has not run its course and continues to have utility in building state interest, particularly the resources of foreign affairs and defence departments, to secure global health diplomacy objectives (Kickbusch et al. 2007; Feldbaum et al. 2010; Elbe 2011). Others contend it is a ‘smokescreen’ that captures short bursts of attention that are episodic and may have immediate impact but no essential ‘follow through’ (McInnes and Rushton 2013). In this chapter, I explored how global health initiatives securitise and what becomes of them. I deliberately chose two successful initiatives with the expectation that one had securitised a conventional health issue – vaccine preventable infectious diseases – and one had not – tobacco regulation. In examining the cases of TFI and GAVI, I looked at their core document: their mission and value statements reflected in, respectively, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the first meeting documents of GAVI. Speech acts, identified as the hallmark of securitising moves, were analysed in both documents and contrasted with ‘non-securitisation’ or ‘other normative’ language. The Framework Convention engaged in more securitising language or ‘speech acts’ compared to GAVI but both contained more references to human rights and responsibilities discourse. In neither case did it appear as if actors had taken a conscious decision to securitise the issue any more than they chose to articulate the issue in terms of human rights obligations. In the case of the Framework Convention where a focus on security was expected and to a greater extent seen here was an equally strong presence of human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ language. The security discourse may have helped capture attention but it was not the only discursive tool at play and neither did it obviously displace other discourses. In the case of GAVI, the initiative identified its primary mission as fulfilling the rights of the child; whereas for TFI, emphasis was member states fulfilling their responsibility to address the threat of tobacco related illness from tobacco usage. GAVI appears to have a single referent – the right of the child to health via immunisation; while TFI related to a multitude of actors. The operationalisation of the initiative(s) and their embeddedness in global health architecture dominated the discussion far more than the framing language. Framing language constituted a relatively small part of the discourse compared to the consuming discussion of institutional design. What this comparison of two global health initiatives reveals is that whilst security discourse might help capture the attention of states, it has not necessarily overtaken other policy frames such as human rights and ‘sovereignty as responsibility language’. Indeed, the key priority seems to be not whether the international community should be engaged with these issues, but the appropriate institutional design for initiatives to achieve these health goals.

### AT: L – Emerging Tech

#### No impact to securitizing emerging tech – empirical studies

Rolenc 20 Jan Martin Rolenc, Jan Masaryk Centre for International Studies, Faculty of International Relations, University of Economics, Prague, “Technological Change and Innovation as Security Threats,” SHS Web of Conferences, 74(02015), 2020, DOI 10.1051/shsconf/20207402015 /GoGreen!

4 Discussion and conclusion

There are dozens of emerging and new technologies and innovations that are to come in the foreseeable future. However, it is hard to imagine them now, especially the all possibilities of their convergence. Due to the uncertainty and because “all technologies are inherently prone to potential misuse and […] the necessary regulations usually lag behind the technologies” [1], fears among the public can arise. This is nothing new, but the recent research is relatively scarce and sometimes art (literature, film) is better in portraying the fears or the security threats generated by technological change, that are perceived.

The reviewed academic literature identifies some technological threats that are relatively likely and (will be) intensive such as cyber-attacks, artificial intelligence and robotics, and biotechnologies. In the Czech political discourse, we identified especially the securitization of robotics and automation, particularly in relation to the automotive industry that produces a substantial part of the country’s GDP. There are fears that they will lead to loss of employment and ensuing social and economic instability. Specialized national agencies and official documents also often mention cyber-threats. But the rest of all the possible concerns and threats is entirely absent from the Czech narrative.

Unsurprisingly, the Czech public only repeats the fears verbalized in politics and policies, but even those securitization moves are not very successful. The biggest threat perceived at the beginning of 2019 was water scarcity and then other mainstream fears such as terrorism or migration. Therefore, we can confirm Hauptman’s observation that “the public is rather badly informed about dangers of new technologies and that governments tend to underestimate the potential threats” [1].

Czech politicians and experts should accept the fact that, apart from the hope of solutions of the problems we face, new technologies can become security threats through having unintended consequences or being misused. They should also expect that the public fears do not necessarily have to reflect the “objective” existence, intensity, or nature of threats, but they can be “only” perceived or imagined and, thus, still have unsettling social and economic effects. Politicians and experts should intensify the public discussion in order to become better at managing technological change and to avoid the previously mentioned issues. There is also potential for further research in the Czech context, concretely to learn if and how Czech scientists, researchers, and experts see technological change and innovation as technology threats and which solutions they suggest.

### AT: L – Environment

#### Securitizing environmental destruction spurs pro-social responses – NOT militarization

Veldman 12 Robin Veldman, Ph.D. candidate, Religion and Nature, University of Florida, National Foundation Fellow at the Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship, “Narrating the Environmental Apocalypse: How Imagining the End Facilitates Moral Reasoning Among Environmental Activists,” Ethics and the Environment, 17(1), Spring 2012, ProjectMUSE /GoGreen!

Environmental Apocalypticism and Activism As we saw in the introduction, critics often argue that apocalyptic rhetoric induces feelings of hopelessness or fatalism. While it certainly does for some people, in this section I will present evidence that apocalypticism also often goes hand in hand with activism. Some of the strongest evidence of a connection between environmental apocalypticism and activism comes from a national survey that examined whether Americans perceived climate change to be dangerous. As part of his analysis, Anthony Leiserowitz identified several “interpretive communities,” which had consistent demographic characteristics but varied in their levels of risk perception. The group who perceived the risk to be the greatest, which he labeled “alarmists,” described climate change [End Page 5] using apocalyptic language, such as “Bad…bad…bad…like after nuclear war…no vegetation,” “Heat waves, it’s gonna kill the world,” and “Death of the planet” (2005, 1440). Given such language, this would seem to be a reasonable way to operationalize environmental apocalypticism. If such apocalypticism encouraged fatalism, we would expect alarmists to be less likely to have engaged in environmental behavior compared to groups with moderate or low levels of concern. To the contrary, however, Leiserowitz found that alarmists “were significantly more likely to have taken personal action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (ibid.) than respondents who perceived climate change to pose less of a threat. Interestingly, while one might expect such radical views to appeal only to a tiny minority, Leiserowitz found that a respectable eleven percent of Americans fell into this group (ibid). Further supporting Leiserowitz’s findings, in a separate national survey conducted in 2008, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, and Leiserowitz found that a group they labeled “the Alarmed” (again, due to their high levels of concern about climate change) “are the segment most engaged in the issue of global warming. They are very convinced it is happening, human-caused, and a serious and urgent threat. The Alarmed are already making changes in their own lives and support an aggressive national response” (2009, 3, emphasis added). This group was far more likely than people with lower levels of concern over climate change to have engaged in consumer activism (by rewarding companies that support action to reduce global warming with their business, for example) or to have contacted elected officials to express their concern. Additionally, the authors found that “[w]hen asked which reason for action was most important to them personally, the Alarmed were most likely to select preventing the destruction of most life on the planet (31%)” (2009, 31)—a finding suggesting that for many in this group it is specifically the desire to avert catastrophe, rather than some other motivation, that encourages pro-environmental behavior. Taken together, these and other studies (cf. Semenza et al. 2008 and DerKarabetia, Stephenson, and Poggi 1996) provide important evidence that many of those who think environmental problems pose a severe threat practice some form of activism, rather than giving way to fatalistic resignation. National surveys give a good overview of the association between apocalypticism and activism among the general public, but they do not [End Page 6] provide sufficient ethnographic detail. To complement this broader picture I now turn to case studies, which provide greater insight into how adherents themselves understand what motivates their environmental behavior. When seeking a subset of environmentalists with apocalyptic beliefs, the radical wing is an obvious place to look. For example, many Earth First!ers believe that the collapse of industrial society is inevitable (Taylor 1994). At the same time, the majority are actively committed to preventing ecological disaster. As Earth First! co-founder Howie Wolke acknowledged, the two are directly connected: “As ecological calamity unravels the living fabric of the Earth, environmental radicalism has become both common and necessary” (1989, 29).3 This logic underlies efforts to preserve wilderness areas, which many radical environmentalists believe will serve as reservoirs of genetic diversity, helping to restore the planet after industrial society collapses (Taylor 1994). In addition to encouraging activism to preserve wilderness, apocalyptic beliefs also motivate practices such as “monkeywrenching,” or ecological sabotage, civil disobedience, and the more conventional “paper monkeywrenching” (lobbying, engaging in public information campaigns to shift legislative priorities, or using lawsuits when these tactics fail). Ultimately, while there are disagreements over what strategies will best achieve their desired goals, for most radical environmentalists, apocalypticism and activism are bound closely together. The connection between belief in impending disaster and environmental activism holds true for Wiccans as well. During fieldwork in the southeastern United States, for example, Shawn Arthur reported meeting “dozens of Wiccans who professed their apocalyptic millenarian beliefs to anyone who expressed interest, yet many others only quietly agreed with them without any further elaboration” (2008, 201). For this group, the coming disaster was understood as divine retribution, the result of an angry Earth Goddess preparing to punish humans for squandering her ecological gifts (Arthur 2008, 203). In light of Gaia’s impending revenge, Arthur found that Wiccans advocated both spiritual and material forms of activism. For example, practices such as Goddess worship, the use of herbal remedies for healing, and awareness of the body and its energies were considered important for initiating a more harmonious relationship with the earth (Arthur 2008, 207). As for material activism, Arthur notes [End Page 7] that the notion of environmental apocalypse played a key role in encouraging pro-environmental behavior: images of immanent [sic] ecological crisis and apocalyptic change often were utilized as motivating factors for developing an environmentally and ecologically conscious worldview; for stressing the importance of working for the Earth through a variety of practices, including environmental activism, garbage collecting, recycling, composting, and religious rituals; for learning sustainable living skills; and for developing a special relationship with the world as a divine entity. (2008, 212) What these studies and my own experiences in the environmentalist milieu4 suggest is that people who make a serious commitment to engaging in environmentally friendly behavior, people who move beyond making superficial changes to making substantial and permanent ones, are quite likely to subscribe to some form of the apocalyptic narrative. All this is not to say that apocalypticism directly or inevitably causes activism, or that believing catastrophe is imminent is the only reason people become activists. However, it is to say that activism and apocalypticism are associated for some people, and that this association is not arbitrary, for there is something uniquely powerful and compelling about the apocalyptic narrative. Plenty of people will hear it and ignore it, or find it implausible, or simply decide that if the situation really is so dire there is nothing they can do to prevent it from continuing to deteriorate. Yet to focus only on the ability of apocalyptic rhetoric to induce apathy, indifference or reactance is to ignore the evidence that it also fuels quite the opposite—grave concern, activism, and sometimes even outrage. It is also to ignore the movement’s history. From Silent Spring (Carson [1962] 2002) to The Limits to Growth (Meadows et al 1972) to The End of Nature (McKibben 1989), apocalyptic arguments have held a prominent place within environmental literature, topping best-seller lists and spreading the message far and wide that protecting the environment should be a societal priority. Thus, while it is not a style of argument that will be effective in convincing everyone to commit to the environmental cause (see Feinberg and Willer 2011), there does appear to be a close relationship between apocalyptic belief and activism among a certain minority. The next section explores the implications of that relationship further. [End Page 8] The Apocalyptic Narrative as a Framework for Moral Deliberation In discussing how apocalypticism functions within the environmental community, it will be helpful to analyze it as a type of narrative. I do so because the domain of narrative includes both the stories that people read and write, as well as those they tell and live by. By using narratives as data, scholars can analyze experiential and textual sources simultaneously (Polkinghorne 1988; Riessman 2000). To analyze environmental apocalypticism as a type of narrative is not to suggest that apocalyptics’ claims about the future are fictional. Rather, it is to highlight that the facts to which environmentalists appeal have been organized with particular goals in mind, goals which have necessarily shaped the selection and presentation of those facts. Compelling environmental writers do not simply list every known fact pertaining to the natural world, but instead select certain findings and place them within a larger interpretive framework. Alone, each fact has little meaning, but when woven into a larger narrative, a message emerges. This process of narrativization is essential if a message is to be persuasive (Killingsworth and Palmer 2000, 197), and has occurred not only in the rapidly expanding genre of environmental nonfiction, but in much scientific writing about the environment as well (Harré, Brockmeier, and Mühlhäusler 1999, 69). What defines narratives as such is their beginning-middle-end structure, their ability to “describe an action that begins, continues over a well-defined period of time, and finally draws to a definite close” (Cronon 1992, 1367). Here I will focus on the last of these elements, the ending, because anything we can learn about how endings function within narratives in general will be applicable to the apocalypse, the most final ending of all. An ending is essential in order for a story to be complete, but there is more to it than this. Endings are also key because they establish a story’s moral, the lesson it is supposed to impart upon the reader. In other words, to know the moral of the story, auditors must know the consequences of the actions depicted therein, so there can be no moral without an ending. To take a simple example, when we hear the story of the shepherd boy who falsely claims that a wolf is attacking his flock of sheep in order to entertain himself at his community’s expense, what makes the lesson clear is that when a wolf does attack his flock, the disenchanted town members refuse to come to his aid. By clearly illustrating how telling lies can have [End Page 9] unpleasant consequences for the perpetrator, the ending reveals the moral that lying is wrong. As Cronon explains, it is “[t]he difference between beginning and end [that] gives us our chance to extract a moral from the rhetorical landscape” (1992, 1370). Endings play a similar role in environmental stories. In Al Gore’s book Earth in the Balance (1992), for example, he devotes over a third of the book’s pages to presenting scientific evidence that disaster is imminent.5 As he sums it up, “Modern industrial civilization…is colliding violently with our planet’s ecological system. The ferocity of its assault on the earth is breathtaking, and the horrific consequences are occurring so quickly as to defy our capacity to recognize them” (1992, 269). He builds this argument so carefully precisely because if the ending does not seem credible, the moral he wants readers to draw from the story will not be compelling. If his readers are not convinced that the ending to this story of ecological misbehavior will be a debacle of colossal proportions, they will not become convinced that they need to dramatically alter their ecological behavior. Thus the vision of future catastrophe that Gore presents provides a crucial vantage point from which the present environmental situation can be understood as the result of a grand moral failure, and Gore’s readers are made aware of their obligations in light of it. Gore himself appreciates the importance of this recognition, arguing that “whether we realize it or not, we are now engaged in an epic battle to right the balance of our earth, and the tide of this battle will turn only when the majority of people in the world become sufficiently aroused by a shared sense of urgent danger to join an all-out effort” (1992, 269, emphasis added). Here, as in so many other stories, the ending must be in place for the moral to become clear. To say that endings are essential in order for stories to have morals is already to hint that stories alter behavior, that they can encourage action in the real world even as they invoke an imaginary one. This much is clear from Earth in the Balance (1992): Gore does not just want people to grasp a moral, to perceive some ethic in the abstract—he wants them change their behavior in the here and now. In constructing a narrative with this goal in mind, he is banking on the ability of powerful stories to motivate social change, to be, as Cronon puts it, “our chief moral compass in the world” (1992, 1375). Mark Johnson’s insightful synthesis of cognitive science and philosophy helps explain further how this process of moral guidance occurs. For [End Page 10] Johnson, narrative is fundamental to our experience of reality, “the most comprehensive means we have for constructing temporal syntheses that bind together and unify our past, present, and future into more or less meaningful patterns” (1993, 174). Narratives are also critical to our ability to reason morally, an activity which Johnson asserts is fundamentally imaginative. In this view, we use stories to imagine ourselves in different scenarios, exploring and evaluating the consequences of different possible actions in order to determine the right one. Moral deliberation is thus …an imaginative exploration of the possibilities for constructive action within a present situation. We have a problem to solve here and now (e.g., ‘What am I to do?’…. ‘How should I treat others?’), and we must try out various possible continuations of our narrative in search of the one that seems best to resolve the indeterminacy of our present situation. (1993, 180) Put another way, what cognitive science has revealed is that from an empirical perspective the process of moral deliberation entails constructing narratives rooted in our unique history and circumstances, rather than applying universal principles (such as Kant’s categorical imperative) to particular cases. That we use narratives to reason morally is not a result of conscious choice but of how human cognition works. That is, insofar as we experience ourselves as temporal beings, a narrative framework is necessary to organize, explain, and ultimately justify the many individual decisions that over time become a life. Formal principles may be useful in unambiguous textbook cases, but in real life “we can almost never decide (reflectively) how to act without considering the ways in which we can continue our narrative construction of our situation” (Johnson 1993, 160). Empirically speaking, “our moral reasoning is situated within our narrative understanding” (Johnson 1993, 180, italics in original). The observation that people use narratives to reason morally may help explain the association between environmental apocalypticism and activism. The function of the apocalyptic narrative may be that it helps adherents determine how to act by providing a storyline from which they can imaginatively sample, enabling them to assess the consequences of their actions. In order to answer the question, “Should I drive or walk to the store?” for example, they can reason, “If I walk, that will reduce my carbon footprint, which will help keep the ice caps from melting, saving humans and other species.” It is their access to this narrative of impending [End Page 11] disaster that makes such reasoning possible, for it provides a simple framework within which people can consider and eventually arrive at some conclusion about their moral obligations.6 More broadly, it can guide entire lives by providing a narrative frame of reference that imbues the individual’s experiences with meaning. For example, it is the context of looming anthropogenic apocalypse which suggests that dedicating one’s life to achieving a healthier relationship with the natural world is a worthwhile endeavor. Absent the apocalypse, choices such as limiting one’s travel to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, becoming vegetarian, working in the environmental sector (often for less compensation), or growing one’s own food could seem to be meaningless sacrifices. Within this context, on the other hand, such choices become essential features of the quest to live a moral life. The apocalyptic narrative is but one of many ways to tell the environmental story, yet it is one that seems particularly well-suited to encouraging pro-environmental behavior. First, the apocalyptic ending discloses certain everyday decisions as moral decisions. Without the narrative context of impending disaster, decisions such as whether to drive or walk to the store would be merely matters of convenience or preference. In the context of potentially disastrous consequences for valued places, people, and organisms, by contrast, such decisions become matters of right and wrong. Second, putting information about the environment into narrative form enables apocalyptics to link complex global environmental processes to their own lives, a perceptual technique Thomashow describes as “bringing the biosphere home” (2002). Developing this skill is essential because without that felt sense of connection to their own lived experience, people are much less likely to become convinced that it is incumbent upon them to act (2002, 2). Finally, the sheer magnitude of the impending disaster increases the feeling of responsibility to make good on one’s moral intuitions. By locating individuals within a drama of ultimate concern, the narrative frames their choices as cosmically important, and this feeling of urgency then helps to convert moral deliberation into action. With this conceptual overview in place, we can now examine more closely what the relationship between apocalypticism and moral reasoning looks like in practice. [End Page 12]

#### Empirics prove they’re NOT coopted toward militarism and are key to our internal links

Leeson-Schatz 12 Joe Leeson-Schatz, Director of Speech & Debate, and teaches Media & Politics, Binghamton University, PhD English, Binghamton University, “The Importance of Apocalypse: The Value of End-Of- The-World Politics While Advancing Ecocriticism,” Journal of Ecocriticism, 4(2), 2012 /GoGreen!

It is no longer a question that human interaction with the world is destroying the very ecosystems that sustain life1. Nevertheless, within academic communities people are divided over which discursive tactic, ontological position, or strategy for activism should be adopted. I contend that regardless of an ecocritic’s particular orientation that ecocriticism most effectively produces change when it doesn’t neglect the tangible reality that surrounds any discussion of the environment. This demands including human-induced ecocidal violence within all our accounts. Retreating from images of ecological collapse to speak purely within inner-­‐academic or policymaking circles isolates our conversations away from the rest of the world—as it dies before our eyes.¶ This is not to argue that interrogating people’s discourse, tactics, ontological orientation, or anything else lacks merit. Timothy Luke, Chair and Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, explains that¶ Because nothing in Nature simply is given within society, such terms must be assigned significance by every social group that mobilizes them[.] ... Many styles of ecologically grounded criticism circulate in present-­‐day American mass culture, partisan debate, consumer society, academic discourse, and electoral politics as episodes of ecocritique, contesting our politics of nature, economy, and culture in the contemporary global system of capitalist production and consumption. (1997: xi)¶ Luke reminds us that regardless of how ecocritics advance their agenda they always impact our environmental awareness and therefore alter our surrounding ecology. In doing so he shows that both literal governmental policies and the symbolic universe they take place within reconstruct the discourses utilized to justify policy and criticism in the first place. This is why films like The Day After Tomorrow and 2012 can put forth realistic depictions of government response to environmental apocalypse. And despite being fictional, these films in turn can influence the reality of governmental policy. Even the science-­‐fiction of weather-­‐controlling weapons are now only steps away from becoming reality2.¶ Oftentimes it takes images of planetary annihilation to motivate people into action after years of sitting idly by watching things slowly decay. In reality it takes awareness of impending disaster to compel policymakers to enact even piecemeal reform. On the screen it takes the actual appearance of ecological apocalypse to set the plot in motion. What is constant is that “as these debates unfold, visions of what is the good or bad life ... find many of their most compelling articulations as ecocritiques ... [that are] mobilized for and against various projects of power and economy in the organization of our everyday existence” (Luke 1997: xi). We cannot motivate people to change the ecological conditions that give rise to thoughts of theorization without reference to the concrete environmental destruction ongoing in reality. This means that, even when our images of apocalypse aren’t fully accurate, our use of elements of scientifically-established reality reconstructs the surrounding power structures in beneficial ways. When we ignore either ecological metaphors or environmental reality we only get part of the picture.`¶ In recent years, many ecocritics have shied away from the very metaphors that compel a sense of urgency. They have largely done so out of the fear that its deployment will get co-opted by hegemonic institutions. Such critics ignore how what we advocate alters our understanding of ourselves to the surrounding ecology. In doing so, our advocacies render such co-optation meaningless because of the possibility to redeploy our metaphors in the future. In the upcoming sections, I will provide an overview of how poststructuralist thinkers like Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger influence some ecocritics to retreat from omnicidal rhetoric. This retreat minimizes the main objectives of their ecocriticism. I argue that rather than withdrawing from images of apocalypse that we should utilize them in subversive ways to disrupt the current relationship people have to their ecology. Professor of Sociology at York University, Fuyuki Kurasawa argues that “instead of bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary ... it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action ... that can be termed preventive foresight. ... [I]t is a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society ... [by] putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes” (454-­‐455).

### AT: L – Extinction

#### Extinction scenarios do NOT create docile subjects tolerant of violent overreactions – that ignores the other half of the 1AC explaining why plan makes those responses unnecessary – rather, provokes reflection and criticism of the underlying conditions that make it possible – refusing to consider existential risks is itself existential

Stevens, 18—Lecturer in Global Security, King’s College London (Tim, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 283-302, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognised, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.75 Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.77 This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterised by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalises and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.84 Again quoting from his autobiographical account of the impact of Nazism, Herz described the relationship between his early pessimism and his developing intellectual stance: The world became a theatre of the absurd. Suicide would probably have been the logical next move, and I considered it from time to time. But I was still too young for such a radical step. One thing, however, emerged: a growing interest in domestic and, above all, international politics. My complete resignation was no longer appropriate. If not from within, fascism might perhaps still be destroyed from without. To my continuing interest in theory, therefore, was added a practical interest in action.85 Channelling the spirit of E.H. Carr, he wrote of this ‘brutal awakening’ to the nature of power politics in the 1930s that, ‘Study could no longer be “pure” research; it had to become research committed to warn of the deadly peril and show the way to the necessary action.’86 His commitment to active engagement was an early one, gestated during his personal experiences of Nazism in the 1930s.87 This desire to combat Nazism from the outside was manifest in his activities for the Allies during and after World War II but it coloured his scholarly life also. Herz recognised pessimism was a powerful force in his life but, rather than overcome or mask it, he used it to propel his intellectual project further, and to engage with, not withdraw from, the world. He was, as van Munster and Sylvest relate, ‘[d]eeply pessimistic yet a committed social thinker’.88 Herz was explicit about this: a realistic and consistent pessimism can clarify where we are and prepare us to do what is necessary.89 Pessimism is a necessary component of a realistic view of the world, upon which proper and reasoned action can be founded. In this sense, pessimism can be productive. It produces positive outcomes through action, rather than negative ones through inaction or resignation. These are subjective value-judgements, to be sure, but are obtained through a process of realist engagement with the world, rather than blind [mere] fumbling or ideological railroading. Survival Research was a response to Herz’s pessimism about the future, not a rejection of it. This leads us to two observations about the relevance of pessimism to the study of international relations. The first is that pessimism does not imply disengagement from the world. If anything, the example of John Herz suggests the opposite. He was a pessimist, but his brand of pessimism was no ‘passive fatalism’.90 As he recalled a few years before he died, ‘I consider myself a realist who comes sometimes to pessimistic conclusions, but never gives up looking for solutions if ever so difficult ones’.91 Pessimism can be a spur to thought and to action and need not be a watchword for conservatism in theory or practice.92 This is not to say being a pessimist is easy. Morgenthau, for his part, ‘never flagged in efforts to use his conceptual skills to help improve the human condition’, despite his pessimism about the ability and will of people to take the long view on significant political issues.93 This required that scholars chart different paths through troublesome times and articulate alternative visions of international order, not to preclude political action but to facilitate it; not quite the conservative position realism is often assumed to occupy.94 In the face of worldly frustrations and horrors, it is this attention to the production of alternative futures that prevents ‘pessimism from turning into fatalism’.95 The second observation is that it is unhelpful and misleading to treat pessimism and optimism as oppositional.96 Pessimism and optimism are commonly regarded as antonyms but often enjoy a symbiotic relationship. In Herz, they mingle and cross-pollinate in ways that defy easy explication. Stirk claims, for instance, that Herz’s optimism about how the world could be refashioned ‘was never more than guarded’, restrained by his fierce attachment to the importance of the security dilemma.97 Puglierin notes that his ‘blatant pessimism’ (eklatanter Pessimismus) was always accompanied by some form of optimism.98 We are reminded of Gramsci’s famous statement regarding ‘pessimism of intellect, optimism of the will’ as the cognitive binary at work in the political mind.99 Even as his pessimism deepened over the course of his career, he was always wont to end his analyses with a ‘yet’ or ‘in spite of it all’.100 Importantly, as he became more pessimistic, ‘the solutions he proposed became ever more ambitious’.101 His growing pessimism was accompanied by increasing resolve to tackle the problems of the world head-on, although, as he admitted in a footnote in the 1980s, ‘Not for a moment do I have the illusion that what I have proposed is likely to happen’.102 A suitably pessimistic aside, perhaps, but it did not deter him from continuing his project for another twenty years. This drive seems not to be rooted in optimistic conviction, nor even a subtle version of hope, but in a properly pessimistic reading of the world and its possibilities, engendered as they were by the ontological temporality of perpetual change.

### AT: L – Hybrid War

#### Securitizing hybrid war is good – threat’s real – AND failure turns the K

Samuel Carruthers 19, Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University, “Countering Disinformation: A Case Study of Government Responses to Russian Information Warfare,” Master’s Thesis, 2019, Institute of Political Science, https://dspace.cuni.cz/bitstream/handle/20.500.11956/110029/120343310.pdf?sequence=1

Ethics of Securitization

As discussed in the literature review, securitization is most often discussed as a ‘negative’ concept for several reasons. First of all, securitization argues that the normal democratic procedures for decision makers be abandoned in favor of a streamlined decision-making process handled by a small elite that dictate policy on security related issues. Critics assert that securitization is something largely inconsistent with the openness and accountability that liberal democratic systems value, therefore securitization is something ‘negative’ to be avoided in societies that place true importance on these values. But what if the issue being securitized is a direct threat to those very democratic procedures themselves. Are there issues that deserve to be securitized for the common good, and can government policies have a positive impact on society when these issues are securitized?

Experts on disinformation warn of the dire potential that such propaganda can have on a society, and argue that liberal democracies are especially vulnerable to them. New technologies have made the 21st century into a completely different type of information space than its predecessor. The internet has decentralized and democratized the flow of information to the point where somebody sitting on a laptop at home may be able to make the same impact with a blog as a major newspaper with an article. With less institutional control and traditional media gatekeeping on the flow of information, the internet is a truly democratic platform.148 These democratic processes; freedom of information, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and free elections; are precisely what make liberal democracies so vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda. With knowledge of these asymmetric vulnerabilities, the Kremlin consciously aims “to take advantage of the free flow of information in a democratic society, the effect of that information on public opinion, and the electoral mechanisms through which public opinion determines a country’s leadership.”149

One foundation of a democratic society is the ability to make decisions in the public forum based on shared truth. When voters go to the polls, they may make a judgement on which candidate or which proposal they favor based on the information that they have consumed. Traditionally, they may differ on what course of action may be the best way to handle a problem, but there is an agreed upon reality that is a matter of fact; it is shared. Disinformation, from Russia and other actors hostile to the West, promotes falsehoods to the point where society cannot have a shared truth. Imagine four people each with a different source of news. One reads the New York Times, one watches Fox News, one reads Breitbart, and one watches RT. Each one of these people will not only come to radically different conclusions about what solutions are best for society, but also about what the basic facts of reality are in the first place. One person may be out on the streets protesting the disappearance and rape of a young Russian girl by Muslim migrants, while the next person may be aware that the story is a complete falsehood that never happened to begin with. Russian efforts in the EU show that these situations are not a hysterical fear-mongering reaction to new technologies and new sources of information, but that they are already a reality.

Disinformation creates a situation where people can have opposing realities because the information they consume is so radically different from that of their neighbor. Critical theory in international relations warns that securitization subverts democratic decision-making processes, but disinformation destroys these very democratic processes that are so fundamental for liberal democratic societies to function the way they are intended. It is impossible to imagine normal democratic processes solving these types of problems when those processes are being eroded by propaganda to the point where Western societies may no longer have normal democratic processes if this trend continues. In order to maintain these democratic norms, securitization may be a necessary process, even a ‘positive’ concept that can yield positive results and protect the democratic values that have propelled the European project into existence.

From the perspective of states, it is difficult to see why they would not wish to securitize the issue of Russian disinformation more. States tend to place an emphasis on matters of physical and territorial security over all else, which is why issues such as nuclear weapons, or rising military power in China, or international terrorism are prioritized in terms of security policy. States’ desire for physical security explains why these issues tend to be some of the most securitized political issues, with decisions made regarding military policy in Afghanistan by military panels rather than public referendums. Walt, arguing from the realist perspective, argues that states “place particular emphasis on the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity and the physical safety of its inhabitants.” 150 Material harm is of the utmost importance while more ethereal issues, like democratic procedures, freedom of the information space, and societal resilience towards propaganda are not prioritized in the same way. Disinformation has threatened some of the building blocks of democratic societies throughout the EU, and if these democratic systems fail, it isn’t difficult to imagine that physical security would come under threat as well. In the case of Spain, the issue of the Spanish government’s territorial sovereignty over Catalonia was attacked by Russian disinformation, exacerbating the political wounds of the independence referendum. The disinformation campaign questioned Spain’s fundamental right to exist in its current form, yet Spain did not place the integrity of their media space as an important security issue despite this. There needs to be a shift in the importance and value that European democracies place on the fundamental democratic principles that allow their system to flourish. They should be prioritized with the same importance that states place on more traditional measures of power. Securitization of disinformation with the liberal democratic system and democratic processes themselves as the referent object, has the potential to have a more ‘positive’ outcome than emphasis on hard power, or immigration, or other issues that contribute to the ‘negative’ conception of securitization.

Successful Securitization and Societal Resilience

In the case studies it is clear that some European countries have securitized Russian disinformation while some have not. Namely, the United Kingdom and Lithuania have successfully securitized disinformation, while Spain, Germany, and the supranational institutions of the EU have not securitized disinformation. Those that have not securitized, have identified Russian disinformation as a perceived security threat and have several securitizing actors currently at play. The potential audiences of the securitizing speech acts, those within the security apparatus, NGOs, think-tanks, and even the wider public of these countries have accepted that Russian disinformation is a security threat that warrants greater action by their governments. Thus far, they have not taken measures that could by any means be considered extraordinary, having allocated a relatively small number of resources and minimal effort towards combating disinformation, and therefore cannot be considered to have securitized the issue. These countries, and the EU, are possibly in the early stages of the process of securitization, though this does not necessarily mean that they will complete the process by taking more extraordinary measures against disinformation. In fact, there could be a reversal and disinformation could slip back into the realm of normal politics and become desecuritized.

Some clear trends emerge in the countries who have successfully securitized disinformation. First, propaganda narratives have a weaker effect on society when disinformation has been securitized, failing to have their desired impact and cause major rifts in the public. They also show that securitization of disinformation is possible without implicitly violating democratic norms of freedom of speech and open access to information. This becomes clear in looking at the contrast between Lithuania’s countermeasures against disinformation compared to those of Germany and Spain. In Germany, the Lisa case was dealt with almost exclusively via the normal criminal and legal channels, with the police investigation into Lisa’s accusations of kidnap and rape by migrants and police handling of most public statements related to the controversy. 151 They have begun to enact minor laws that aim at punishing hate speech and disinformation when posted on popular social media platforms as well.152 Spanish authorities have started task forces devoted to alerting the national government when disinformation narratives start to dominate a story online. 153 Spanish and German officials at the higher levels of national authority in their respective foreign and defense departments gave minimal statements regarding the controversies, and have preferred to continue dealing with Russia through dialogue over more overt confrontation that could complicate communication. Both Germany and Spain have taken a more reactive approach to countering disinformation, choosing to deal with it on a case-by-case basis as an incident unfolds.

Lithuania has taken similar messages to alert national authorities on dangerous narratives as they develop online, but it has also taken extraordinary measures that encompass a broader scope. The Lithuanian government has supported efforts at every level of society; political, economic, educational, and cultural. 154 Their wide spread programs focus not only on dealing with each case as it emerges, but also on strengthening the fundamental resilience of society at the source through teaching media literacy in secondary schools, funding Russian language media for the susceptible minority group, and sensitizing the public to the dangers of propaganda by making disinformation a security issue linked to the physical security and existence of the state.155 Their bans on Russian media channels during disinformation campaigns, while possibly construed as violations of a free press, are necessary to prevent media from spreading out right falsehoods. The news media, both Lithuanian and Russian language, should be held accountable and has a responsibility to act as a gatekeeper of the truth. Many media channels in Lithuania have voluntarily chosen to follow such a route, choosing not to report on ‘fake’ news stories that can be detrimental to society by becoming ‘real’ news through regurgitation by legitimate media outlets. It is important not to confuse the right of free speech of an individual with that of a news organization with ties to a foreign country, and such acts should not be considered violations of democratic norms when it comes to protecting the fundamental values of democracy.

The countermeasures taken by a country undoubtedly play a role in the impact disinformation narratives may have in that country. With Lithuania’s ‘successful’ securitization of disinformation, fake stories and attempts at propaganda have often fallen on deaf ears, with little real success. Lithuania’s overarching, comprehensive strategy at countering disinformation is the reason the NATO rape allegations failed to cause a large disruption in the news cycle.156 This strong contrast is seen with Germany, where the story of a rape by migrants of a young Russian girl caused an uproar and led to protests in Berlin and a diplomatic row with Moscow. 157 Spain also fell short, with Russian disinformation exacerbating a contentious independence referendum in Catalonia and influencing public opinion at home and abroad on the status of Catalan autonomy. Government policies that fail to securitize disinformation and alert society to the dangers of propaganda lead to false stories having explosive consequences.

Both Spain and Germany’s strategies of dealing with disinformation narratives as they arise is simply not effective enough. The state can spend time and resources trying to discredit every fake news story that finds its way to the public forum, but there will always be one to take its place. It is like fire prevention; a fire alarm can be an important part of fire prevention, alerting the fire department to come extinguish a blaze. But there are more important measures as well, such as building structures with fire resistant materials, or teaching people what to do in case of a fire. These types of continuous measures, like the policies Lithuania pursues, make society more resilient and prevent disinformation from causing a fire in the first place.

Policies aimed at improving societal resilience towards disinformation are being utilized in other countries with successful outcomes as well. Latvia uses a sweeping media literacy program from an early age to improve critical thinking in its citizens.158 Finland, a country with a long history of hostility with Russia, uses similar programs, emphasizing not only the need to publicly correct false narratives, but also the importance of creating a positive counternarrative to disinformation that is repeatedly applied to offer an alternative vision.159 These countermeasures only appear in countries that have securitized disinformation, as Finland and Latvia have similar histories as Lithuania and treat disinformation in similar terms, and they are much more promising than government authorities attempting to play catchup with internet trolls and false stories.

Internationalization of Countermeasures

Another key conclusion comes from the other case of successful securitization in the United Kingdom. The UK, in its securitization of disinformation following the assassination attempt on Sergei Skripal, internationalized the threat by creating a set of countermeasures that could be implemented along with its allies. The UK successfully convinced 20 allies to expel Russian diplomats in a coordinated effort at punishing Putin’s regime for the incident and the subsequent disinformation surrounding it.160 Theresa May, as a securitizing actor, not only convinced her public in the UK of disinformation as a security threat, but convinced the international community that such behavior “threatens the security of us all.” 161 Compared with the minimal Spanish attempts at coordinating counter disinformation at the EU level, and German attempts to keep the Lisa Case under the authority of Berlin’s police department, British efforts at securitizing their incident by bringing it to the attention of the international community and launching a unified response were highly successful.

This lesson of internationalization should be critical for the EU to deal with disinformation. Securitization needs to take place not only at the national level of member states, but also at the supranational level of the EU as an institution. The EU itself is under threat of Russian disinformation just as much as individual member states, with experts warning of further regionalization of Europe and the EU after Brexit. In this critical time for the continued existence of the EU, the threat of disinformation “requires new international instruments to manage it.” 162 Thus far, member states have shown a preference for taking individual routes in order to deal with disinformation. The importance of joint initiatives could be especially important during elections, a time in which the ability of national and EU authorities to cooperate is critical. During the European elections of 2019 for example, consisting of four days of simultaneous elections across 28 individual member states, “the failure of one government to properly mitigate disinformation efforts threatens the credibility of the entire electoral process.” 163 This problem of coordination cannot be understated, as some countries do not even have their own systems in place to monitor disinformation, allowing “local and national actors to spread fake news more freely” and leaving these countries defenseless against propaganda.164

It is essential for the EU to act as a bloc and start joint initiatives to counter disinformation. Russian efforts, as shown in the case studies, are not exclusive to one particular area of Europe, but threaten all member states. Issues Russia chooses to target; the migrant crisis, espionage, the use of chemical weapons in a member state, the solidarity and legitimacy of the NATO, and even the territorial sovereignty of some countries; should alarm every single member of the EU. These issues are not unique to one country, but they are issues that countries even outside of the EU are currently confronting. Europe is targeted as a bloc, and therefore it should respond as a bloc. Such a response, as seen in with the UK’s diplomatic expulsion, has a larger impact as a bloc rather than individually. Division will only encourage more provocations. Acting on a unified front in securitizing disinformation and reacting with countermeasures will do much more to potentially deter Russia from continuing down the same path in its relations with Europe. The EU needs to stop hesitating, and start throwing its full weight on the economic, political, and informational fronts.

‘Positive’ Securitization

The two trends discussed in the sections above also show that disinformation can be securitized without wide violations of democratic norms and exclusionary tactics towards Russian minorities in Europe. By arguing for securitization, this paper is not arguing that democratic principles should be thrown out in favor of extraordinary measures that subvert the democratic process, indeed the democratic process is of the utmost importance because these principles are the referent object of a European push to securitize disinformation. And according to polls in all of the countries involved in the case studies and the EU as a whole, the general public agrees that disinformation constitutes a security threat that could be detrimental to liberal democratic norms. Efforts like media literacy, cooperation with news organizations, and comprehensive strategies that deal with disinformation at every level of society are still extraordinary without necessarily violating democratic norms. These policies aim to sensitize the public to disinformation. They do not aim to monitor the public in a surveillance state and punish individual views that are unfavorable to European states. On the other hand, these policies are not afraid to prevent large news outlets from spreading lies that harm the ability to make democratic decisions based on shared truths. Diplomatic expulsion and unprecedented international cooperation on information issues are extraordinary measures taken without abuse of state power as in the War on Terror. Policies that aim to provide alternative news sources to Russian speaking minorities in Europe are not exclusionary ‘othering,’ but are inclusive and offer a broader, diverse, and more positive view of the Russian diaspora than as a monolithic fifth-column prone to side with Moscow and Putin’s regime over their new homes. These policies need to be inclusive to mitigate the risk of disinformation and the subsequent disillusion with European governments. A conscious, just policy of securitization of disinformation must take democratic principles, inclusion of diverse viewpoints, and the treatment of Russian minorities into account while avoiding the misuse of state power in order to succeed.

#### It's net positive

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Conclusion

This thesis aimed to identify similar processes occurring throughout the EU by analyzing how four individual member states have approached the issue of disinformation. In looking at incidents of disinformation in the UK, Germany, Lithuania, and Spain, research was conducted to analyze the incidents themselves and how governments responded, placing that response into the wider context of securitization within those countries. It is clear that there is an ongoing process of securitization taking place in Europe around the issue of disinformation. Not all countries researched have demonstrated that disinformation has been fully securitized, but every country had elements of securitization taking place, such as securitizing actors and speech acts meant to draw attention to propaganda as an existential security threat. While these countries did show the initial factors in securitization occurring, they chose to deal with disinformation through the route of normal politics rather than extraordinary politics. It can be concluded that the level of securitization of Russian disinformation within a society, that is the treatment of propaganda and false narratives as a security threat and how deep a country is within the process of securitization, played a direct role in shaping the policies those countries pursued in order to counter disinformation.

Examining the different cases, the research showed how history, experience, and threat perceptions related to Russia influenced securitization of disinformation. The United Kingdom securitized Russian disinformation in the aftermath of a catalyst event, the attempted assassination of former GRU agent Sergei Skripal and the subsequent disinformation campaign in its aftermath. The UK government propelled disinformation to extraordinary politics in its diplomatic expulsion of Russian diplomats coordinated with its allies. Lithuania securitized Russian disinformation over a long period of time because of its complex history with Russia and the Soviet Union, and its experience of a slow barrage of disinformation since it regained independence. Due to decades of experience, Lithuania pursues a more comprehensive strategy at countering disinformation, which seeks to address the threat at multiple levels of society and multiple stages as false-narratives spread.

It was clear that other countries, and the EU as an organization, had not fully securitized Russian disinformation, although they showed signs they were in the process of securitization. Germany, in response to a young girl’s explosive accusations of rape in the context of the migrant crisis, showed a clear preference for dealing with disinformation through the normal political channels of Berlin’s police department. Spain took minimal responses through its foreign and defense ministries and is still in the early stages of instituting policies aimed at alerting the government to disinformation narratives. As a bloc, the EU also failed to enact extraordinary policies to counteract disinformation from Europe’s Eastern neighbor, with a lack of coordination between the individual member states and the supranational EU bodies.

While some countries have securitized disinformation, other have chosen a different route, and we can see how the different policies enacted by these countries can either protect society or make society more vulnerable to disinformation. Those countries that have securitized disinformation have also had the most success in countering it. Continuous policies that not only track disinformation narratives and discredit them as they emerge on a case-by-case basis, but also build resilience at the source through policy efforts in the social, cultural, educational, and political realm have proven more effective. Media literacy, Russian language programming, and public statements exposing false stories can all have an impact. Disinformation narratives have often failed to cause the same explosive consequences in those countries that have instituted comprehensive strategies to counter it. Internationalization of counterdisinformation policies, seeking solidarity and joint initiatives with like-minded allies, has also proven more effective cultivating societies that are less vulnerable to fake news. Diplomatic expulsions, online tracking, and coordinated alert systems have the potential to ensure that the more vulnerable countries in the EU do not let disinformation exert influence on political processes and thereby endanger the bloc as a whole.

This paper has also argued against ‘negative’ conceptions of securitization in relation to the issue of disinformation. It has warned that disinformation is indeed a security threat to liberal democracies in the West, with its ability to destroy foundations of shared truth and potentially ~~cripple~~ [destroy] democratic decision-making processes. While critical IR theorists believe securitization should be avoided to protect openness and accountability, and frame the process in a negative light, this paper has argued that securitization

is a necessary protective measure and does not inherently lead to abuse of state power. Policies pursued by the case study countries that have successfully securitized disinformation prove that while still extraordinary, countermeasures against disinformation do not necessarily need to violate the democratic values they are meant to protect. These policies do not need to be exclusive towards Russian minorities, but can be inclusive and contribute to public life. If European countries and the EU as an institution value the democratic principles that govern their societies, a conscious, successful securitization of disinformation may be beneficial and even have ‘positive’ results. Viewing disinformation as a national security threat is the path forward for the EU to respond to Russia.

### AT: L – Nuke War

#### Securitizing nuclear deterrence failure spurs peace and disarm mobilization, NOT militarization

Harris & Bender 17 John Harris, Politico editor-in-chief; and Bryan Bender, Politico national security editor; interviewing William Perry, mathematician, engineer, businessman and former Secretary of Defense, currently the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (Emeritus) at Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering, “Bill Perry Is Terrified. Why Aren’t You?” Politico, 1-6-2017, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/william-perry-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-214604/> /GoGreen!

At this naked moment in the American experiment, when many people perceive civilization on the verge of blowing up in some metaphorical sense, there is an elderly man in California hoping to seize your attention about another possibility. It is that civilization is on the verge of blowing up in a non-metaphorical sense. William J. Perry is 89 now, at the tail end of one of his generation’s most illustrious careers in national security. By all rights, the former U.S. secretary of Defense, a trained mathematician who served or advised nearly every administration since Eisenhower, should be filling out the remainder of his years in quiet reflection on his achievements. Instead, he has set out on an urgent pilgrimage. Bill Perry has become, he says with a rueful smile, “a prophet of doom.” His life’s work, most of it highly classified, was nuclear weapons—how to maximize the fearsome deterrent power of the U.S. arsenal, how to minimize the possibility that the old Soviet arsenal would obliterate the United States and much of the planet along the way. Perry played a supporting role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which he went back to his Washington hotel room each night, fearing he had only hours left to live. He later founded his own successful defense firm, helped revolutionize the American way of high-tech war, and honed his diplomatic skills seeking common ground on security issues with the Soviets and Chinese—all culminating as head of the Pentagon in the early years after the end of the Cold War. Nuclear bombs are an area of expertise Perry had assumed would be largely obsolete by now, seven decades after Hiroshima, a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union, and in the flickering light of his own life. Instead, nukes are suddenly—insanely, by Perry’s estimate—once again a contemporary nightmare, and an emphatically ascendant one. At the dawn of 2017, there is a Russian president making bellicose boasts about his modernized arsenal. There is an American president-elect who breezily free-associates on Twitter about starting a new nuclear arms race. Decades of cooperation between the two nations on arms control is nearly at a standstill. And, unlike the original Cold War, this time there is a world of busy fanatics excited by the prospect of a planet with more bombs—people who have already demonstrated the desire to slaughter many thousands of people in an instant, and are zealously pursuing ever more deadly means to do so. And there’s one other difference from the Cold War: Americans no longer think about the threat every day. Nuclear war isn’t the subtext of popular movies, or novels; disarmament has fallen far from the top of the policy priority list. The largest upcoming generation, the millennials, were raised in a time when the problem felt largely solved, and it’s easy for them to imagine it’s still quietly fading into history. The problem is, it’s no longer fading. “Today, the danger of some sort of a nuclear catastrophe is greater than it was during the Cold War,” Perry said in an interview in his Stanford office, “and most people are blissfully unaware of this danger.” It is a turn of events that has an old man newly obsessed with a question: Why isn’t everyone as terrified as he is? Perry’s hypothesis for the disconnect is that much of the population, especially that rising portion with no clear memories of the first Cold War, is suffering from a deficit of comprehension. Even a single nuclear explosion in a major city would represent an abrupt and possibly irreversible turn in modern life, upending the global economy, forcing every open society to suspend traditional liberties and remake itself into a security state. “The political, economic and social consequences are beyond what people understand,” Perry says. And yet many people place this scenario in roughly the same category as the meteor strike that supposedly wiped out the dinosaurs—frightening, to be sure, but something of an abstraction. So Perry regards his last great contribution of a 65-year career as a crusade to stimulate the public imagination—to share the vivid details of his own nightmares. He is doing so in a recent memoir, in a busy public speaking schedule, in half-empty hearing rooms on Capitol Hill, and increasingly with an online presence aimed especially at young people. He has enlisted the help of his 28-year-old granddaughter to figure out how to engage a new generation, including through a series of virtual lectures known as a MOOC, or massive open online course. He is eagerly signing up for “Ask Me Anything” chats on Reddit, in which some people still confuse him with William “The Refrigerator” Perry of NFL fame. He posts his ruminations on YouTube, where they give Katy Perry no run for her money, even as the most popular are closing in on 100,000 views. One of the nightmare scenarios Perry invokes most often is designed to roust policymakers who live and work in the nation’s capital. The terrorists would need enriched uranium. Due to the elaborate and highly industrial nature of production, hard to conceal from surveillance, fissile material is still hard to come by—but, alas, far from impossible. Once it is procured, with help from conspirators in a poorly secured overseas commercial power centrifuge facility, the rest of the plot as Perry imagines it is no great technological or logistical feat. The mechanics of building a crude nuclear device are easily within the reach of well-educated and well-funded militants. The crate would arrive at Dulles International Airport, disguised as agricultural freight. The truck bomb that detonates on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and Capitol instantly kills the president, vice president, House speaker, and 80,000 others. Where exactly is your office? Your house? And then, as Perry spins it forward, how credible would you find the warnings, soon delivered to news networks, that five more bombs are set to explode in unnamed U.S. cities, once a week for the next month, unless all U.S. military personnel overseas are withdrawn immediately? If this particular scenario does not resonate with you, Perry can easily rattle off a long roster of others—a regional war that escalates into a nuclear exchange, a miscalculation between Moscow and Washington, a computer glitch at the exact wrong moment. They are all ilks of the same theme—the dimly understood threat that the science of the 20th century is set to collide with the destructive passions of the 21st. “We’re going back to the kind of dangers we had during the Cold War,” Perry said. “I really thought in 1990, 1991, 1992, that we left those behind us. We’re starting to re-invent them. We and the Russians and others don’t understand that what we’re doing is re-creating those dangers—or maybe they don’t remember the dangers. For younger people, they didn’t live through those dangers. But when you live through a Cuban Missile Crisis up close and you live through a false alarm up close, you do understand how dangerous it is, and you believe you should do everything you could possibly do to [avoid] going back.” For people who follow the national security priesthood, the dire scenarios are all the more alarming for who is delivering them. Through his long years in government Perry invariably impressed colleagues as the calmest person in the room, relentlessly rational, such that people who did not know him well—his love of music and literature and travel—regarded his as a purely analytical mind, emotion subordinated to logic and duty. Starting in the 1950s as a technology executive and entrepreneur in some of the most secretive precincts of the defense industry, he gradually took on a series of high-level government assignments that gave him one of the most quietly influential careers of the Cold War and its aftermath. Fifteen years before serving as Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense, Perry was the Pentagon official in charge of weapons research during the Carter administration. It was from this perch that he may have had his most far-reaching impact, and left him in some circles as a legendary figure. He used his office to give an essential push to two ideas that transformed warfare over the next generation decisively to American advantage. One idea was stealth technology, which allowed U.S. warplanes to fly over enemy territory undetected. The other was precision-guided munitions, which allowed U.S. bombs to land with near-perfect accuracy. During the Clinton years, Perry so prized his privacy that he initially turned down the job of Defense secretary—changing his mind only after Clinton and Al Gore pleaded with him that the news media scrutiny wouldn’t be so bad. The reputation he built over a life in the public sphere is starkly at odds with this latest highly impassioned chapter of Perry’s career. Harold Brown, who also is 89, first recruited Perry into government, and was Perry’s boss while serving as Defense secretary in the Carter years. “No one would have thought of Bill Perry as a crusader,” he says. “But he is on a crusade.” Lee Perry, his wife of nearly 70 years, is living in an elder care facility, her once buoyant presence now lost to dementia. Perry himself, lucid as ever, has seen his physical frame become frail and stooped. Rather than slowing his schedule, he has accelerated his travels to plead with people to awaken to the danger. A trip to Washington includes a dinner with national security reporters and testimony on Capitol Hill. Back home in California, he’s at the Google campus to prod engineers to contemplate that their world may not last long enough for their dreams of technology riches to come true. He’s created an advocacy group, the William J. Perry project, devoted to public education about nuclear weapons. He’s enlisted both his granddaughter and his 64-year-old daughter, Robin Perry, in the cause. But if his profile is rising, his style is essentially unchanged. He is a man known for self-effacement, trying to shape an era known for relentless self-promotion, a voice of quiet precision in a time of devil-take-the-hindmost bombast. The rational approach to problem-solving that propelled his career and won him adherents and friends in both political parties and even among some of America’s erstwhile enemies remains his guide—in this case, by endeavoring to calculate the possibilities and probabilities of a terrorist attack, regional nuclear war, or horrible miscalculation with Russia. “I want to be very clear,” he said. “I do not think it is a probability this year or next year or anytime in the foreseeable future. But the consequence is so great, we have to take it seriously. And there are things to greatly lower those possibilities that we’re simply not doing.” \*\*\* Perry really did not expect he would have to write this chapter of his public life. His official career closed with what seemed then an unambiguous sense of mission accomplished. By the time he arrived in the Pentagon’s top job in 1994, the Cold War was over, and the main item on the nuclear agenda seemed to be cleaning up no-longer-needed arsenals. As defense secretary, Perry stood with his Russian counterpart, Pavel Grachev, as they jointly blew up missile silos in the former Soviet Union and tilled sunflower seeds in the dirt. “I finally thought by the end of the ‘80s we lived through this horrible experience and it’s behind us,” Perry said. “When I was secretary, I fully believed it was behind us.” After leaving the Pentagon, he accepted an assignment from Clinton to negotiate an end to North Korea’s nuclear development program—and seemed agonizingly close to a breakthrough as the last days of the president’s term expired. Now, he sees his grandchildren inheriting a planet possibly more dangerous than it was during his public career. No one could doubt that the Sept. 11 terrorists would have gladly used nuclear bombs instead of airplanes if they had had them, and it seems only a matter of time until they try. Instead of a retreating threat in North Korea, that fanatical regime now possesses as many as eight nuclear bombs, and is just one member of a growing nuclear club. Far from a new partnership with Russia, Vladimir Putin has given old antagonisms a malevolent new face. American policymakers talk of spending up to $1 trillion to modernize the nuclear arsenal. And now comes Donald Trump with a long trail of statements effectively shrugging his shoulders about a world newly bristling with bombs and people with reasons to use them. Perry knew Hillary Clinton well professionally, and says he admired both her and Bill Clinton for their professional judgment though he was never a personal intimate of either. He was prescient before the election in expressing skepticism about how voters would respond to the dynastic premise of the Clinton campaign—a healthy democracy should grow new voices—but was as surprised as everyone else on Election Day. Donald Trump was not the voice he was looking for, to put it mildly, but he has responded to the Trump cyclone with modulated restraint. Perry said he assumes his most truculent rhetoric isn’t serious, the utterances of a man who assumed his words were for political effect only and had no real consequences. Now that they do, Perry is hoping to serve as a kind of ambassador to rationality. He said he is hoping for audiences soon, with Trump if the incoming president will see him, and certainly Trump’s national security team, which includes several people Perry knows, including Defense Secretary nominee James Mattis. There is little doubt the message if the meeting comes. “We are starting a new Cold War,” he says. “We seem to be sleepwalking into this new nuclear arms race. … We and the Russians and others don’t understand what we are doing.” “I am not suggesting that this Cold War and this arms race is identical to the old one,” Perry added. “But in many ways, it is just as bad, just as dangerous. And totally unnecessary.” \*\*\* Perry had been brooding over the question for a year. It was in the early 1950s, he was still in his 20s, and the subject was partial differential equations—the topic of his Ph.D. thesis. A particular problem had been absorbing him, day in and day out, hours and hours on end. Then, out of nowhere, a light came on. “I woke up in the middle of the night, and it was all there,” Perry recalled. “It was all there, and I got out of bed and sat down. The next two or three hours, I wrote my thesis, and from the first word I wrote down, I never doubted what the last word was going to be: It was a magic moment.” The story is a reminder of something definitional about Bill Perry. Before he became in recent years an apostle of disarmament, before he sat atop the nation’s war-making apparatus in the 1990s, before he was the executive of a defense contractor specializing in the most complex arenas of Cold War surveillance in the 1960s, he was a young man in love with mathematics. In those days, Perry had planned on a career as a math professor. His attraction to math was not merely practical, in the way that engineers or architects rely on math. The appeal was just as much aesthetic, in ways that people who are not numbers people—political life tends to be dominated by word people—cannot easily comprehend. To Perry’s mind, there was a purity to math, a beauty to the patterns and relationships, that was not unlike music. Math for Perry represented analytical discipline, a way of achieving mastery not only over numerical problems but any hard problem, by breaking it down into essential parts, distilling complexity into simplicity. This trait was why Pentagon reporters in the 1990s liked spending time around Perry. When most public officials are asked a question, one studies the transcript later to decipher a succession of starts and stalls, sentence fragments and ellipses, that cumulatively convey an impressionistic sense of mind but no clear fixed meaning. Perry’s sentences, by contrast, always cut with surgical precision. It was one reason Clinton White House officials often held their breath when he gave interviews—Perry might make news by being clear on subjects, such as ethnic warfare in the Balkans or a nuclear showdown in North Korea, that the West Wing preferred to try to fog over. “I’ve never been able to attack a policy problem with a mathematical formula,” he recalled, “but I have always believed that the rigorous way of thinking about a problem was good. It separated the fact from the bullshit, and that’s very important sometimes, to separate what you can from what you would hope you can do.” Perry wishes more people were familiar with the concept of “expected value.” That is a statistical way of understanding events of very large magnitude that have a low probability. The large magnitude event could be something good, like winning a lottery ticket. Or it could be something bad, like a nuclear bomb exploding. Because the odds of winning the lottery are so low, the rational thing is to save your money and not buy the ticket. As for a nuclear explosion, by Perry’s lights, the consequences are so grave that the rational thing would be for people in the United States and everywhere to be in a state of peak alarm about their vulnerability, and for political debate to be dominated by discussion of how to reduce the risk. And just how high is the risk? The answer of course is ultimately unknowable. Perry’s point, though, is that it’s a hell of a lot higher than you think. Perry invites his listeners to consider all the various scenarios that might lead to a nuclear event. “Mathematically speaking, you add those all together in one year it is still just a possibility, not a probability,” he reckons. “But then you go out ten, twenty years and each time this possibility repeats itself, and then it starts to become a probability. How much time we have to get those possibility numbers lower, I don’t know. But sooner or later the odds are going to get us, I am afraid.” \*\*\* Almost uniquely among living Americans, Bill Perry has actually faced down the prospect of nuclear war before—twice. In the fall of 1962, Bill Perry was 35, father of five young children, living in the Bay Area and serving as director of Sylvania’s Electronic Defense Laboratories—driving his station wagon to recitals in between studying missile trajectories and the radius of nuclear detonations. Where he resided was not then called Silicon Valley, but the exuberance and spirit of creative possibility we now associate with the region was already evident. The giants then were Bill Hewlett and David Packard, men Perry deeply admired and wished to emulate in his own business career. The innovation engine at that time, however, was not consumer technology; it was the government’s appetite for advantage in a mortal struggle against a powerful Soviet foe. Perry was known as a star in the highly complex field of weapons surveillance and interpretation. So it was not a surprise, one bright October day, for Perry to get a call from Albert “Bud” Wheelon, a friend at the Central Intelligence Agency. Wheelon said he wanted Perry in Washington for a consultation. Perry said he’d juggle his schedule and be there the next week. “No,” Wheelon responded. “I need to see you right away.” Perry caught the red-eye from San Francisco, and went straight to the CIA, where he was handed photographs whose meaning was instantly clear to him. They were of Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba. For the next couple weeks, Perry would stay up past midnight each evening poring over the latest reconnaissance photos and help write the analysis that senior officials would present the next morning to President Kennedy. Perry experienced the crisis partly as ordinary citizen, hearing Kennedy on television draw an unambiguous line against Soviet missiles in this hemisphere and promising that any attack would be met with “a full retaliatory response.” But he possessed context, about the capabilities of weapons and the daily state of play in the crisis, that gave him a vantage point superior to that of all but perhaps a few dozen people. “I was part of a small team—six or eight people,” he recounted of those days 54 years earlier. “Half of them technical experts, half of them intelligence analysts, or photo interpreters. It was a minor role but I was seeing all the information coming in. I thought every day when I went back to the hotel it was the last day of my life because I knew exactly what nuclear weapons could do. I knew it was not just a lot of people getting killed. It was the end of civilization and I thought it was about to happen.” It was years later that Perry, like other more senior participants in the crisis, learned how right that appraisal was. Nuclear bombs weren’t only heading toward Cuba on Soviet ships, as Kennedy believed and announced to Americans at the time. Some of them were already there, and local commanders had been given authority to use them if Americans launched a preemptive raid on Cuba, as Kennedy was being urged, goaded even, by Air Force Gen. Curtis LeMay and other military commanders. At the same time, Soviet submarines were armed and one commander had been on the verge of launching them until other officers on the vessel talked him out of it. Either event would have in turn sent U.S. missiles flying. The Cuban Missile Crisis recounting is one of the dramatic peaks in “My Journey on the Nuclear Brink,” the memoir Perry published last fall. It is a book laced with other close calls—like November 9, 1979, when Perry was awakened in the middle of the night by a watch officer at the North American Aerospace and Defense Command (NORAD) reporting that his computers showed 200 Soviet missiles in flight toward the United States. For a frozen moment, Perry thought: This is it—This is how it ends. The watch officer soon set him at ease. It was a computer error, and he was calling to see whether Perry, the technology expert, had any explanation. It took a couple days to discover the low-tech answer: Someone had carelessly left a crisis-simulation training tape in the computer. All was well. But what if this blunder had happened in the middle of a real crisis, with leaders in Washington and Moscow already on high alert? The inescapable conclusion was the same as it was in 1962: The world skirting nuclear Armageddon as much by good luck as by skilled crisis management. Perry is part of a distinct cohort in American history, one that didn’t come home with the large-living ethos of the World War II generation, but took responsibility for cleaning up the world that the war bequeathed. He was a 14-year-old in Butler, Pennsylvania when he heard the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in a friend’s living room, and had the disappointed realization that the war might be over by the time he was old enough to fight in it. That turned out to be true—he was just shy of 18 at war’s end—a fact that places Perry in what demographers have called the “Silent Generation,” too young for one war but already middle-aged by the time college campuses erupted over Vietnam. Like many in his generation, Perry was not so much silent as deeply dutiful, with an understated style that served as a genial, dry-witted exterior to a life in which success was defined by how faithfully one met his responsibilities. Perry said he became aware, first gradually and over time profoundly, of the surreal contradictions of his professional life. His work—first at Sylvania and then at ESL, a highly successful defense contracting firm he co-founded in 1963—was relentlessly logical, analyzing Soviet threats and intentions and coming up with rational responses to deter them. But each rational move was part of a supremely irrational dynamic—“mutually assured destruction”—that placed the threat of massive casualties at the heart of America’s basic strategic thinking. It was the kind of framework in which policymakers could accept that a mere 25 million people dead was good news. Also the kind that in one year alone led the United States to produce 8,000 nuclear bombs. By the end, the Cold War left the planet with about 70,000 bombs (a total that is now down to about 15,500). “I think probably everybody who was involved in nuclear weapons in those days would see the two sides of it,” Perry recalls, “the logic of deterrence and the madness of deterrence, and there was no mistake, I think, that the acronym was MAD.” \*\*\* Perry has been at the forefront of a movement that he considers the sane and only alternative, and he has joined forces with other leading Cold Warriors who in another era would likely have derided their vision as naïve. In January 2007, he was a co-author of a remarkable commentary that ran on the op-ed page of the Wall Street Journal. It was signed also by two former secretaries of state, George Schulz and Henry Kissinger and by Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—all leading military hawks and foreign policy realists who came together to argue for something radical: that the goal of U.S. policy should be not merely the reduction and control of atomic arms, it should be the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. This sounded like gauzy utopianism, especially bizarre coming from supremely pragmatic men. But Perry and the others always made clear they were describing a long-term ideal, one that would only be achieved through a series of more incremental steps. The vision was stirring enough that it was endorsed by President Obama in his opening weeks in office, in a March 2009 address in Prague. In retrospect, Obama’s speech may have been the high point for the vision of abolition. “A huge amount of progress was made,” recalled Shultz, now 93. “Now it is going in the other direction.” “We have less danger of an all-out war with Russia,” in Nunn’s view. “But we have more danger of some type of accident, miscalculation, cyber interference, a terrorist group getting a nuclear weapon. It requires a lot more attention than world leaders are giving it.” Perry’s goal now is much more defensive than it was just a few years ago—halting what has become inexorable momentum toward reviving Cold War assumptions about the central role of nukes in national security. More recently he’s added yet another recruit to his cause: California Governor Jerry Brown. Brown, now 78, met Perry a year ago, after deciding that he wanted to devote his remaining time in public service mainly to what he sees as civilization’s two existential issues, climate change and nuclear weapons. Brown said he became fixated on spreading Perry’s message after reading his memoir: He recently gave a copy to President Obama and is trying to bend the ear of others with influence in Washington. If Bill Perry has a gift for understatement, Brown has a gift for the theatrical. In an interview at the governor’s mansion in Sacramento, he wonders why everyone is not paying attention to his new friend and his warnings for mankind. “He is at the brink! At the brink! Not WAS at the brink—IS at the brink,” Brown exclaimed. “But no one else is.” A California governor can have more influence, at least indirectly, than one might think, due to the state’s outsized role in policy debates and the fact that the University of California’s Board of Regents helps manage some of the nation’s top weapons laboratories, which study and design nuclear weapons. Brown, who was a vocal critic in the 1980s of what he called America's "nuclear addiction," reviewed Perry's recent memoir in the New York Review of Books, and said he is determined to help his new friend spread his message. “Everybody is, 'we are not at the brink,' and we have this guy Perry who says we are. It is the thesis that is being ignored." Even if more influential people wake up to Perry’s message—a nuclear event is more likely and will be more terrible than you realize—a hard questions remains: Now what? This is where Perry’s pragmatism comes back into play. The smartest move, he thinks, is to eliminate the riskiest part of the system. If we can’t eliminate all nukes, Perry argues, we could at least eliminate one leg of the so-called nuclear triad, intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are especially prone to an accidental nuclear war, if they are launched by accident or due to miscalculation by a leader operating with only minutes to spare. Nuclear weapons carried by submarines beneath the sea or aboard bomber planes, he argues, are logically more than enough to deter Russia. The problem, he knows, is that logic is not necessarily the prevailing force in political debates. Psychology is, and this seems to be dictating not merely that we deter a Russian military force that is modernizing its weapons but that we have a force that is self-evidently superior to them. It is an argument that strikes Perry as drearily familiar to the old days. Which leads him the conclusion that the only long-term way out is to persuade a younger generation to make a different choice. His granddaughter, Lisa Perry, is precisely in the cohort he needs to reach. At first she had some uncomfortable news for her grandfather: Not many in her generation thought much about the issue. “The more I learned from him about nuclear weapons the more concerned I was that my generation had this massive and dangerous blind spot in our understanding of the world,” she said in an interview. “Nuclear weapons are the biggest public health issue I can think of.” But she has not lost hope that their efforts can make a difference, and today she has put her graduate studies in public health on hold to work full time for the Perry Project as its social media and web manager. “It can be easy to get discouraged about being able to do anything to change our course,” she said. “But the good news is that nuclear weapons are actually something that we as humans can control...but first we need to start the conversation.” It was with her help that Perry went on Reddit to field questions ranging from how his PhD in mathematics prepared him to what young people need to understand. “As a 90s baby I never lived in the Cold War era,” wrote one participant, with the Reddit username BobinForApples. “What is one thing today's generations will never understand about life during the Cold War?” Perry’s answered, as SecDef19: “Because you were born in the 1990s, you did not experience the daily terror of ‘duck and cover’ drills as my children did. Therefore the appropriate fear of nuclear weapons is not part of your heritage, but the danger is just as real now as it was then. It will be up to your generation to develop the policies to deal with the deadly nuclear legacy that is still very much with us.” For the former defense secretary, the task now is to finally—belatedly—prove Einstein wrong. The physicist said in 1946: “The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking and we thus drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.” In Perry’s view the only way to avoid it is by directly contemplating catastrophe—and doing so face to face with the world’s largest nuclear power, Russia, as he recently did in a forum in Luxembourg with several like-minded Russians he says are brave enough to speak out about nuclear dangers in the era of Putin. “We could solve it,” he said. “When you’re a prophet of doom, what keeps you going is not just prophesizing doom but saying there are things we do to avoid that doom. That’s where the optimism is.”

### AT: L – Russia

#### Securitization theory does NOT explain Russia

van der Laan 16 Mark van der Laan, MA candidate, International Studies, Universiteit Leiden, BA History, University of Amsterdam, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Security Dilemma in the Baltics?” MA thesis, 10-12-2016, <https://www.academia.edu/29525112/BETWEEN_A_ROCK_AND_A_HARD_PLACE_A_Security_Dilemma_in_the_Baltics> /GoGreen!

The main theoretical underpinning of this thesis is, as mentioned before, that of securitisation. 13 The interesting point about this theory as explained by Wæver and others, is that takes a post-modern approach to security. Primarily that a discourse about security can enforce a reality. To specify this to Russian foreign policy, when NATO is seen as the primary adversary, every action by the alliance, such stationing military units Eastern Europe to reassure allies and deter possible military actions, can be viewed as a threat to Russian security concerns. Or as Sergey Karaganov, head of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, puts it in an interview with Der Spiegel, ‘Now, fears in countries like Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are to be allayed by NATO stationing weapons there. But that doesn't help them; we interpret that as a provocation. In a crisis, we will destroy exactly these weapons. Russia will never again fight on its own territory…’14 It must be stressed though that this securitisation debate in this case is not sole a Russian purview. In response to Russian actions taken in Ukraine, and the several large military exercises in the Russian Western Military District, a securitisation debate is taking place in the West. One outcome of this debate were the NATO Summits of 2014, and 2016 which were explicitly concerned with coming up with a response to Russian military aggression.15 Therein lies also a weakness for the securitisation theory. If two narratives are put beside each other, and are then argued to be a discourse, then we might arguably state a false equivalency about the two narratives. While the Russian narrative in regard to the West, is arguably a constructed view of the world, Western concerns about Russian behaviour are arguably justified and a response to Russian aggression. In other words, we must discern fact from bullshit, as Harry Frankfurt put in his article On Bullshit.16 While it can be argued that the current security situation is a construct, this construct has implications in the real world. How did this construct came into being? It can be argued that President Putin’s notion that the collapse of the Soviet as one of the greatest geopolitical disasters of the twentieth century is not without merit.17 If we view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a collapse of an imperial power, Putin’s argument is understandable. Decolonisation can be a traumatic experience, for both the coloniser, and the colonised. The example of how France fought two destructive wars in Algeria and Indochina reminds us, shows that this can be the case. However, how both parties interact with one another after the dust has settled can do much to normalise relations between the two. For much of the past twenty-six years, it seemed that new geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe was a fait accompli. Which was reinforced by several treaties signed in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Treaties like the Budapest Memorandum18 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act19 in 1994, and 1997 respectively. Even the advent of President Putin as prime minister, and later as president, gave no indication of major shifts in Russian foreign policy behaviour. While there were tensions in the way NATO resolved the several Balkan conflicts, one would have to be clairvoyant, or extremely pessimistic to predict the current security situation in Europe. Yet, in 2008 with the five-day war against Georgia, and the annexation of Crimea and starting a war in Donbas in 2014, Western governments were confronted by a Russia, willing to bare its teeth to gain a geopolitical advantage. The timing of these actions are arguably well planned. Russia, having invested heavily in upgrading its armed forces, giving it a comparative advantage militarily. This development caught European governments on a vulnerable moment, which issued condemnatory declarations, but lacked substantial tools, save economic sanctions, to give teeth to those condemnations. Due to systemic defence budget cuts in the past twentysix years. Undeterred, Russian sabre rattling has continued unabated.

#### Even if it did, it’s too late now

Berls & Ratz 15 Dr. Robert E. Berls, Jr., Senior Advisor for Russia and Eurasia at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, former Colonel, U.S. Air Force, former air attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, former special assistant to the Secretary of Energy for Russia/NIS programs, Ph.D. Russian Area Studies, Georgetown University; and Leon Ratz, Program Officer with NTI’s Materials Security and Minimization Program, former policy specialist on Russian nuclear security, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Office for International Material Protection and Cooperation, U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, M.A. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, B.A. Boston College; “Rising Nuclear Dangers: Assessing the Risk of Nuclear Use in the Euro-Atlantic Region,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI Paper, October 2015, <http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/NTI_Rising_Nuclear_Dangers_Paper_FINAL.pdf> /GoGreen!

The risk of nuclear weapons use in the Euro-Atlantic region is on the rise—and it is higher than it has ever been since the end of the Cold War. This is the conclusion of leading security experts from the United States, Russia, and Europe who responded to a questionnaire from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in early 2015.1 While the experts disagreed on the scale of the increase in risk and the reasons for the change, nearly all shared the view that the significant deterioration in relations between the United States and the Russian Federation has led to dangerous conditions under which nuclear weapons use has become more likely— although the probability of this outcome remains low. This study examined the risk of use of nuclear weapons, not just the risk of nuclear exchange or nuclear war. In other words, the study did not exclude the possibility of unilateral nuclear use. Indeed, respondents identified the possibility of unilateral nuclear use by Russia to quell a conflict on its borders as a risk of particular concern.2 Other possible nuclear-use scenarios identified by respondents include a rapid escalation due to miscalculation or accident (such as a mid-air collision between NATO and Russian warplanes), an escalatory response to a Russian incursion into the Baltic States, and a Russian reaction to NATO military intervention in Crimea or eastern Ukraine. The study did not assess the relative probabilities of these scenarios. Of all the risks examined, it is the risk of miscalculation that is of most concern. Absent a major incident, the likelihood of deliberate nuclear exchange under current circumstances is low. But it is the possibility of a major transformative event, such as a mid-air collision or a skirmish along NATO or Russian borders, that is on the rise. Such an incident involving the world’s two largest nuclear powers could plausibly shift alert postures and lead to a rapid series of escalatory measures precipitated by miscalculation and exacerbated by mistrust. The following section describes in detail the circumstances that have led to a heightened risk of escalation and possible nuclear use in the Euro-Atlantic region. Risk Factors The security experts who responded to NTI’s questionnaire identified one or more of the following ten reasons as contributing factors to the heightened risk: 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions 2. A Deficit of Trust 3. Domestic Political Imperatives 4. Alliance Politics 5. Close Military Encounters 6. Broken Channels of Communication 7. Failing Safeguards to Prevent Nuclear Use 8. Conventional Force Disparity 9. Reckless Nuclear Saber Rattling 10. Lack of Nuclear Experience The authors of this paper provided supplementary research to expand on topics raised in the responses. 1. Competing, Irreconcilable Narratives That Drive Heightened Threat Perceptions Moscow and Washington diverge not only in their interpretations of recent events in Ukraine but also in the basic narratives that describe their relations during the entire post–Cold War era.3 The Russian narrative is characterized by a combination of grievance and resolve. Prominent Russians frequently claim that Western powers took advantage of Moscow’s weakness after the Cold War to shift NATO borders east and bomb Russia’s allies in the Balkans.4 Western support for Ukraine’s European Union association agreement, Western sanctions against Russia, and Western demonstrations of military support for allies on Russia’s borders (military exercises, supplies of arms) appear to reinforce this narrative of Russia as victim of Western bullying. Prominent Russian officials thus argue that they face no choice but to demonstrate resolve lest they invite further Western aggression against their most vital national interests.5 The Western narrative is starkly different. The United States and its NATO allies view Russia as a revanchist power aggressively attempting to reclaim influence and territory in neighboring countries that desire a break from their Soviet legacies.6 Western officials chastise Russia for employing tactics such as hybrid warfare, manipulation of gas exports, and other forms of economic and military intimidation to achieve its political aims.7 They argue that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine represent a major break with the post-war order in Europe, an order that has prioritized respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.8 Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and the potential for Russian intervention in the Baltic States necessitate demonstrations of resolve lest the West invite further Russian aggression.9 These competing, irreconcilable narratives breed heightened threat perceptions, driving a vicious cycle of confrontation and escalation. By themselves, these threat perceptions would not necessarily lead to nuclear use, but—combined with the factors described below—they create dangerous conditions under which misunderstandings could escalate to unprecedented levels of confrontation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers. 2. A Deficit of Trust Russians and Americans have returned to Cold War-era levels of antagonism toward one another. According to a recent Gallup poll, Americans now view Russia as the greatest enemy to the United States, edging out both North Korea and Iran.10 The same poll showed that 49 percent of Americans view Russia as a critical military threat, and only 24 percent of Americans have a favorable view of Russia. By contrast, 62 percent of Americans held a favorable view of the Soviet Union in 1989 (see Figure 1).11 [ FIGURE 1 OMITTED – Figure 1. Americans’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of Russia ] In Russia, the trust deficit is even worse. According to a recent poll conducted by the Levada Center, a Russian public opinion research organization, only 15 percent of Russians have a favorable view of the United States and 73 percent of Russians hold an unfavorable view, a figure that nearly doubled in the last year (see Figure 2).12 Another poll released in late June found that 62 percent of Russians believe that Russia’s relations with the West will always be characterized by mistrust.13 [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED – Figure 2. Russians’ Favorable/Unfavorable Ratings of the United States ] 3. Domestic Political Imperatives With such deep antagonism permeating public opinion, it becomes highly improbable for elected officials to support conciliatory measures. Instead, policy hawks who advocate resolve and confrontation tend to prevail in such environments. This is especially true in Russia where President Vladimir Putin brandishes a public image as Russia’s best guardian against Western bullying. Indeed, President Putin’s domestic approval ratings have never been higher. In June, a Levada Center poll revealed that 89 percent of Russians hold a favorable opinion of their President—Putin’s highest approval rating since he succeeded Boris Yeltsin 15 years ago.14 Considering that Russia’s economy continues to reel from the combination of low oil prices, Western sanctions, and structural economic problems, Putin’s high public approval rating indicates that the Russian people strongly support his handling of the Ukrainian crisis and his relations with the West. Any departure from the current course would almost certainly come with a heavy political price for Putin. In the United States, although anti-Russian rhetoric is much less prevalent, many public officials and political candidates also have voiced positions favoring resolve over restraint. For example, General Joseph Dunford, the Obama Administration’s nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in July 2015 told a Congressional committee that Russia poses the number one threat to the United States and that he favors sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. The Islamic State, by contrast, was fourth on his list of security threats facing the United States.15 In August, the outgoing U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno echoed General Dunford’s comments by labeling Russia “the most dangerous threat” facing the United States today.16 As the 2016 U.S. presidential election approaches, it is also unlikely that political candidates will depart significantly from this anti-Russia rhetoric given how closely it aligns with record-high public antagonism toward Russia. Such domestic political imperatives—from public opinion to political posturing—in Russia and the United States create strong incentives for demonstrations of resolve, diminishing the chances of a resolution to the current standoff and leading to a high risk of a continued cycle of confrontation and escalation. 4. Alliance Politics Alliance politics also contributes to the rhetoric of resolve and confrontation. NATO’s Eastern European and Baltic members increasingly view Russia as a major threat and voice concerns that NATO is ill-prepared to fulfill its Article 5 obligation for collective defense.17 Meanwhile, recent public opinion polls show that most Germans, Italians, and French believe that their countries should not use military force to defend a NATO ally (see Figure 3).18 In this context, NATO publics increasingly view the United States as the only credible military opposition to potential Russian aggression against the Alliance (see Figure 4).19 The Obama Administration is thus faced with both political and policy imperatives to demonstrate readiness to [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED – Figure 3. Many NATO Countries Reluctant to Use Force to Defend Allies ] [ FIGURE 4 OMITTED – Figure 4. NATO Countries Believe U.S. Will Come to Defense of Allies ] fulfill its Article 5 commitments, creating a situation that is not conducive to promoting a conciliatory tone in relations with Russia. This, in turn, exacerbates the risk of further demonstrations of resolve and increases the chance of miscalculation. 5. Close Military Encounters With increasing frequency and alarming regularity, Russian warplanes and warships are coming dangerously close to Western military and civilian assets, creating heightened risks for accidents that could lead to further escalation. As described in a recent report by the European Leadership Network, these close encounters include two near-collisions between Russian military jets and Swedish commercial airliners, repeated incidents of Russian fighter jets “buzzing” U.S. warships in the Black Sea, and incursions and near-incursions by Russian military aircraft into NATO airspace during the last 18 months.20 Russia has insisted that NATO also has engaged in such behavior, arguing that NATO military exercises close to Russian borders have “destabilizing” effects on the region.21 In the absence of routine military-to-military communications (a factor described in more detail later in this paper), these close encounters and military exercises create conditions under which dangerous misunderstandings and accidents could happen—accidents with the potential to prompt rapid escalation. 6. Broken Channels of Communication During the past 18 months, institutions designed to promote dialogue between Western powers and Russia have been suspended or rendered powerless. In March 2014, Russia’s membership in the Group of Eight (G8) was revoked and its participation in G8-linked processes, such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, suspended.22 In April 2014, Russia’s representation at the NATO-Russia Council—the mechanism designed to foster security-related consultation and consensus building—was limited to the Ambassador-level, practically stripping it of any meaningful working-level interactions.23 Meanwhile, Russia withdrew from the Nuclear Security Summit process24 and suspended most of its nuclear security cooperation with the United States.25 Military-to-military engagement on EuroAtlantic issues between NATO and Russia, as well as the United States and Russia, has—for all practical purposes—been terminated. Security confidence-building engagement only continues in the context of arms control verification, an area that has also come under considerable strain as Western powers and Russia accuse each other of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty violations.26 Such severe curtailment of communications creates little room for confidence-building and increases the likelihood of misunderstandings that could lead to escalation.

### AT: L – Terrorism

#### Their evidence does NOT meet similar epistemological standards AND poststructuralism fails to affect either discourse or practice

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The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman [strawperson] they set up to shoot – “orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training  and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and ~~blind on one eye~~.